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[2000] UKSSCSC CI_1307_1999 (25 May 2000)

 


THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONERS

Commissioner's Case no: CI 1307 1999

SOCIAL SECURITY ACTS 1992 - 1998

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF A SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL TRIBUNAL

ON A QUESTION OF LAW

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

Mr Commissioner David Williams

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

1. I allow the appeal by the claimant. I set aside the decision of the tribunal under appeal and substitute for it my own decision which is as follows:

The decision of the adjudicating medical authority is not confirmed.

From 6. 12. 1994 there is a loss of faculty identified as follows:

post traumatic stress disorder with anxiety

resulting from the disablement from the relevant accident.

The extent of the disablement from the loss of faculty is to be

assessed as follows, without offset or addition:

for the period from 6. 12. 1994 to 5. 12. 1995 60%

for the period from 6. 12. 1995 to 31. 7. 1997 40%

for the period from 1. 8. 1997 to 31. 7. 1998 20%

for the period from 1. 8. 1998 for life 10%

This is a final assessment.

The appeal

2. The appeal is against the decision of the Bexleyheath medical appeal tribunal on 9 October 1998, by leave of the Commissioner. The decision of the tribunal was that from 6. 12. 1994 the claimant suffered a loss of faculty as a result of the industrial accident on 23 August 1994 identified as post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with anxiety. The extent of the disablement resulting from the loss of faculty was 30% for the period 6. 12. 1994 to 5. 12. 1995, 20% for the period from 6. 12. 1995 to 31. 7. 1997, and 10% from 1. 8. 1997 to 31. 7. 2001. In reaching this decision, the tribunal did not confirm the decision of the adjudicating medical authority, which was that the disablement should be assessed at 20% from 6. 12. 1994 to 5. 4. 1999.
3. The appeal is unusual for a number of reasons, not least that it results from a decision of another Commissioner on a previous appeal by the claimant connected to the same benefit claim. That decision, following an oral hearing by the Commissioner, was CI 15589 1996 (starred decision 5/98), made on 22 January 1998. The Commissioner's decision was:

"My decision is that on 23 August 1994 the claimant suffered personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, being employed earner's employment, and is entitled to a declaration of an industrial accident accordingly: Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, section 94; Social Security Administration Act 1992, sections 44(2) and (6) and 60(3). I direct the adjudication officer to refer the disablement question to the appropriate adjudicating medical authority: Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1995, regulation 29."

The appeal in this case is from the decisions taken following that reference.

4. I also held an oral hearing, on 16 September 1999. The claimant was represented by Miss T Bell of counsel, instructed by Mr Knight, solicitor. The Secretary of State was represented by Miss Main-Thompson of the Office of the Solicitor to the Department of Social Security. While I am grateful to all concerned for their contributions to the hearing, it transpired unfortunately that Miss Main-Thompson did not have sufficient instructions from the Secretary of State to deal with some of the submissions made on behalf of the claimant. This was in part because there had been important changes to parts of the relevant legislation, by and under the Social Security Act 1998, only a few weeks before. After an adjournment, it was agreed by all parties that we should make such progress as we could, leaving other issues to be dealt with by direction and written submissions after the hearing. For several reasons, dealt with in a series of directions and rulings by me and a Legal Officer, it was only in May 2000 that the round of submissions following my post-hearing direction was concluded. In a further direction of 18 May 2000, having noted the views of both parties, I directed that there be no further oral hearing or submissions, and that the matter be decided expeditiously.

Background to this appeal

5. The events that lead to the Commissioner's decision that the claimant suffered an industrial accident on 23 August 1994 are set out fully in decision CI 15589 1996. In paragraph 12 of that decision the Commissioner concluded:

"that on the proved and exceptional facts of this case the claimant has shown that there was an incident …which did constitute an industrial accident … Not only was his own testimony, which was accepted by the tribunal and was not questioned before me at the hearing, demonstrate this but the medical evidence is also strongly to the same effect. Consequently on the special facts of this case he is entitled to the declaration of industrial accident that he seeks."

6. The claim then went to an adjudicating medical authority. The claimant had, before seeing the adjudicating medical authority, obtained a psychiatric report from a consultant psychiatrist and psychotherapist, Dr T. The report includes a diagnosis of a severe emotional/psychological breakdown fulfilling the requirement of PTSD. The report of the adjudicating medical authority does not indicate that the authority saw this report, but the authority also diagnoses PTSD.

The decision under appeal

7. The case came before a tribunal on 7 August 1998. It was adjourned to be relisted with a psychiatrist member. The resumed hearing (with a psychiatrist present) had before it the report of Dr T and a full statement about the incident and consequences from the claimant. The tribunal decision is set out above. The claimant sought leave to appeal against it on three separate grounds. When the written submission of the Secretary of State showed that the appeal was not supported, the claimant sought an oral hearing. Following the oral hearing I issued a direction on 12 October 1999 indicating that in my provisional view the decision of the tribunal should be set aside as erroneous in law. I indicated that I would give my full reasons in due course, as the appeal was not supported.
8. The claimant's grounds of appeal were succinctly but cogently stated on the appeal form and again by Miss Bell at the oral hearing. There were essentially two arguments. The first, repeating an argument before the tribunal, was that the tribunal did not take sufficient account of Schedule 2 to the Social Security (General Benefit) Regulations. The other was that the decision was inadequate when judged, in particular by the requirements of the decision in Evans and Kitchen v Secretary of State for Social Services (30 July 1993, unreported) and Commissioners decision CI 636 1993. The specific point at issue was the relevance of the report by Dr T.
9. Although Miss Main-Thompson strongly supported the decision of the tribunal, I concluded that the main ground of appeal was made out. There is a full report by Dr T of obvious direct relevance to the case. As the claimant pointed out to the tribunal, it appeared to have been ignored by the adjudicating medical authority. That was the main ground of his appeal to the tribunal. I think it all the more important, as that point had been made, that it be clear that the tribunal took it into account. I accept that the record of proceedings shows that the tribunal discussed the matter with the claimant, but it is not clear from the decision what conclusions it reached. Specifically, this emerges because the tribunal took a view about improvement which was different from that of Dr T, but without either commenting on the conflicting medical views or otherwise explaining why it took that view of improvement. Given that there was an expert report dealing with these points, and that the report had been put directly in issue – indeed it was the central ground of appeal– I must conclude that the statement of reasons was inadequate. And while I accept the record as showing that the tribunal considered the report, I cannot read the record of proceedings as making good the deficiency in reasoning of the statement. Dr T's report showed that it was his professional view that the claimant could not make a complete recovery from his PTSD without specific treatment. The claimant's case was that he had not had and could not afford this treatment, his former employers refused to pay for it, and it was not otherwise available to him. Yet the tribunal's decision states, without noting this clash of evidence, that there would be a complete recovery. It is for those reasons that the decision of the tribunal is set aside.

Can a Commissioner take a decision on the facts in an industrial injuries case?

10. Miss Bell urged me to take my own decision in place of that of the tribunal. This submission arose because of the introduction, as from 5 July 1999, of section 14(8) of the Social Security Act 1998 to medical appeals. Under previous legislation a Commissioner had no power to replace a decision of a medical appeal tribunal. The only power was to refer it to a further tribunal.
11. The submission of the Secretary of State was made on medical and legal advice. I think it appropriate, because of the issues it covers, to append it in full to this decision, rather than to refer to extracts from it. That submission accepts that a Commissioner does have jurisdiction to take his or her own decision on the facts. Since I invited this submission, I am aware that a number of other Commissioners have made decisions in place of those of medical appeal tribunals and unified appeal tribunals with medical members. That there is now power to do so in the same way as for other kinds of appeal is clear beyond argument. The case also appeared at the time of the oral hearing to give rise to other issues about the new provisions by and under the Social Security Act 1998. I raised some of these issues with the parties in my direction of 12 October 1999. It is now clear from other decisions that this case should be decided as a transitional case under the Social Security Act 1998, and I accept the submission of the Secretary of State's representative (at paragraph 6.13) that this case should be decided down to the date of hearing.

Should a Commissioner take a decision on the facts in an industrial injuries case?

12. The main submission of the Secretary of State, at its simplest, is an argument that it is for doctors, not lawyers, to decide the question whether a disablement suffered by a claimant is a result of an industrial accident, and of the level of disablement resulting from any loss of faculty flowing from such an accident. The argument for the claimant can also be put simply: the Commissioner now has the power to decide these matters, and therefore has a duty to consider using such power in every case. In this case the Commissioner should use the power as the diagnosis and other facts are not in dispute and the level of disablement awarded is too low. A separate submission of Secretary of State's representative argues that it is undesirable for Commissioners to decide issues of fact because of the absence of appeal rights (paragraph 2). I consider that issue below.
13. The medical profession was centrally placed in the decision making process for disablement claims before 5 July 1999. A medical appeal tribunal would be constituted with a physician member and a surgeon member. In some cases – and this was one – one or both of the medical members was of the specialism relevant to the claim before it. It decided appeals from other medical experts, the medical officers who formed the adjudicating medical authority or medical board. There were therefore decisions by tribunals with a majority of medical members from decisions of medical officers. Neither the Commissioner nor the Secretary of State could interfere with a decision of a medical officer or a medical appeal tribunal. All that either could do was to refer a decision considered to be faulty or to need reviewing to a medical appeal tribunal. Only if the tribunal agreed could matters proceed.
14. The Social Security Act 1998 changes the nature of the decision-making in disablement benefit cases fundamentally. The initial decision is on every occasion the decision of the Secretary of State. The views of medical officers have been relegated to the status of advice. The tribunal may, and often does, consist of one medical member and one legal member, giving the lawyer the casting vote, and removing what might be termed the "jury" function of medical members working by common consent. The Commissioner has the power also to take a decision in place of the tribunal, and the Secretary of State has wide powers to revise and supersede decisions of tribunals with medical members. The cumulative effect of these changes is to shift the role of the medical profession from that of central decision maker to that of adviser or provider of evidence.
15. Nonetheless, even under the new system there is an important distinction to be drawn between diagnosis decisions and disablement decisions. Not all disablement cases give rise to a diagnosis question. For example, no such issue arises where an industrial accident clearly resulted in an amputated limb. But in cases such as the present one it does arise. A decision on diagnosis is essentially a question of medical expertise. In my view, where medical advice consistently points to a clear conclusion - as it does in this case - a tribunal chairman, a Commissioner or a Secretary of State who purported to ignore that advice and decide otherwise would be acting irrationally. Such advice can only be challenged, in effect, by further expert medical evidence. But I do not need to comment further on diagnosis questions as they do not arise here.
16. By contrast, I do not accept that a disablement question is essentially a medical question. Rather, it has come to be regarded as such in disablement benefit cases simply as a matter of history. Because no one other than a medical authority, or an authority in which medical opinion was in the majority, could decide such cases, it followed by default that the decisions were made by members of the medical profession. Quite rightly, they used their own expertise. The Court of Appeal emphasised in Murrell v Secretary of State for Social Services (see appendix to R(I) 3/84) that the Court and Commissioners could only interfere with these decisions on a point of law, and that mere disagreement with the level of disablement was not a point of law. But while Murrell is, in my view, still good law it does not reflect the changed powers of a Commissioner where a tribunal makes some other mistake. Further, actual decisions of tribunals rarely surfaced on the public record, so comparison was difficult. That may need to change in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998.
17. I also take into account that it is not only the Commissioner who can now take a disablement decision. It is also the Secretary of State and the lawyer chairman of a tribunal. And, as was argued by Miss Bell, all I am being asked to do is to conduct an assessment similar to that conducted by lawyers applying the tariff of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. More generally, of course, it is not dissimilar to the decisions taken through the ages by the judges in civil actions for damages for personal injuries. The difference is not in the act of determining levels of claim, but in the reasons for, and the principles for determining the levels of, compensation.

Should I take the decision in this case?

18. So far as I am aware, there has to date been no considered view by a Commissioner on the precise disablement level to be set in an individual case where the level of disablement is in dispute. But that is no reason for me to shirk the duty that Parliament has now imposed upon me in this case, if it is expedient to do so. In CI 3521 1999, decided on 13 April 2000, the Commissioner stated:

"Commissioners now have power to give their own assessment of disablement: see section 14(8)(a) of the Social Security Act 1998. They will do this in suitable cases. So, it is appropriate for me to comment on the degree of the assessment."

The Commissioner then did so, but referred the case to a new tribunal to decide on disputed factual issues (including the issue of diagnosis) in the light of those comments.

19. In this case, I see no strong reason to refer the decision back to a new tribunal and good reason why I should not. The key prior decision is that of a Commissioner who himself made relevant findings of fact. The diagnosis of the loss of faculty of the claimant resulting from the accident has never been in dispute. The tribunal which took the decision now set aside saw no reason to conduct any physical examination of the claimant. There is a record of their oral examination of the claimant which the claimant accepts as accurate. There is a full expert report from Dr T. I am the second Commissioner to hear oral evidence from the claimant in formal oral hearing on what is essentially the same claim. Furthermore, at no stage has the evidence of the claimant been challenged. Both the first Commissioner and the tribunal recorded their acceptance of the claimant's evidence. I also record that I do so from the hearing before me. And I have to observe that it is now almost six years since the relevant accident took place. This points strongly to my making a decision without further delay. The only issue pointing the other way is a possible curtailment of further appeal rights. I find that to be of limited significance in this long-drawn-out case.

On what principles should I determine the level of disablement?

20. On behalf of the claimant, I was asked to revise the decision of the tribunal upwards sharply. That submission was based on two comparators: the "general tone" of Schedule 2 to the General Benefit Regulations and the tariff used by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. The Secretary of State's submission deals with both those comparators. Mention was also made of a third comparator, the Judicial Studies Board's Guidelines for personal injuries claims, but this was not pursued and I do not consider it further.

The Criminal Injuries Compensation tariff

21. I accept the submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State that it would not be appropriate to base a decision about disablement on that tariff (see appendix). In my direction of 12 October 1999, I indicated that I was not sure that this comparator would assist the claimant. I also gave examples indicating why I felt specific items in the tariff were inconsistent with similar items in Schedule 2 to the General Benefit Regulations in a way that showed no particular pattern. I also accept the more general argument of the Secretary of State that the basis of the tariff and of Schedule 2 are essentially different (see paragraph 6.10 - 11).

Guidance from social security legislation

22. The guidance I must follow is therefore the guidance given by in the Act and regulations. It takes two forms. General principles relating to the assessment of the extent of disablement are set out in section 103 of, and Schedule 6 to, the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. These are supplemented by the Social Security (General Benefit) Regulations, and in particular regulation 11. Guidance is given on 55 specific forms of disablement in Schedule 2 to those Regulations. Schedule 2 is a tariff of some antiquity, as it has apparently been in use for war pensions since 1914.
23. The central principle in Schedule 6 is that "the assessment shall be made without reference to the particular circumstances of the claimant other than age, sex, and physical and mental condition." This has been the subject of full consideration by Commissioners, and bars reference in this case to the fact that the claimant lost his job or the opportunity for promotion. Schedule 6 also requires that the award is a percentage between 1% and 100%. But 100% does not mean total disablement. It reflects only the maximum level of disablement benefit available under the scheme. For example, an individual who suffers extreme head injuries might lose total vision (100%), suffer very severe facial disfigurement (100%) and be rendered partially deaf (perhaps 50%). Such extreme injuries will, under the rules of Schedule 2, be perhaps 250% disablement, but is taken as 100% disablement. The Schedule 2 tariff awards levels of compensation at or near 100% only in severe cases. Loss of both feet is a 90% disablement, while loss of one foot is 30%. Blindness in both eyes is 100%, but blindness in one eye is 30%.
24. Few other guides are available in social security law. Severe disablement allowance becomes payable when an individual suffers from loss of physical or mental faculty such that the resulting disablement assessed in accordance with Schedule 6 amounts to not less than 80% (section 68(6) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992). Schedule 6 applies the same general principles to severe disablement allowance as to industrial injuries disablement benefit . Further, regulation 10A of the Social Security (Severe Disablement Allowance) Regulations 1984 (as amended) lists 9 sets of circumstances in which an individual is to be assumed to be not less than 80% disabled. But I stress that is it "not less". For example, one of the 9 circumstances is a level of blindness that would count as 100% disablement under the Schedule. Another is that the individual is entitled to the highest rate of care component of disability living allowance. In other words, he or she meets both the day and night conditions for the care component as defined in section 72 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. But this might result from levels of disablement significantly over 80% in the schedule. There is also limited comparative guidance to be found in the Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases) Regulations 1985, in particular with regard to partial loss of hearing (in Schedule 3 to those Regulations).

How disabled was the claimant?

25. The initial date for assessment is not in dispute, and is 6 December 1994. Nor is the loss of faculty in dispute. The claimant has PTSD. There are three sources of evidence about the level of disablement since then: the evidence of Dr T, the evidence of the adjudicating medical authority, and the evidence of the claimant as given to the tribunal, at the previous Commissioner's hearing, and before me.
26. The picture that emerges is of someone who was almost inevitably severely stressed by the accident. I say "almost inevitably" because Dr. T's evidence is that over 95% per cent of the population would have suffered a similar reaction. Without going again into details fully rehearsed by the previous Commissioner, the incident that constituted the accident was exceptional and I see no reason to doubt Dr T's overall assessment of the claimant. I also accept the evidence of Dr T, confirmed by the other medical evidence in the case, that the claimant could in no way be regarded as the author of his own misfortune nor is there any question on the evidence before me of any pre-existing condition, constitutional weakness or other factor that should be considered as an offset against an award.
27. The result of the accident is also not in dispute. The claimant found himself unable to continue his work, and he was, after a period of absence on medical advice, medically retired in September 1995. He was affected not only in his ability to work, but in his social life and in the way he could conduct his day to day activities, indeed all his interpersonal relationships. He had continuing headaches, in part described as staggering. He was anxious, had depressed spells, with poor sleep and concentration, and experienced flashbacks. Since retirement, he could work at home but found it difficult to work with others in any form of institutional setting. All this is taken from the report of Dr T, which I accept. Dr T also reported that in 1997 the emotional conflicts were as severe as they had been after the accident, and that "decent ongoing psychotherapy beyond normal counseling" was needed to lead to complete recovery. The adjudicating medical authority, apparently without reference to Dr T's report, recorded limited social and work contacts as the loss of faculty, noting obvious depression, flatness, introspection, lack of confidence and motivation, poor memory, change of personality, flashbacks and nightmares, can't cope with others, but also recorded that there was no continuing treatment although it had been advised and that he did a little job for 1/2 a day a week.
28. The tribunal recorded the claimant as telling it: "His headaches went on permanently for about the first 12 months. The first 12 months were terrible and then until July 1997 was a little better and the last 12 months have been better still". It also recorded that the claimant had last had bad headaches in July 1998, and he saw his general practitioner about this. He still could not cope with people but said that he sold pictures on a non-commercial basis and went to auctions and mixed with people. The claimant told me that he had no dispute with the record made by the tribunal of the evidence he gave it. I also accept this evidence save that, on the one point of obvious conflict between Dr T and the tribunal (period of recovery), I accept the views of Dr T because the basis for his reasoning is clearly presented and does not appear to have been superseded by any change of circumstances. It was on precisely this point that the tribunal did not comment.
29. Applying the statutory guidance to psychological injuries is notorious difficult. Of the forms of injury listed in the Schedule, almost all are injuries involving the loss of some part of the human body, and it is implicit that these losses are permanent. The only forms of injury that do not as such involve the loss of one or more parts of the body are: loss of functional sight (100%), very severe facial disfigurement (100%), total deafness (100%), and loss of vision of one eye (30%). In this case, the adjudicating medical authority put the disablement at 20%. This is the equivalent of the loss of the final joint of one thumb, or an average hearing loss of 50 decibels. The adjudicating medical authority left the award continuing at that level. The tribunal accepted that a level award was wrong and adopted a split award. It put the initial level at 30%. The comparators to this are the equivalent of the loss of a whole thumb, or of a foot, or of vision of one eye, or an average hearing loss of 53 decibels. It put the later level of disablement at 10%, the equivalent of the loss of a lesser part of an index finger or the loss of several, but not all, toes.
30. The tariff has no direct guide relevant to either the inner conflict recorded by Dr. T or to the effect on interpersonal relationships. I take the award of 100% for very severe facial disfigurement or the awards from 20% to 100% for loss of vision or of hearing as the nearest comparators, as all interfere with interpersonal communications. I think it also right to note that – with rare exceptions – those comparators will be permanent losses, while it is clear that any permanent loss in this case is or will be at a much lower level than the initial loss.
31. In their final submissions, the claimant put the level of disablement at 91% in the early stages "improved by percentages over the following years". The Secretary of State submitted that the assessment was correct at 10% from 1 August 1997 but expressed no specific opinion for the earlier period.
32. I agree with the tribunal that a staged assessment is appropriate, and that the adjudicating medical authority was wrong to give a flat award. The three periods of staging used by the tribunal were, it seems clear, based on the claimant's own evidence. I also record that at the time of the accident the claimant (male) was only 30 and had no other relevant physical or mental disablements save for a couple of short-term stress-related headaches in the previous ten years while working for his employer and some low back pain caused by a road traffic accident. He was, that apart, a young, fit, healthy, sociable man who had worked for over ten years for his then employer.
33. For the first period, from 6 December 1994 to 5 December 1995, I set the level of disablement at 60%. This is the period described by the claimant as terrible. In my view the appropriate level is significantly more than 30%, but is not so much as to be comparable to severe disablement at 80%. In so far as the comparison is of value, 60% is the level of disablement of the loss of a hand or of the lower half of a leg. I also take into account that this is an assessment for a limited period.
34. The tribunal took as the second period the period from 6 December 1995 to 31 July 1997. Again, this was based on the claimant's evidence which I also accept. It is also the period leading up to Dr T's report, which shows significant continuing problems. I put the level of disablement in this period at 40%, being between the initial and later levels decided.
35. I find the third period the most problematic. This is the period from 1 August 1997, so starting some three years after the accident. The adjudicating medical authority set the level during this period (but for the whole period assessed) at 20%. The tribunal set it at 10% for the later period. The Secretary of State submits that the 10% level is right. The claimant makes no specific submission. The adjudicating medical authority's examination was in March 1998, the tribunal's oral (and psychiatric) examination was in October 1998, and my oral hearing was in September 1999. I am strongly influenced by the level of disablement set by the tribunal for the period current to its hearing, given in particular the constitution of the tribunal with a consultant psychiatrist present. I also take into account the evidence that the claimant gave me, and his acceptance of the record of the tribunal (though not its decision). I have accepted that he was seriously, but not severely, affected during the initial period. Before me, he was clearly a much improved individual, though one aged by and still scarred mentally by his experience and its consequences. He was at that time still only 36.
36. With all those factors in mind, my view is that the evidence is best reflected by further dividing the periods of assessment, and looking separately at the year from 1 August 1997 to 31 July 1998. The report of the adjudicating medical authority suggests that the claimant had not improved as much at that time as when he saw the tribunal (for example with regard to the buying and selling of pictures). I accept the tribunal's assessment of 10% for the period when it saw the claimant, but accept the adjudicating medical authority's decision of 20% for the first year (when the adjudicating medical authority saw the claimant). The claimant was clearly getting better, as the evidence of the two reports show and as he himself accepted. How long should the period from 1 August 1998 last? I have no undisputed evidence that, without some circumstances of which I am currently not aware, he will recover entirely. The Act (Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, Schedule 6, paragraph 6 (3) and (5)), requires that "the period to be taken into account ... shall not end before the earliest date on which it seems likely that the extent of the disablement will be less than 1 per cent." I have no undisputed evidence before me of such a date, bearing in mind particularly Dr T's report. I therefore put no limit on the final period, which is therefore "for life". If - as I hope - the claimant does stage a full recovery, the Secretary of State now has powers of revision and supersession. If - and I hope this does not arise - things deteriorate, the claimant can ask for such a review.
37. I have set out my reasons for this assessment at considerable length because I am aware that I am departing from previous practice in so doing. I anticipate that there will be other appeals that return to the general issues in this case but in circumstances of wider significance, and that in some Commissioners will explore the issues raised in this case further. I must again emphasise that there is an unusual combination of factors that led me to take my own decision in this case, and that the precedent value of this decision as an exercise in setting a level of disablement on the facts of this most unusual accident is strictly limited even if all my more general reasoning is accepted.

David Williams

Commissioner

25 May 2000