Decision of the Upper Tribunal
(Administrative Appeals Chamber)

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal that was made on 4 September 2012 under reference X/11/244200 is quashed: section 15(1)(c) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

DIRECTIONS:

A. The matter is remitted to the tribunal with the following directions under section 17(1)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

B. The tribunal must undertake a fresh consideration of the issues raised by the appeal in accordance with my analysis of the law below. As a preliminary matter, it must decide whether to hold an oral hearing.

Reasons for Decision

A. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (2008) and the Guide

1. The provisions to which I refer are set out at the end of this decision. I have used the version of the Guide that is available on CICA’s website. The paragraph numbers differ from the version published in Criminal Injuries Compensation Claims 2008 – A Guide to the New Scheme by Laura Pegley, Aileen Downey and Clare Padley.

B. History and background

2. I will call the applicant Mr M in order to preserve his identity. He applied for criminal injuries compensation on 20 December 2011. He said that he had been raped in the summer of 1970 when he was aged 8. He did not know the name of the man, but he was a painter working on the houses where Mr M lived. The man called him into a shed to sort out some paint pots. He then shut the door, held Mr M by the stomach and head, and anally raped him. He described the effects as being ‘depressed, suicidal, panic attacks, nightmares, distressing images of the incident, sleep disorder and sexual problems.’ He mentioned flashbacks and problems when similar incidents came on the television. He did not tell anyone because of his feelings of despair and shame.

3. In 2008 and 2009, he had to undergo hospital treatment as a result of an experience his son had had with a male nurse who had held him tightly from behind. He was diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder. His psychiatrist told him about claiming for criminal injuries compensation in 2011.

4. CICA refused the application, relying on paragraph 18 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2008. The letter notifying Mr M explained that ‘As the assault against you was never reported to the police it would be impracticable to waive the time limit as there is no police evidence to corroborate your claim.’

5. Mr M challenged this, pointing out that he had only been 8 years old at the time. In response, CICA wrote accepting that it was not reasonable to expect him to report the assault at the time, but he could have reported it within 2 years of reaching 18 in 1980. Moreover, as the incident was never reported to the police, even as an adult, there was no evidence to corroborate his claim.

C. The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

6. Mr M exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. He produced some evidence from his psychiatrist. If I have understood it correctly, he says that the memory of the incident could only be reconstructed in therapy. He also says that when Mr M told his mother in 2009, she remembered children being molested around that time and had reported these to the police.

7. The tribunal dismissed the appeal without holding an oral hearing. By way of explanation, it set out a series of statements. They are all in general terms, and on the basis of other cases that my colleagues and I have seen, are in standard form. They refer to:

· the overriding objective;

· the tribunal’s case management powers;

· the presumption that time limits ensure certainty and finality;

· oral hearings can cause or contribute to inefficiency;

· the documents in the bundle ‘deal sufficiently fully with the issues in this appeal.’

8. The tribunal then dealt with the two elements of paragraph 18.

9. As to practicality, the tribunal decided that it was not practicable to consider the application. By way of explanation, it set out four points:

· As the application was made over 41 years after the alleged assault, investigations will take longer, evidence will either not be available or it will be disproportionately excessive to investigate, producing evidence that is less reliable and cogent than if Mr M had reported it sooner.

· There was no detailed evidence to substantiate what Mr M said and no prospect of obtaining that evidence.

· There was not enough evidence for Mr M to prove an assault on the balance of probabilities.

· The tribunal was not persuaded that it was practicable to consider the application.

10. As to the two year period, the tribunal decided that it would not have been reasonable to make the application within this period, as Mr M was still a young child when the period expired.

D. In the Upper Tribunal

11. I gave permission to apply for judicial review saying:

It is arguable that the reasons given by the tribunal fail to take account of the nature of sexual abuse and the possibilities of testing allegations long after the event, which is the key issue under the Scheme. Experience shows that cases can be proved when the victims finally come forward. Mr M… gave details of the time, place and employment of the alleged perpetrator. He also said he had a criminal record, which could have helped in tracing him.

12. The First-tier Tribunal took no part in the proceedings. CICA responded in writing. Mr M’s clinical psychologist wrote in Mr M’s support enclosing a letter from Mr M’s mother. She wrote that she had reported the same man to the police when her daughter complained that he had touched her thighs.

13. Having received CICA’s response, I issued a detailed direction raising a number of issues. CICA has provided a detailed submission in reply, on which Mr M has said he does not wish to comment. I will deal with those issues in turn. But first, I need to deal with a more general problem in the tribunal’s reasoning on an oral hearing.

E. Oral hearing

14. The tribunal’s reasons for not holding an oral hearing are inadequate to justify that decision in the circumstances of this case. It is possible, although I do not need to go so far to decide this application, that it was also perverse to proceed without holding a hearing.

15. Parts of the tribunal’s reasons are, as I have said, in the familiar form. That of itself is not an error of law. It is permissible to make use of standard explanations of provisions that are regularly mentioned in tribunal’s reasons. What is lacking in the tribunal’s reasons is any consideration of what points the tribunal considered in favour of holding a hearing. In its reasons explaining why it was not practicable to consider the application, the tribunal referred to the limited evidence. But nowhere is there anything to suggest that the tribunal considered whether hearing from Mr M in person might provide the tribunal with better evidence than it had. It is, after all, not unknown for sexual abuse to be established long after the event with little or no contemporaneous evidence. The tribunal’s reasons present the case for deciding the case on the papers, but do not consider at all the case for holding a hearing. For that reason alone, they are inadequate.

F. Practicability

My direction

16. In my direction, I quoted from paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix 2 to the Guide to the 2008 Scheme. I then asked:

Applying the test of the Scheme rather than the Guide, the issue is whether it is practicable for the application to be considered. I find this wording difficult. It is always possible to consider an application. With what success for the applicant is another matter. What action would CICA expect to take following an application, especially considering that it is for the applicant to make the case for compensation (paragraph 19 of the Scheme), not for CICA to do so? Does CICA investigate, as the Guide suggests? Does this mean more than assessing the application? If so, what?

Does CICA insist on corroboration? I have read paragraph 39 of the Guide. That suggests that police evidence is essential. How does that fit with the duty under paragraph 20 of the Scheme to decide on the balance of probabilities? Does this mean that it is impossible for a victim of abuse that was not reported at the time, or even subsequently, to persuade CICA that a crime took place? Is this consistent with the common experience that the victims of abuse may be too embarrassed to report it and may, as in this case, suppress it?

If that is CICA’s approach, is it not all the more important for the First-tier Tribunal to hold an oral hearing in order to be able to assess the applicant’s oral evidence on what happened?

Are there not interview techniques and assessment procedures that allow evidence to be assessed in cases like this? They are certainly available to test for false memory syndrome.

CICA’s response

17. CICA’s response was provided by Ben Collins of counsel. He made the following points in response to these questions:

· The Guide does not attempt to restate the Scheme but to explain how CICA operates.

· The burden is on the applicant, but CICA may make further enquiries if there is a basis for doing so in the evidence provided.

· Corroboration is not essential.

· It is possible for the victim of abuse that was not reported at the time or later to persuade CICA that a crime of violence took place. Embarrassment will not usually be considered as a reason for not reporting to the police before making a claim.

· Holding an oral hearing is a matter of judicial discretion in the circumstances of the individual case.

Analysis

18. The issue for the claims officer is whether it is practicable for the application to be considered. This is a condition precedent to the power to waive the time limit. It is a judgment that has to be made at the point when the application has been received, but before any consideration has taken place. The evidence that is, or is likely to be, available may be a factor that is relevant to that judgment. But the issue is whether it is practicable for the application to be considered, not whether it will result in an award.

19. The applicant has to show that a crime of violence took place. See paragraphs 8 and 19 of the Scheme. But the applicant only has to make out a case for an award on the balance of probabilities, not to the criminal standard. See paragraph 20 of the Scheme.

20. The test is not whether it is practicable to investigate the offence. That is a separate matter that is dealt at the stage of the award. See paragraph 13 of the Scheme. At the stage when paragraph 18 applies, the possibility of the crime being investigated is a factor that is relevant only in so far as it affects the evidence that is available and, therefore, the practicability of considering the application.

21. CICA, quite properly, makes allowance for the problems facing applicants who have experienced abuse. See Appendix 2 to the Guide. These difficulties have to be taken into account whenever the claims officer is exercising a power or discretion under the Scheme. Appendix 2 is not comprehensive. Nor is it definitive. The claims officer has to apply the Scheme, not the Guide. So, by way of example, paragraph 4 of Appendix 2 refers to investigating a claim, whereas paragraph 18 of the Scheme refers to considering an application. If there is a difference in meaning, it is the latter that prevails. The difference may be explained by the audience. The Guide is intended for use by applicants, who may not understand the technical meaning of the language of the Scheme. In so far as it suggests that the claims officer may be under a duty to take the initiative in investigating a claim, that is contrary to paragraph 19 of the Scheme. It is wrong for tribunals to assume that considering an application will necessarily impose an investigative burden on CICA. It may indicate what evidence it needs, it may gather information, it may raise questions about the evidence or lack of it, and it will assess the evidence. But even taken together those steps are not the same as undertaking an investigation.

22. Although CICA is not obliged to initiate an investigation, the claims officer does give an applicant advice on the evidence to produce. See paragraph 34 of Section 3. The practicability of considering the application must take account of this advice and the sort of information that it might lead the applicant to provide.

23. The issue for the First-tier Tribunal on an appeal is the same as for the claims officer. There is, though, this difference. The tribunal takes account of the evidence and arguments available at the time of the appeal. It is not limited to the evidence that was available to the claims officer. This follows from the nature of an initial general appeal against an administrative decision-maker.

24. One source of evidence that is available to the tribunal is the oral evidence of the applicant. There is nothing to prevent a claims officer interviewing an applicant, but as far as I know this is not part of CICA’s practice. The tribunal will be able to question the applicant and form a judgment on whether there is sufficient information available for it to be practicable to consider the application. It is a common experience across jurisdictions within the First-tier Tribunal that decisions are changed as more information becomes available, partly as a result of the applicant realising what is relevant and partly as a result of the approach taken by the tribunal. It is for this reason that an oral hearing is potentially important.

25. This analysis shows that the tribunal made other errors of law. First, the tribunal’s reasons show no recognition of this potential value of an oral hearing. Second, the tribunal’s reasoning was based on a false assumption about the role taken by CICA and, perhaps, a confusion between CICA considering a claim and a police investigation of the alleged crime. I read the tribunal’s reasons as explaining why it dismissed the appeal rather than as self-directions in law. In other words, I do not read the tribunal as saying, for example, that it is essential for an applicant to provide corroboration. I read the tribunal as saying only that in the context of this case the absence of corroboration was significant in deciding whether it would be practicable to investigate the claim. Nevertheless, the tribunal’s reasons taken as a package suggest that it assumed CICA would undertake some form of investigation in the application more akin to an investigation of the crime.

G. Time limits and waiver

My direction

26. In my direction, I set out my thoughts on time limits and wavier:

It seems to me that the structure of paragraph 18 is this. There is an exhortation (the application should be made as soon as possible after the incident giving rise to the injury) followed by a precise time limit (the application must be received by the Authority within two years of the date of the incident). That time limit may be waived. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) contain the conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the officer can waive the time limit. They are necessary conditions, but they are not necessarily sufficient. The officer still has a discretion that must be exercised. This allows the officer to take account of all relevant circumstances either for or against waiver.

In R (MJ) v First-tier Tribunal ad CICA [2011] UKUT 402 (AAC), Judge Ward said that there was no general discretion and that once the conditions precedent were met, the officer had to waive the time limit:

3. I interpret this not as saying that where (a) and (b) are satisfied, a general discretion arises, to be exercised by the claims officer on unspecified grounds. If a discretion were intended to arise, I consider that the basis for its exercise would have been specified, as in the various predecessor schemes from 1990 to 2001. Rather, paragraph 18’s natural reading is that where (a) and (b) are satisfied, the conditions for waiving the time limit are met, but that there are no other circumstances in which waiver is permitted. In this respect, it differs from the predecessor schemes which contained a widely phrased discretionary power and I derive little assistance from case law on those predecessor schemes.

I take the point about the contrast with the earlier schemes, but the contrasting language of paragraph 18 seems carefully used – contrast the use of should, must and may. Judge Ward reads may as must. Why use two words with the same meaning in a single paragraph?

In the absence of a general discretion, Judge Ward had to reject as irrelevant any other factors:

10. Taking the two year time limit first, paragraph 18 requires a claim to be made “within two years of the date of the incident”. That takes one to, at latest, 1992, when the applicant was aged 15. The judge, however, considered the matter not only by reference to whether it would have been reasonable to expect the applicant to have made the application within that two year period but whether it was reasonable for him to have done so within two years of becoming an adult i.e. of 2 April 1995. While it may have been the practice of CICA to view sympathetically claims from those who claim soon after reaching adulthood, the use of two years since reaching adulthood as a test by which to exclude claimants is not authorised by the statutory Scheme. On the wording of paragraph 18, once it is established that it would not have been reasonable to expect the applicant to have made an application within two years of the date of the incident, all that remains is to determine whether it is practicable for the application to be considered.

11. The CICA has indicated in these proceedings that it does not suggest that the applicant ought to have claimed within two years of sustaining the injury; given that he was young, living away from home, with separated parents and other family difficulties and that the abuse or alleged abuse was perpetrated by people who stood in loco parentis to him, this seems an entirely proper and realistic approach.

12. The CICA, in its short written submission, has argued that the First‑tier Tribunal did not apply the wrong test in asking whether it was reasonable to have expected the applicant to have made the application for compensation within two years of him becoming 18 years old under paragraph 18(b) of the Scheme. Its reasoning is that “where an adult has not applied for compensation on behalf of a minor applicant within two years of the incident, the authority would expect the applicant to make an application himself within two years of reaching the age of 18. This is because it is reasonable to assume that the applicant would now have sufficient maturity to make the claim on his or her own. The First‑tier Tribunal were therefore entitled to apply this reasoning in the present case.”

13. I am unable to accept this submission. The obligation on the CICA and, on appeal, the First‑tier Tribunal is to apply the Scheme which Parliament has approved. That it is said to be reasonable to assume, in a case of the sexual abuse of a child, that an applicant would have sufficient maturity to make the claim within two years of reaching the age of 18 seems to me to be a matter of conjecture as to which other views are possible, which highlights the necessity that, if there were to be such a rule, it should have been included in the Scheme and subjected to the degree of scrutiny for which section 11 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 provides. It has not been and the effect of its introduction by the CICA as a yardstick to reject claims, without authority, has been to impose an additional hurdle, not authorised by the Scheme, in cases of this type.

An alternative analysis to Judge Ward’s is that even if the two-year limit is waived, the applicant must still have claimed as soon as possible after the incident. This was the view of Judge Rowland in R (AM) v First-tier Tribunal [2012] UKUT 55 (AAC):

12. As to the language in the present context, the words “as soon as possible” in the opening part of paragraph 18 seem to be a mere exhortation where the application is submitted within the two-year time limit. However, they become important if the two-year time limit is waived. Sub-paragraph (b), which is concerned with waiver of the two-year time limit, on the face of it provides for a simple test of reasonableness which is a bit more liberal that the employment tribunal test which is whether “it was not reasonably practicable” for the complaint to be submitted before the time limit expired (see Palmer at 384H). However, even here a non-literal approach may be required in some instances. Suppose a person intended to put a claim in a few days before the time limit expired but, a week earlier, either was hospitalised by a serious car accident or gave the form to a friend to post who then forgot about it, so that it then became reasonable for the would-be applicant to do nothing further until shortly after the time limit expired. In one sense, it would “have been reasonable to expect the applicant to have made the application within the two-year period” because it would have ceased to be so only during the last week or two. Nonetheless, I do not think that the 2008 Scheme is to be construed so as to prevent waiver in those sorts of circumstances. It seems to me that paragraph 18(b) is not very different in its effect from paragraph 17 of the 2001 Scheme which provided that a claims officer could waive the two-year time limit “where he considers that, by reason of the particular circumstances of the case, it is reasonable and in the interests of justice to do so”. What is new is paragraph 18(a), which emphasises one element of the “interests of justice”.

13. In any event, if there is waiver of the two-year period, presumably it is not to be considered “possible” to make the claim for such further period during which it would not have been reasonable to expect the Applicant to make the application. However, an application must be made “as soon as possible” thereafter. It cannot be right that a person who could not be expected to submit an application within two years has an unlimited time thereafter in which to do so.

14. Thus three questions arise where a claim is made after the two-year period, rather than just the one that arose under the 2001 Scheme. The first is whether it is practicable to consider the application. The second is whether the two-year time limit should be waived. The third, which arises only if the answer to each of the others is “yes”, is whether the application has been submitted as soon as possible after the end of the two-year period. However, even though the third question arises only if the answer to the other two is “yes”, if the answer to the third question would plainly be “no”, it is not necessary to reach a firm conclusion on either of the other questions.

This reasoning identifies an additional element that Judge Ward did not consider. There is nothing to suggest that Judge Rowland was aware of Judge Ward’s decision.

I find it difficult to understand how an exhortation can become a duty depending on whether or not the time two-year limit is waived. On my analysis, the sort of case that Judge Rowland mentioned in paragraph 12 would be dealt with as part of the officer’s general discretion without any need to elevate an exhortation into a duty.

CICA’s response

27. On behalf of CICA, Ben Collins accepted my analysis of paragraph 18 and my criticisms of the authorities.

Analysis

28. I need to deal with this issue in order to direct the First-tier Tribunal on the law to apply at the rehearing. My reading of paragraph 18 is this.

29. Paragraph 18 applies if and only if an application is not made within two years of the incident. This takes account of the contrasting language of should and must. It also takes account of the reference to waiving this time limit. That naturally refers to the two year period. It would not be a normal use of language to refer to an obligation to apply as soon as possible as a time limit; the language indicates something more precise.

30. If the application is received outside the time limit, the claims officer has a power to waive the time limit provided that the two specified conditions are satisfied. They are conditions precedent to the exercise of the power. They are not conditions precedent to a duty to waive the time limit. A duty is not consistent with the contrasting language of paragraph 18. The paragraph provides that an applicant must apply within two years. If it then created a duty, it would be more natural to use the same word rather than may, which usually indicates a power. Moreover, there would be no point in providing for the claims officer to waive the limit. It would be sufficient simply to provide that once the conditions were satisfied the time limit was waived. Giving the power to the officer indicates that the officer has a judgment to make.

31. It may be that in practice the conditions dictate the outcome. But there may be circumstances in which it is nevertheless not appropriate to waive the time limit. It might, for example, be obvious that no award could or would be made. Just to take a few examples: the incident might have occurred before 1 August 1964; or the application might allege no crime of violence; or the applicant’s criminal record or character might obviously preclude an award. There is a role for discretion in these, and other, cases.

32. I further consider the discretion arises once the claims officer decides that it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to make the claim within two years. It seems that, if this is not reasonable in view of the applicant’s age, CICA allows a further two years from the date when the applicant attains 18. That is a permissible use of discretion, but it is not how I read paragraph 18. I see no justification for that approach in the language. The issue is whether it was reasonable to expect the applicant to claim within two years of the date of the incident. If it was not, there is nothing that allows a further period of two years to be imposed from a later date. This is a further reason for disagreeing with Judge Ward’s analysis. If that analysis is correct, subparagraph (b) would have no application to anyone injured as a child. There would be no time limit so long as it was practicable to consider the application. On my reading, once subparagraphs (a) and (b) are satisfied, the officer has a discretion. It is permissible to use that discretion to allow a further two years from the age of 18. But that is not the same thing as being obliged to do so and it does not preclude an officer from refusing to waive the time limit even if the claim was made within that period, whether in the circumstances I set out in the previous paragraph or otherwise.

Signed on original
on 14 August 2013

Edward Jacobs
Upper Tribunal Judge

the criminal injuries compensation scheme (2008)

Eligibility to apply for compensation

6. Compensation may be paid in accordance with this Scheme:

(a) to an applicant who has sustained a criminal injury on or after 1 August 1964; …

8. For the purposes of this Scheme, “criminal injury” means one or more personal injuries as described in paragraph 9, being an injury sustained in and directly attributable to an act occurring in Great Britain which is:

(a) a crime of violence (including arson, fire-raising or an act of poisoning); …

10. It is not necessary for the assailant to have been convicted of a criminal offence in connection with the injury. …

Eligibility to receive compensation

13. (1) A claims officer may withhold or reduce an award where he or she considers that:

(a) the applicant failed to take, without delay, all reasonable steps to inform the police, or other body or person considered by the Authority to be appropriate for the purpose, of the circumstances giving rise to the injury; or

(b) the applicant failed to co-operate with the police or other authority in attempting to bring the assailant to justice; or

(c) the applicant has failed to give all reasonable assistance to the Authority or other body or person in connection with the application; or

(d) the conduct of the applicant before, during or after the incident giving rise to the application makes it inappropriate that a full award or any award at all be made; …

Consideration of applications

18. An application for compensation under this Scheme in respect of a criminal injury (“injury” hereafter in this Scheme) must be made in writing on a form obtainable from the Authority. It should be made as soon as possible after the incident giving rise to the injury and must be received by the Authority within two years of the date of the incident. A claims officer may waive this time limit only where he or she considers that:

(a) it is practicable for the application to be considered; and

(b) in the particular circumstances of the case, it would not have been reasonable to expect the applicant to have made an application within the two-year period.

19. (1) It will be for the applicant to make out his or her case including, where appropriate:

(a) making out the case for a waiver of the time limit in paragraph 18; …

20. … The standard of proof to be applied by a claims officer in all matters will be the balance of probabilities.

Review of decisions

58. (1) An applicant may seek a review of any decision under this Scheme by a claims officer:

(a) not to waive or extend the time limit in paragraph 18 (application for compensation) or paragraph 59 (application for review); …

Appeals

61. An applicant who is dissatisfied with a decision taken on a review under paragraph 60(1) or with a determination under paragraph 60(2) may appeal against the decision to the First-tier Tribunal in accordance with Tribunal Procedure Rules.

63. (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal allows an appeal against a decision taken on review under paragraph 58(1)(a), (b) or (f), it will direct the Authority in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In a case where the appeal was against a decision not to waive the time limit in paragraph 18, the First-tier Tribunal will direct the Authority to arrange for the application for compensation to be dealt with under this Scheme as if the time limit had been waived by a claims officer.

guide to the criminal injuries compensation scheme 2008

Section 2 – Who can get an award?

Failure to report the crime quickly

17. We expect you to report the crime immediately (to ensure the best chance of catching the person who injured you). Normally we will refuse a claim if you do not report the incident to the police straightaway. There are a few exceptions to this, for example:

· in certain cases of child abuse;

· if the kind of injuries you got meant we could not reasonably have expected you to make a full report to the police immediately.

18. We normally expect you to report the crime to the police. However, there may be circumstances where we accept that it was more reasonable for you to have reported it to another authority (for example, military police, a prison warden or the chief officer in an institution for people with mental illnesses).

Failure to co-operate with the police and courts

19. We expect you to have done everything possible to help the police catch and convict the person who injured you, including making a full statement to the police and co-operating in bringing the person who injured you to justice.

20. We appreciate that you may be reluctant to bring charges (for example, if you fear a revenge attack or reprisal). However, since the Scheme is publicly funded, it is important that you have done your public duty by reporting the crime and co-operating with the police.

Failure to co-operate with us

21. It is your responsibility to help us collect the information we need to investigate your claim. For example, we may refuse your claim if:

· you fail to give us the information we need in order to check something you have claimed for;

· you fail to attend a medical examination that lets us verify your injuries;

· you don’t tell us about something that would affect your claim;

· you fail to tell us if you change your contact details.

If you tell us about a change of address, please make sure you get confirmation from us that we have changed your records. Otherwise we may lose contact, which means we will withhold your claim.

Section 3 – Applying for compensation

34. The first thing we do when we get your form is to list the evidence that’s needed in order to assess your claim (we call this our ‘case strategy’). The evidence we normally need includes:

· confirmation from the police that a crime of violence was committed and that you were a blameless victim (we will also need to collect witness statements to confirm your role in the incident which led to your injury); …

Appendix 2 — Claiming after a period of abuse

1. If you, or someone for whom you have responsibility, has been injured because of a period of physical or sexual abuse, you can submit a claim for compensation.

Time limits

4. Under the Scheme we expect you to send us your application within two years of the date of the incident. We will only consider applications outside this time limit where:

· the circumstances of your injury meant that we could not reasonably have expected you to apply within the two-year time limit; and

· it is still possible to investigate your claim.

5. These special circumstances may apply to a person who was sexually abused as a child but who could not report the abuse until they became an adult. However, we would expect that the person reports the abuse as soon as it is reasonable for them to do so.

Further enquiries

7. Before we can make an award, we have to know:

· the full circumstances of the incident and the injury;

· how serious the injury was; and

· how well you are recovering from the injury.

8. We may get this information from the police, hospitals, doctors and anyone else listed on the application form. You can help us by sending any other supporting information with the application itself, such as medical or psychological reports that you already hold. Please note that we will not normally pay for medical reports that you have arranged.

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	Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) >> MM, R (on the application of) v FTT and CICA [2013] UKUT 402 (AAC) (14 August 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/AAC/2013/402.html Cite as: [2013] UKUT 402 (AAC)

Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)

A. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (2008) and the Guide

B. History and background

C. The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

D. In the Upper Tribunal

E. Oral hearing

F. Practicability

My direction

CICA’s response

Analysis

G. Time limits and waiver

My direction

CICA’s response

Analysis

the criminal injuries compensation scheme (2008)

guide to the criminal injuries compensation scheme 2008