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United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) >> Stormhill Properties Ltd v Roberts (Valuation Officer) (RATING – HEREDITAMENT – multi-floored office building – proposal to merge contiguous and interconnected hereditaments) [2022] UKUT 109 (LC) (22 April 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/LC/2022/109.html Cite as: [2022] UKUT 109 (LC) |
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UT Neutral citation number:
UTLC Case Number: LC-2021-229
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
RATING – HEREDITAMENT – multi-floored office building – proposal to merge contiguous and interconnected hereditaments – Rating (Property in Common Occupation) and Council Tax (Empty Dwellings) Act 2018 - appeal dismissed
TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007
AN APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF
THE VALUATION TRIBUNAL FOR ENGLAND
BETWEEN:
-and-
Re: Alpha House
Rowlandsway
Manchester
M22 5RG
P D McCREA FRICS FCIArb
DECISION ON WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS
Mr John Fifield FRICS, for the appellant
Mr Admas Habteslasie, instructed by HMRC solicitor, for the respondent.
The following cases are referred to in this decision:
Woolway (VO) v Mazars [2015] UKSC 53
Libra Textiles Limited T/A Boundary Mills Stores, Centric Assets Limited v Ritchie Roberts and David Alford (Valuation Officers) [2020] UKUT 237 (LC)
Roberts (VO) v Backhouse Jones Limited [2020] UKUT 38 (LC)
“44.
45.
46.
47.
‘…the practice of treating contiguous floors in single occupation as single hereditaments was convenient and had previously been thought unobjectionable. In the 2017 Autumn Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer therefore announced that the government would legislate to reinstate the practice. A public consultation followed in December 2017 entitled “Business rates in multi-occupied properties: reinstating the practice of the Valuation Officer Agency prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Woolway (VO) v Mazars.”
12. The proposal in the draft Bill which accompanied the consultation was to revert to the practice of treating contiguous units as single hereditaments. It was favourably received…’
48.
…
52.
“(3ZA) In relation to England, where-
(a) two or more hereditaments (whether in the same building or otherwise) are occupied by the same person,
…
the hereditaments shall be treated as one hereditament.
(3ZB) In relation to England, where-
(a) two or more hereditaments (whether in the same building or otherwise) are-
(i) owned by the same person, and
(ii) unoccupied,
(b) the hereditaments-
(i) ceased to be occupied on the same day, and
(ii) have each remained unoccupied since that day,
(c) immediately before that day, the hereditaments were, or formed part of, a single hereditament by virtue of subsection (3ZA), and
(d) the hereditaments meet the contiguity condition (see subsection (3ZC)),
the hereditaments shall be treated as one hereditament.”
“11. Mr Fifield provided rental schedules for the whole building covering the period 25 March 2010 to 29 September 2010 which showed that the whole building was vacant at the material date of 1 April 2010, apart from the Ground Floor. The ratepayer in respect of these vacant premises was Fleetguild Ltd (now Stormhill Properties Ltd), and that as they were all in the same “ownership” they met the criteria of subsection 3ZB…”
(my emphasis)
“22. In essence, the amended regulations removed the requirement for properties in common occupation which were contiguous to be interconnected in order to form a single entry in the List. The additional types of Hereditament created by the new regulations are defined by 3ZA and 3ZB detailed above, and Mr Fifield argues that the current separate assessments in Alpha House met the criteria of 3ZB and should therefore form a single entry in the List. He contended that all of the Hereditaments, apart from the Ground Floor, had been unoccupied since at least 1 April 2010, and were in the same ownership. He contended that it could not have been the intention of the amended regulations that all of the separate assessments must have become unoccupied on the same date in order to fit the criteria, as this would exclude any multi-occupied building such as Alpha house from becoming a single entry in the List.
23. I can see why the Appellant would query the intention of the regulations in effectively excluding such multi-occupied properties from being able to make a late proposal. However the regulations are clear and unambiguous in stating the criteria for unoccupied properties to be merged further to the reversal of Mazars. In my view, although Mr Fifield offered an alternative interpretation of the regulations in that the date in question refers to the effective date sought for the merger, I could see no indication in the drafting of the regulation that this was the intention. Even if this was to be the case, further on in the regulation (3ZB(c)), it is a requirement that all the properties to be merged were previously in the same occupation prior to being unoccupied and would have been considered ripe for merging under (3ZA). It is clear to me that this was also not the case and even if all the properties had become unoccupied on the same date, they would fail the further criteria set out in (3ZB(c)). I therefore find that the proposal to merge the appeal properties is invalid and dismiss the appeal.
24. Were it not for this failure to meet the criteria of 3ZB, I would be obliged to consider the findings of the [Upper Tribunal] in the [Libra Textiles] decision in relation to this appeal. At the material day all of the appeal hereditaments, apart possibly from part of the ground floor, were unoccupied and in the same ownership. They were contiguous and they were interconnected by common areas. Mr Fifield has stated in response to the [Libra Textiles] decision that there was no interconnection between the properties which would have prevented them from being merged subsequent to Mazars.
25. If as contended by the Respondent, as at the material day, 1 April 2010, the ground floor was still occupied then not all twelve hereditaments shown in the list were unoccupied and the proposal is invalid, because there would remain two hereditaments in different ownership/occupation which cannot be merged.
26. The Appellant had stated that at the material date, all twelve were unoccupied. This is at odds with his submission, but if this was the case, I find that the common areas which provided the interconnection between the hereditaments were in the demise of the owner of the appeal hereditaments. They could therefore have been merged had the appellant made a proposal at any time under regulation 4(1)k whilst the list was in force if the whole building was unoccupied and in the same ownership. As no proposal was made before 31 March 2017, the PICO legislation to make a proposal under reg 4(1)(k) after this date does not, in accordance with the [Libra Textiles] decision allow such a proposal. Therefore the assessments for which a merger was proposed, were unaffected by the Mazars judgment because the whole building was in the same occupation/ownership and the reversal of Mazars reversal (PICO legislation) does not help the appellant.
‘so the whole of Alpha House became vacant on that date. For the avoidance of doubt, whilst the termination of the subleases might have yielded up possession on different dates to the Appellant, vacant possession of the whole of Alpha House was yielded up on a single date, being 31 March 2010.’
P D McCrea FRICS FCIArb
Right of appeal
Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.