

O/593/17

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF TRADE MARK REGISTRATION NO 1 342 975:



IN THE NAME OF BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR REVOCATION BY
MICHAEL GLEISSNER

Background and pleadings

1. British Airways Plc (BA) is the registered proprietor (RP) of trade mark



registration No 1 342 975 consisting of . The trade mark was filed on 28th April 1988 and completed its registration procedure on 8th February 1991. It is registered in respect of the following goods in Class 28:

Toys, games, playthings; models, model aircraft; model aircraft, all for sale in kit form; all included in Class 28.

2. Michael Gleissner seeks revocation of the trade mark registration on the grounds of non use based upon Section 46(1)(a) and (b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. BA filed a counterstatement denying the claim.
3. Revocation is sought under Section 46(1)(a) in respect of the 5 year time period following the date of completion of the registration procedure, namely 9th February 1991 to 8th February 1996. Revocation is therefore sought from 9th February 1996. Revocation is also sought under Section 46(1)(b) in respect of the time period 5th September 2011 to 4th September 2016. Revocation is therefore sought from 5th September 2016.
4. Only the registered proprietor filed evidence in these proceedings. This will be summarised to the extent that it is considered necessary. Both sides filed written submissions which will not be summarised but will be referred to as and where appropriate during this decision.

5. A Hearing took place on 10th October 2017 with the RP represented by Mr Pendered of Maucher Jenkins, the RP's trade mark attorney. The applicant for revocation, Michael Gleissner, represented himself alongside his colleague Mr Afean Samad.

Legislation

6. Section 46(1) of the Act states that:

“The registration of a trade mark may be revoked on any of the following grounds-

(a) that within the period of five years following the date of completion of the registration procedure it has not been put to genuine use in the United Kingdom, by the proprietor or with his consent, in relation to the goods or services for which it is registered, and there are no proper reasons for non-use;

(b) that such use has been suspended for an uninterrupted period of five years, and there are no proper reasons for non-use;

(c).....
.....

(d).....

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) use of a trade mark includes use in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered, and use in the United Kingdom includes affixing the trade mark to goods or to the packaging of goods in the United Kingdom solely for export purposes.

(3) The registration of a trade mark shall not be revoked on the ground mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) if such use as is referred to in that paragraph is commenced or resumed after the expiry of the five year period and before the application for revocation is made: Provided that, any such commencement or resumption of use after the expiry of the five year period but within the period of three months before the making of the application shall be disregarded unless preparations for the commencement or resumption began before the proprietor became aware that the application might be made.

(4) An application for revocation may be made by any person, and may be made to the registrar or to the court, except that –

(a) if proceedings concerning the trade mark in question are pending in the court, the application must be made to the court; and

(b) if in any other case the application is made to the registrar, he may at any stage of the proceedings refer the application to the court.

(5) Where grounds for revocation exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the trade mark is registered, revocation shall relate to those goods or services only.

6) Where the registration of a trade mark is revoked to any extent, the rights of the proprietor shall be deemed to have ceased to that extent as from –

(a) the date of the application for revocation, or

(b) if the registrar or court is satisfied that the grounds for revocation existed at an earlier date, that date.”

7. Section 100 is also relevant, which reads:

“If in any civil proceedings under this Act a question arises as to the use to which a registered trade mark has been put, it is for the proprietor to show

what use has been made of it.”

BA's evidence

8. This is a witness statement, dated 25th January 2017, from Christopher Brown, a Brand Executive of BA. He explains that the BA Crest has been used by many years by BA and/or its licensees in respect of the Class 28 goods for which the trade mark is registered. The crest device appears on the products themselves and/or in sales and marketing materials for the products. Exhibit CB1 is a bundle of materials of model airplanes displaying the crest device, alongside others marks, such as British Airways. Exhibit CB2 is a bundle of materials showing model aircraft displaying the crest device being sold by outlets such as Hobbycraft and an aircraft model website. Mr Brown also explains that royalties from licensees for model aircraft between 2011-2016 have been approximately £100,000 per annum.

9. In considering whether or not there has been genuine use, I take into account the following guidance:

10. In *The London Taxi Corporation Limited v Frazer-Nash Research Limited & Ecotive Limited*, [2016] EWHC 52, Arnold J. summarised the case law on genuine use of trade marks. He said:

“I would now summarise the principles for the assessment of whether there has been genuine use of a trade mark established by the case law of the Court of Justice, which also includes Case C-442/07 *Verein Radetsky-Order v Bunderversammlung Kameradschaft 'Feldmarschall Radetsky'* [2008] ECR I-9223 and Case C-609/11 *Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH v Centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG* [EU:C:2013:592], [2014] ETMR 7, as follows:

(1) Genuine use means actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor or by a third party with authority to use the mark: *Ansul* at [35] and [37].

(2) The use must be more than merely token, that is to say, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the registration of the mark: *Ansul* at [36]; *Sunrider* at [70]; *Verein* at [13]; *Centrotherm* at [71]; *Leno* at [29].

(3) The use must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin: *Ansul* at [36]; *Sunrider* at [70]; *Verein* at [13]; *Silberquelle* at [17]; *Centrotherm* at [71]; *Leno* at [29].

(4) Use of the mark must relate to goods or services which are already marketed or which are about to be marketed and for which preparations to secure customers are under way, particularly in the form of advertising campaigns: *Ansul* at [37]. Internal use by the proprietor does not suffice: *Ansul* at [37]; *Verein* at [14]. Nor does the distribution of promotional items as a reward for the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the latter: *Silberquelle* at [20]-[21]. But use by a non-profit making association can constitute genuine use: *Verein* at [16]-[23].

(5) The use must be by way of real commercial exploitation of the mark on the market for the relevant goods or services, that is to say, use in accordance with the commercial *raison d'être* of the mark, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services that bear the mark: *Ansul* at [37]-[38]; *Verein* at [14]; *Silberquelle* at [18]; *Centrotherm* at [71].

(6) All the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark, including: (a) whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services in question; (b) the nature of the goods or services; (c) the characteristics of the market concerned; (d) the scale and frequency of use of the mark; (e) whether the mark is used for the purpose of marketing all the goods and services covered by the mark or just some of them; (f) the

evidence that the proprietor is able to provide; and (g) the territorial extent of the use: *Ansul* at [38] and [39]; *La Mer* at [22]-[23]; *Sunrider* at [70]-[71], [76]; *Centrotherm* at [72]-[76]; *Reber* at [29], [32]-[34]; *Leno* at [29]-[30], [56].

(7) Use of the mark need not always be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use may qualify as genuine use if it is deemed to be justified in the economic sector concerned for the purpose of creating or preserving market share for the relevant goods or services. For example, use of the mark by a single client which imports the relevant goods can be sufficient to demonstrate that such use is genuine, if it appears that the import operation has a genuine commercial justification for the proprietor. Thus there is no *de minimis* rule: *Ansul* at [39]; *La Mer* at [21], [24] and [25]; *Sunrider* at [72]; *Leno* at [55].

(8) It is not the case that every proven commercial use of the mark may automatically be deemed to constitute genuine use: *Reber* at [32].”

11. The evidence of use provided is limited. However, royalty figures are provided. Further, there are examples showing the crest device as attached to the goods, which are clearly model aircraft. Finally, there are print outs from two websites showing the model aircrafts on sale, some of which are dated within the last relevant period. It is considered that the information filed is sufficient to demonstrate that there has been genuine use made of the crest device. However, there has not been use shown across all of the goods covered by the registration. In this regard, in *Euro Gida Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited v Gima (UK) Limited*, BL O/345/10, Mr Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C. as the Appointed Person summed up the law as being:

“In the present state of the law, fair protection is to be achieved by identifying and defining not the particular examples of goods or services for which there has been genuine use but the particular categories of goods or services they should realistically be taken to exemplify. For that

purpose the terminology of the resulting specification should accord with the perceptions of the average consumer of the goods or services concerned.”

12. Further, in *Property Renaissance Ltd (t/a Titanic Spa) v Stanley Dock Hotel Ltd (t/a Titanic Hotel Liverpool) & Ors* [2016] EWHC 3103 (Ch), Mr Justice Carr summed up the law relating to partial revocation as follows.

“iii) Where the trade mark proprietor has made genuine use of the mark in respect of some goods or services covered by the general wording of the specification, and not others, it is necessary for the court to arrive at a fair specification in the circumstance, which may require amendment; *Thomas Pink Ltd v Victoria's Secret UK Ltd* [2014] EWHC 2631 (Ch) ("Thomas Pink") at [52].

iv) In cases of partial revocation, pursuant to section 46(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, the question is how would the average consumer fairly describe the services in relation to which the trade mark has been used; *Thomas Pink* at [53].

v) It is not the task of the court to describe the use made by the trade mark proprietor in the narrowest possible terms unless that is what the average consumer would do. For example, in *Pan World Brands v Tripp Ltd* (Extreme Trade Mark) [2008] RPC 2 it was held that use in relation to holdalls justified a registration for luggage generally; *Thomas Pink* at [53].

vi) A trade mark proprietor should not be allowed to monopolise the use of a trade mark in relation to a general category of goods or services simply because he has used it in relation to a few. Conversely, a proprietor cannot reasonably be expected to use a mark in relation to all possible variations of the particular goods or services covered by the registration. *Maier v Asos Plc* [2015] EWCA Civ 220 ("Asos") at [56] and [60].

vii) In some cases, it may be possible to identify subcategories of goods or services within a general term which are capable of being viewed independently. In such cases, use in relation to only one subcategory will not constitute use in relation to all other subcategories. On the other hand, protection must not be cut down to those precise goods or services in relation to which the mark has been used. This would be to strip the proprietor of protection for all goods or services which the average consumer would consider to belong to the same group or category as those for which the mark has been used and which are not in substance different from them; *Mundipharma AG v OHIM* (Case T-256/04) ECR II-449; EU:T:2007:46.”

13. At the hearing, Mr Pendered argued that use on model aircraft constitutes acceptable use in respect of the wider category, toys. I have considered this submission but cannot agree. Toys is a very broad term encompassing a large and differing variety of items. Model aircraft is a specific type of toy and as such it is considered that it is an identifiable sub category. As such, the following is concluded to represent a fair specification based upon the use shown:

Toys, namely model aircraft; model aircraft, all for sale in kit form; all included in Class 28.

Conclusion – Non use

14. The application for revocation succeeds in respect of toys, games and playthings and models. It fails in respect of toys, namely model aircraft; model aircraft, all for sale in kit form.

15. The following goods in Class 28 will therefore be revoked:

Toys, games, playthings; models.

16. As such, they will be revoked from 9th February 1996

COSTS

17. Though not consolidated due to the differing attacked trade marks, these proceedings have travelled with 7 other cases between the same parties. Further, they were all heard at a single oral Hearing. For ease of reference, the respective costs awards in respect of all 8 cases will be detailed under separate cover. It should be noted that the substantive appeal period for all 8 cases will run from the date of the subsequent costs decision.

Dated this 22nd day of November 2017

Louise White

**For the Registrar,
The Comptroller-General**