

76,1948

In the Privy Council.

No. 2 of 1947.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ISLAND OF CEYLON

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
W.C.1
-3 OCT 1956
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED
LEGAL STUDIES

BETWEEN

DR. M. G. PERERA of Colombo (Plaintiff) APPELLANT 14222

AND

1. ANDREW VINCENT PEIRIS of "Winston"
Tewatte Road, Ragama, and
2. THE ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS OF
CEYLON LIMITED, Colombo (Defendants) RESPONDENTS.

CASE FOR THE APPELLANT

1.—This is an Appeal from a Judgment and Decree of the Supreme Court of the Island of Ceylon, dated the 12th February, 1946, dismissing an Appeal by the Appellant from a Judgment and Decree of the District Court of Colombo, dated the 19th June, 1944, in an action for defamation brought by the Appellant against the Respondents. RECORD
pp. 52-65
pp. 33-49

2.—The Appeal involves important questions on the Roman-Dutch law of defamation, and, in particular, the following:—

- (a) whether it is a defence on the part of a person who has published words established to be defamatory to prove absence of *animus injuriandi*, otherwise than by making good one of the recognised defences in a defamation action ;
- (b) whether a Commission of Inquiry conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (No. 9 of 1872, now Chapter 276 of the Revised Legislative Enactments of Ceylon), is a judicial proceeding so as to clothe with a qualified privilege a fair and accurate report in a newspaper of its findings ;

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- (c) whether any privilege attaches to a report in a newspaper which consists of verbatim extracts from a Sessional Paper issued by the Government ;
- (d) whether any privilege can attach to a publication which (it is submitted) contravened the provisions of an Ordinance (No. 25 of 1942, Section 6 (1)), and was, therefore, contrary to law, and whether such a publication can be said to be for the public benefit or to constitute a matter of public interest.
- (e) The general nature and scope of the " public interest " or " public benefit " which must be established in order to make good the defences of fair comment and justification respectively, and whether these are questions of law or questions of fact ; 10
- (f) whether a defence of justification is raised by an Answer such as that filed by the Respondents in this action.

3.—The history leading up to the present proceedings began in 1941, when there were rumours in Ceylon that bribes had been offered to and accepted by members of the State Council. On the 13th August, 1941, the Governor, pursuant to a resolution passed by the State Council on the 15th May, 1941, set up a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (No. 9 of 1872). Mr. L. M. D. de Silva, K.C., was appointed Commissioner, and, in order to assist him in his task, a special Ordinance (No. 25 of 1942, amended by No. 26 of 1942) was passed. This Ordinance gave the Commissioner complete immunity in respect of any act or thing done or omitted to be done by him in his capacity as Commissioner, and provided further that no evidence of any statements made or given by any person to or before the Commissioner should be admissible against that person in any proceedings, civil or criminal, with a saving in respect of perjury. It also contained provisions enabling the Commissioner to take evidence in camera and prohibiting the publication, save with the authority of the Commissioner, of the name and evidence of the witness whose evidence was so taken. These provisions were in the following terms :— 20 30

“ 5. The Commissioner may, in his discretion, hear the evidence or any part of the evidence of any witness *in camera* and may, for such purpose, exclude the public and the press from the inquiry or any part thereof.

“ 6. (1) Where the evidence of any witness is heard *in camera*, the name and the evidence or any part of the evidence of that witness shall not be published by any person save with the authority of the Commissioner.”

4.—One of the matters to be investigated by the Commissioner was what he called “ the Arrack Contract gratification incident.” It appeared that certain contracts held by distillers for the supply of arrack to the Government were due to expire on the 30th April, 1939, and it was alleged that bribes

pp. 77-9

pp. 75-7

pp. 79-80

p. 76, l. 39

p. 75, ll. 32-41

p. 76, ll. 1-13

p. 91, ll. 20-30

p. 131, ll. 28-36

- had been paid to four members of the State Council to induce them to support a proposal that the contracts should be extended without calling for tenders. There were, at that time, eight distilleries supplying arrack to the Government, the proprietors being loosely associated for the purpose of consultation on matters of mutual interest. One of the proprietors was the Appellant. He had returned to Ceylon in 1914 after obtaining his M.R.C.S. and L.R.C.P. in England, and went into private practice as a doctor in Beruwella. Later, without entirely abandoning his medical work, he engaged in certain commercial enterprises: first, rubber planting and, subsequently, arrack distilling. At the material time his distillery was at Magonna and was managed by his brother-in-law, the Appellant himself residing in Colombo. He was requested by letter, dated 20th November, 1942, to attend before the Commissioner on the 27th November, 1942, and duly did so, his evidence being taken in camera.
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- 5.—On the 3rd April, 1943, the Commissioner made his report to the Governor. In paragraph 18 he found as a fact that Rs. 2,000 had been given to a State Councillor since deceased, but that there was no evidence that any part of this had been distributed by the deceased to the other three State Councillors alleged to be concerned. In Appendix C the Commissioner set out more fully his findings on the matter. The only reference to the Appellant was in a short paragraph towards the end of this Appendix in the following words:—
- 20
- “ Dr. M. G. Perera who gave evidence was completely lacking in frankness and pretended that he knew very much less about the transaction than he actually did.”
- 6.—The only reference made by the Commissioner in his report to the publication thereof is contained in paragraph 40 wherein he stated that “ the question whether the report is to be published or not is not a matter for me,” and added a specific request that in any event four appendices (not including Appendix C) should not be published as they dealt with matters of suspicion only. The Governor sent the Report to the Government Printer to be printed. On the 18th May, 1943, the final proof was returned to the Government Printer by the Acting Secretary to the Governor with a request to print it as a Sessional Paper, so however that it should not appear before a Government Gazette Extraordinary which was to contain a Bill to be introduced into the State Council connected with the Bribery Commission Report. Accordingly both publications made their appearance simultaneously on the 19th May, 1943. The Report, formally entitled Sessional Paper No. 12 of 1943, was available for sale to the public in the Record Office and copies were sent free of charge, as is usual with Sessional Papers, to the “ Ceylon Daily News ” and other newspapers.
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- 7.—In the office of the “ Ceylon Daily News ” the view was formed that the events leading up to the appointment of the Commissioner were

p. 132, l. 13

p. 6, ll. 22-5

p. 6, ll. 27-35

p. 7, ll. 7-9

p. 7, l. 3

p. 74, ll. 25-41

p. 7, l. 36

p. 8, l. 7

p. 34, ll. 4-5

p. 47, ll. 38-40

pp. 83-165

p. 91, ll. 24-5

pp. 131-3

p. 133, ll. 12-14

p. 100, ll. 27-8

p. 100, ll. 28-39

p. 28 l. 18

pp. 80-1

p. 28, ll. 23-4

p. 28, l. 24

p. 28, l. 26

p. 28, ll. 29-31

p. 29, ll. 6-8

p. 29, ll. 11-12
pp. 166-205
pp. 202-3

of considerable public interest and that their readers would welcome an account of his findings. Accordingly in their issues on the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 25th and the 28th May, 1943, they included large extracts from the Report, quoting the Commissioner verbatim. Appendix C was extracted in the issue for the 25th May, 1943, concluding with the reference to the Appellant set out in paragraph 5 hereof.

pp. 1-2

8.—The Appellant was naturally anxious to vindicate himself from the serious accusations made against him. Being unable to sue the Government or the Commissioner, he commenced the present proceedings against the Respondents who are respectively the printer and proprietors of the “Ceylon Daily News.” By his plaint dated the 6th September, 1943, the Appellant claimed damages for defamation, relying on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of and also on innuendoes that he had been guilty of dishonesty and had given false evidence before the Commissioner. He claimed Rs. 50,000/- damages stressing the injury to his reputation both as a professional and a business man. 10

pp. 2-4

9.—By their Answer dated the 26th November, 1943, the Respondents raised pleas which may be broadly summarised as follows :—

p. 2, ll. 32-7

(a) they denied that the words complained of bore the innuendoes alleged or any meaning defamatory of the Appellant ; 20

p. 3, ll. 8-33

(b) they claimed privilege on the basis that the Commissioner was a Judicial tribunal and that their publication was an accurate report of his findings ;

p. 3, ll. 35-7

(c) they claimed privilege on the basis that the Commissioner's Report was issued by the Government of Ceylon as a Sessional Paper and was available for purchase at the Government Record Office ;

p. 3, l. 39—p. 4, l. 7

(d) they pleaded in paragraph 9 that part of their extract from the Commissioner's Report consisted of comment on a matter of public interest and that so far as the words complained of consisted of statements of fact, they were in their natural and ordinary meaning true in substance and in fact, and so far as they consisted of expressions of opinion they were fair and *bona fide* comments on matters of public interest and that “the said statements were published *bona fide* for the benefit of the public and without malice.” 30

p. 6, ll. 12-14

10.— On the framing of the issues it was made clear that the Appellant was not setting up any express malice with a view to destroying any qualified privilege which might exist, his case being that there was no privilege at all. At the subsequent hearing he did in cross-examination suggest reasons for his name not having been suppressed, but the trial Judge found that there was no express malice on the part of the 40

p. 9, ll. 11-23

p. 47, ll. 16-37

Respondents. No issue as to this was raised on the Appeal to the Supreme Court or is involved in the present appeal.

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11.—The issues as framed are set out in full in the Record. Some confusion seems to have arisen as to the scope of the plea in paragraph 9 of the Answer, as both of the following issues were accepted :—

- “ 9 (a) Are the words complained of so far as they consist of expressions of opinion fair and bona fide comment on a matter of public interest ?” pp. 4-6
- 10 “ (b) Was the statement published bona fide for the benefit of the public and without malice ?”
- “ 11. (a) Which of the words complained of consist of statements of fact ?” p. 5, ll. 22-6
- “ (b) Are such words true in substance and in fact ?” p. 5, l. 36—p. 6, l. 3
- “ (c) Which of the words complained of consist of expressions of opinion ?”
- “ (d) Are such words true in substance and in fact ?”

20 The Appellant submits that the plea contained in paragraph 9 of the Answer constituted a plea of fair comment only, and that the inclusion of issue 11, and the assumption both in the District Court and in the Supreme Court that justification was in issue, were wrong. Further, assuming that issue 9 is directed to fair comment, the Appellant submits that the limb thereof lettered (b) is irrelevant. The matter commented on must of course, as indicated in the limb lettered (a), be a matter of public interest, but it is immaterial whether the publication is or is not for the public benefit.

12.—At the hearing which began before District Judge Dias in the District Court of Colombo, on the 5th June, 1944, the Appellant gave evidence and was closely cross-examined as to his opinion of the suitability of the Commissioner for his appointment. Thus taunted he expressed his views with vigour and perhaps acerbity, but the whole of this cross-examination was irrelevant except perhaps in aggravation of damages. The rest of the cross-examination went to credit presumably in intended mitigation of damages. It was at no time ever put to the Appellant that he had been guilty of dishonesty or that he had committed perjury before the Commissioner or had withheld information from him or otherwise lacked frankness in giving his evidence. He was supported by a friend who spoke of the loss of estimation suffered by the Appellant by reason of the words complained of. For the Defence the only witnesses called were the Government printer who proved the matters set out in paragraph 6 hereof (except the first sentence of that paragraph) and the Associate Editor of the “Ceylon Daily News” who proved the matters set out in paragraph 7 hereof.

13.—On the 19th June, 1944, the District Judge gave Judgment in favour of the Respondents, dealing with the various issues in the

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pp. 50-2

manner hereinafter set out. The only ground upon which his Judgment was adverse to the Appellant was that a privilege attached to the publication by reason of the Commissioner being a judicial tribunal. The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court by Petition, dated the 27th June, 1944, but his appeal was dismissed on the 12th February, 1946, the issues being dealt with by the Supreme Court (Howard, C.J., and de Silva, J.) in the manner also hereinafter set out. The leading Judgment was delivered by Howard, C.J. (with which de Silva, J. agreed), and the main ground of their Judgment was that the Respondents had established absence of *animus injuriandi*.

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pp. 36, ll. 2-3
ll. 14-15

p. 54, ll. 41-2

14.—On the issue as to whether the words complained of were defamatory the District Judge held that they were and further that they bore the meanings ascribed to them in the innuendo. The Supreme Court agreed that the words were defamatory.

15.—The issue of justification, assuming it to have been properly raised, involved two questions in the light of the established Roman-Dutch law of defamation. These questions were :—

- (a) Were the words true ? and
- (b) Was it for the public benefit that they were published ?

It will be convenient to consider these two questions separately. 20

p. 38, ll. 12-18

16.—Were the words true ? The District Judge's view was that the Court must accept the findings of the Commissioner, there being a presumption that his findings were true and correct, and there being no evidence to the contrary. The District Judge accordingly answered issue 11 so far as truth is concerned as follows :—

p. 30, ll. 25-32

- “(a) The words ‘ Dr. M. G. Perera who gave evidence ’ are a statement
“ of fact.
- “(b) Those words are true in substance and in fact
- “(c) The words ‘ Dr. M. G. Perera was completely lacking
“ ‘ in frankness and pretended that he knew very much less about 30
“ ‘ the transaction than he actually did ’ are expressions of opinion
“ by the learned Commissioner.
- “(d) Those words are true in substance and in fact”

The Appellant submits that the District Judge's view is quite untenable. The onus was upon the Respondents, if they intended to support a plea of justification, to prove by direct evidence that the allegations conveyed by the words complained of were true and no finding by the Commissioner could be of any assistance to them.

p. 59, ll. 33-38

The Supreme Court did not deal with this aspect of the case beyond stating (1) that Counsel for the Appellant in that Court had not challenged 40 the District Judge's finding, and (2) (quite erroneously, it is respectfully submitted) that Counsel for the Appellant in the lower Court had not there contested the truth of the statement.

17.—Was it for the public benefit that the words should be published ? The District Judge held that it was not. His view was that the question in which the public was interested was whether their representatives in the State Council had or had not accepted bribes, and that the manner in which a particular witness had given evidence was outside the realm of public interest and benefit. The Supreme Court came to a different conclusion, holding that public interest and benefit extended to the evidence on which a charge against a representative of accepting bribes was upheld or otherwise. It is submitted that the Supreme Court was wrong and the District Judge right in this matter : indeed it is difficult to reconcile the special protection given to witnesses before the Commissioner by Sections 5 and 6 of Ordinance No. 25 of 1942 with it being for the public benefit that defamatory remarks made about their manner of giving evidence should be broadcast through the Press. Moreover it is further submitted that the publication complained of was illegal for the reason set out in paragraph 21 hereof and that an illegal publication is incapable in law of being for the public benefit.

p. 38, ll. 19-24

p. 59, l. 40—p. 60,
l. 15

18.—On the issue of fair comment, the District Judge held that the plea failed, first because the Defendants had not in fact made any comments at all ; secondly because the matter dealt with, namely the manner in which a witness gave evidence before the Commissioner, was not a matter of public interest for the reasons already indicated. He answered Issue 9 as follows :

p. 38, ll. 37-8

p. 30, ll. 40-2

“(a) The Defendants made no comments and the matter is not a matter of public interest.”

p. 39, ll. 14-16

“(b) Yes.”

These answers are somewhat difficult to follow. The first part of the answer to Issue 9 (a) was, it must be conceded, erroneous in law, since it is not necessary to found a plea of fair comment that the comment should be that of the person or persons responsible for the publication. Furthermore the answer to Issue 9 (b) is difficult to reconcile with the finding, on the alleged plea of justification, that the publication was not for the public benefit. The Appellant does not however seek to derive assistance from this apparent inconsistency because, if the matter commented upon is one of public interest, it is not necessary that the publication of it should also be for the public benefit. It is submitted however that the second part of the answer to Issue 9 (a) was right, more especially because a matter which cannot legally be published cannot as a matter of law be a matter of public interest. Moreover, since no facts were proved by the Respondents upon which the words found to be comment could have been based by a fair-minded man, the whole basis of the defence of fair comment disappeared because a comment cannot be fair which is built upon facts which are not proved to have been truly stated.

In the Supreme Court fair comment as a separate line of defence was not considered.

p. 45, ll. 9-10

p. 43, ll. 6-8

p. 63, ll. 23-7

19.—On the issue whether there was privilege on the basis of the Commissioner being a judicial tribunal, the District Judge found in favour of the Respondents. His view was that the Commissioner was required, by the Ordinances under which he acted, to exercise judicial powers and the inquiry which he conducted therefore fell to be regarded as a judicial proceeding. The Supreme Court however thought differently on this point and it is submitted that they were right. It is to be observed that Roman-Dutch Law recognises no such thing as an absolute privilege unless this is specially created by Statute, which has not happened in Ceylon: nor is there in Ceylon any legislation comparable with the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888. A qualified privilege is, however, recognised in Ceylon as protecting fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings but only, it is submitted, when such proceedings are publicly heard. This privilege indeed would appear to be founded upon the common law principle that “as everyone cannot be in Court it is for the public benefit that they “should be informed of what took place substantially as if they were “present” (*Furniss v. Cambridge Daily News Ltd.* (1907) 23 T.L.R., per Gorell Barnes P. at p. 706). It is submitted that the whole nature and scope of the Commissioner’s inquiry was executive or administrative, and the fact that he conducted himself judicially, as was only to be expected, could not make it otherwise. Moreover so far as the relevant matter was concerned it was not an enquiry which the public had any right to attend as the evidence was taken in camera. 10- 20

p. 41, ll. 20-3

p. 41, ll. 24-5

p. 60, ll. 2-6

p. 62, ll. 15-31

20.—On the issue whether there was a privilege based on the Report being a Sessional Paper available to anyone to purchase there was again conflict between the District Judge and the Supreme Court. The District Judge’s view was that in general principle the newspapers did owe a duty to the public to tell them, and the public had an interest in being told, the findings of the Commissioner as to whether or not any State Councillor had received a bribe in connection with the arrack contracts, but that the words published about the Appellant were foreign to that duty and irrelevant and therefore outside the scope of the privilege. This was in conformity with what he had held on the public benefit point under the alleged justification issue. The Supreme Court came to a different view on the latter point for reasons already indicated in paragraph 17 hereof. On the general principle the Supreme Court assimilated the Commissioner’s Report to reports of proceedings in Parliament or of a public statutory body such as a Harbour Board. The Appellant submits, as regards the general principle, that no privilege attaches to a publication merely because it is a republication of a paper issued by the Government, and that both Courts in Ceylon were wrong in holding the contrary. On the second point the Appellant submits that the District Judge was right and that any privilege there might be does not attach to the passage complained of. 30 40

21.—In both Courts it was contended on behalf of the Appellant that the Commissioner had not authorised the publication complained of; that

such publication therefore contravened the provisions of Section 6 (1) of Ordinance No. 25 of 1942 and, being thus illegal, that no privilege of any kind could accordingly attach to it.

RECORD

In answer to this argument the District Judge held that what was published by the Defendants was a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding however illegally or irregularly it might have been made public. The learned Judge added that the report was published by the Government which in effect invited the Defendants to publish it and, although it might be that those who disclosed the name of the Plaintiff and the nature of his evidence without authority from the Commissioner were guilty of an offence, he did not think that that fact deprived the Defendants of their right to plead privilege.

The Supreme Court met the argument in a different way. Howard, C.J. said first, that the Commissioner must be taken to have authorised the publication of Appendix C because he impliedly invited the Governor to publish his Report apart from the four Appendices which he specifically indicated (H. HH. HI. & P.) and, secondly, that the prohibition in the Ordinance was not against a publication containing only the witness' name but against publication containing the name and the evidence or any part of the evidence of a witness.

de Silva J. agreed with the Chief Justice's judgment.

22.—It is respectfully submitted that the above ruling of the District Judge cannot be supported, and that no privilege can attach to any publication which is contrary to law, and moreover, that no such publication can be said to be for the public benefit or to constitute a matter of public interest.

23.—It is respectfully submitted that the view taken by the Supreme Court is also erroneous. In the first place, the authority to publish the Report originated with the Governor since, as appears from the words set out in paragraph 6 hereof, the Commissioner had stated in terms in paragraph 40 of his Report that the question of publication was not a matter for him, and had merely added a request that four specified appendices should not be published. No authority or invitation to publish the remainder of the Report can be derived from a request made in such circumstances. In the second place, the interpretation which the Supreme Court put upon Section 6 (1) of Ordinance No. 25 of 1942 is, it is submitted, a plain misconstruction of the language of that sub-section.

24.—The main ground on which the Supreme Court found in favour of the Respondents was that, in their view, the Respondents had proved conclusively that the circumstances in which publication took place negatived *animus injuriandi*. In this, it is submitted, they were in error. It is true that Roman-Dutch Law enables a Defendant to an action for defamation to escape liability if he can negative *animus injuriandi*, but it is submitted that he can only do this by proving one of the recognised defences

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to such an action, e.g., privilege or fair comment. The mere publication of words which are, in fact, defamatory imports *animus injuriandi* unless an affirmative defence is established.

p. 48, ll. 3-42
p. 48, ll. 19-22
p. 48, ll. 37-8
p. 48, l. 41

25.—The District Judge dealt with the issue of damages although, upon his view of the law, it did not arise. He held that there was no evidence that the Appellant had suffered any damage, either as a professional man or as a distiller, and that, accordingly, he would not be justified in assessing the damages at Rs. 50,000/- or anything near that figure. His assessment was Rs. 5.00. On the face of it this betrays a serious error in approach, because the basis of the action is not for actual loss proved to have been sustained, but for wounded feelings and hurt to dignity and reputation. Indeed, no special damage was alleged. If, as is submitted was the case, the Respondents had no defence to the action, the seriousness of the imputations made against the Appellant called for an award of reasonably substantial damages. There was no ground for a derisory award, even if the District Judge was, as he said, not impressed by the manner in which the Appellant conducted himself in the witness box. The Supreme Court's attitude to this matter was that, in view of the truth of the publication and the absence of any *animus injuriandi* on the part of the Respondents, they were not prepared to say that the District Judge's assessment was wrong. If, as is submitted to be the case, these premises were ill-founded, the whole ratio for their affirmation of the District Judge's assessment disappears. At best there is the same error as pervades the District Judge's view of ignoring entirely the serious injury to the Appellant's reputation. 10

p. 48, ll. 32-6
p. 64, ll. 7-11

pp. 66-7
pp. 68-9

26.—The Supreme Court having dismissed the Appellant's Appeal for the reasons above indicated, the Appellant applied for, and was granted on the 11th March, 1946, conditional leave to Appeal to His Majesty in Council. Final leave to Appeal to His Majesty in Council was granted on the 20th May, 1946. 30

pp. 52-65
pp. 33-49

27.—The Appellant humbly submits that the Judgment and Decree of the Supreme Court, dated the 12th February, 1946, and the Judgment and Decree of the District Court of Colombo, dated the 19th June, 1944, ought to be set aside and Judgment entered in favour of the Appellant for damages to be assessed at a new trial for the following amongst other

REASONS.

1. Because the words complained of were defamatory of the Appellant.
2. Because there was no plea of justification on the record.
3. Because there was no evidence that the words complained of were true in substance, or in fact. 40

4. Because the publication of the words complained of was not for the public benefit.
5. Because no part of the words complained of amounted to comment.
6. Because the subject-matter of the words complained of was not a matter of public interest.
7. Because the inquiry conducted by the Bribery Commissioner was not a judicial proceeding.
- 10 8. Because the inquiry conducted by the Bribery Commissioner was not, as regards the matter underlying the words complained of, conducted in public.
9. Because no privilege attaches to a publication merely because it is a republication of a paper issued by the Government.
10. Because the subject-matter of the words complained of was not such as to impose on any newspaper a duty to publish it.
11. Because there was no other basis upon which a plea of privilege could be grounded.
12. Because the publication complained of was contrary to law and no privilege could, therefore, attach to it in any event.
- 20 13. Because absence of *animus injuriandi* can only be established by making good one of the recognised defences to an action for defamation.
14. Because a publication which is contrary to law cannot be for the public benefit.
15. Because a matter the publication of which is contrary to law cannot be a matter of public interest.
16. Because the assessment of damages was made without regard to the principles properly applicable.
- 30 17. Because the Judgments of the District Court of Colombo and of the Supreme Court were wrong.

G. O. SLADE,
STEPHEN CHAPMAN.

In the Privy Council.

No. 2 of 1947.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE ISLAND OF CEYLON.

BETWEEN

DR. M. G. PERERA

(Plaintiff) APPELLANT

AND

ANDREW VINCENT PEIRIS and
THE ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS
OF CEYLON LIMITED

(Defendants) RESPONDENTS

CASE FOR THE APPELLANT.

BURCHELLS,

9 Bishopsgate, E.C.2,

Solicitors for Appellant.