[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	United Kingdom Journals
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Journals >> Ramsey, How to Join the Club: Poland, Pre-accession and Agenda 2000 URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/1999/issue5/ramsey5.html Cite as: Ramsey, How to Join the Club: Poland, Pre-accession and Agenda 2000

[New search] [Help]

How to Join the Club: Poland, Pre-accession and Agenda 2000

Dr.Lynn E Ramsey

Lecturer in Law,
School of law
University of Glasgow

<[email protected]>

Copyright © 1999 Lynn E Ramsey.
First Published in Web Journal of Current Legal Issues in association with Blackstone Press Ltd.

Summary

In July 1997 the Commission published "Agenda 2000" a communication designed to deal with future challenges for the European Union. The following year a revised or enhanced pre-accession strategy was adopted. This article focuses upon those parts of the communication which deal with accession. It analyses the impact of Agenda 2000 and the enhanced pre-accession strategy applied to Central and Eastern European states, particularly Poland.

Contents

1. Introduction
2. Towards Pre-Accession
3. Agenda 2000

a. The Opinions
b. The Polish Opinion

4. The Revised or Enhanced Pre-Accession Strategy
5. Accession: Remaining Problems
6. The Future for Poland's Accession Negotiations

Bibliography

1. Introduction

The Association Agreement between Poland and the EC and its Member States, the Polish Europe Agreement, entered into force on 1 February 1994 (Agreement concluding a Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part OJ 1993 L348/2). The Europe Agreement covers political dialogue, free trade, freedom of movement, competition law and economic, financial and cultural co-operation with an institutional framework. (Ramsey 1995a). Just two months after it came into effect, on 5 April, Poland submitted its official application for membership of the European Union. The speed at which the membership application was submitted could be perceived as a failure in that the Agreement could not, and did not, meet the needs of Poland.

By April 5 the Europe Agreement had barely begun to be implemented. Therefore any potential for positive effects whether economic, legal or social could not have hoped to have taken effect. The evaluations which had been carried out by this point were, on the whole, positive. Menkes believes the quick membership application did not arise from a disappointing evaluation of the performance of the Agreement. (Menkes 1995, 81-83). In his opinion the motivating force was "a gap between the political aspirations of Poland (and the other Visegrad Group countries)⁽¹⁾ to membership in the Union and the other European (WEU) and transatlantic (NATO) integration groupings and the political response of these institutions to our expectations" (Menkes 1995, 84).

This article examines the development of the pre-accession strategy for the Central and East European States (CEES) in general and Poland in particular. It will focus upon the issues raised in the Commission's recent report on accession of the CEES, Agenda 2000 and the enhanced pre-accession partnership. (Agenda 2000 COM(97) 2000 final).

Top | Contents | Bibliography

2. Towards Pre-Accession

Although the Europe Agreement was signed on 1 March 1992, it did not enter into force until almost two years later on 1 February 1994. The Europe Agreement being a mixed agreement, required to be ratified by each Member State's parliament.⁽²⁾ This proved to be a time-consuming process and, in order to ease the delay, interim agreements were enacted covering those areas falling wholly within the EC's competence (Council Decision on the conclusion by the European Economic Community of an Interim Agreement between the European Economic Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part, on trade and trade-related matters, OJ 1992 L114/1).

Meanwhile, pressure continued upon the EC to develop a more appropriate response to the needs of the CEES. The European Council was to provide the forum where policy developments would be announced. Article 49 (ex article O) TEU provides that "[a]ny European State may apply to become a member of the Union". The conditions for accession are not articulated. Instead these are to be the "subject of an agreement between the Member States and the Applicant State". The Copenhagen Council of June 1993 outlined the conditions which it considered necessary for accession to the EU as follows: They are

1. The need for stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities;
2. The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union;
3. The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration; and
4. The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.⁽³⁾

Although both the Maastricht and Lisbon Councils had agreed to examine the general implications of enlargement, this was the first occasion where membership criteria, albeit vague, had been articulated; it marked a more concrete acceptance of eventual accession. The Council also agreed to open EC markets more rapidly.⁽⁴⁾ The conditions specified were both political and economic and depended not merely upon the performance of the CEES but also upon the development of the EU itself. (Ramsey 1995b)

The next milestone on the road to accession came with the Essen Council in December which accepted two important Commission proposals, one focussing upon the political dimension (the structured relationship with the EC institutions), the other focussing upon the economic dimension (the White Paper on the Single Market). The "structured relationship" was designed in part to address concerns relating to the bilateral nature of the Europe Agreements by creating multilateral frameworks. Its principal aim was to "develop practical cooperation between the governments of the Member States and of the associated countries" in areas of common interest. It was hoped that the Associated States would become familiar with the workings of the EC institutions through their attendance at certain Council and European Council meetings. The frequency of meetings and issues covered relate to the corresponding Council meetings. So General Affairs, Justice and Home Affairs meetings are held on a semi-annual basis and the Internal Market, Ecofin, Agriculture, Transport, Telecommunications, Research, Environment, Culture and Education meetings are held on an annual basis.

Obviously the structured relationship is limited. It does not grant the Associated States the ability to propose, vote on or oppose EC policy. It merely provides the opportunity for consultation. However, it does serve to move consultation on to a multilateral basis enabling the development of cooperation between the CEES. (This will be very important if internal conflict within an expanded EU is to be minimised). In addition, the structured relationship is designed to help prepare the groundwork for the White Paper.

The White Paper, Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union was published in May 1995 (European Commission 1995). It is a very detailed document running to 478 pages, drafted in response to the Essen Council's exhortation that the integration of the Associated States into the internal market was "the key element in the strategy to narrow the gap". The White Paper aims to help the Associated States prepare for the internal market. The paper does not cover the entire acquis communautaire (acquis), which must be adopted by all applicant Member States, but only those aspects which relate to the internal market.⁽⁵⁾ The White Paper was designed to act as a pre-accession "blue-print" for the Associated States. It defines "key measures" in each sector of the internal market and suggests the order in which the approximation of legislation should be addressed. Support for achieving these goals is provided through a multi-country PHARE programme and technical assistance is provided through the establishment of the Technical Assistance Information Office (TAIEX).⁽⁶⁾

Drawing up the White Paper was coordinated across the Commission. For example, DGXV had responsibility for regulatory convergence and DG1A had responsibility for the PHARE aspects.⁽⁷⁾ It appears that there was some internal conflict before the division of responsibility was agreed (Wallace and Wallace 1996, pp 382-383). The standards contained within the White Paper overlap with some aspects of the Europe Agreement, an important qualitative difference being that the Europe Agreement created legal rights and obligations vis-a-vis the parties. The White Paper imposes no obligations on Poland, or any of the Associated States. It is intended to assist with pre-accession strategy and should also assist with the implementation of the Europe Agreement because it provides guidelines for implementation and additional financial resources through PHARE.

The European Council meeting in Madrid in December 1995 highlighted three features which should help create "the conditions for gradual, harmonious integration of the applicant countries":

1. The development of the market economy;
2. The adjustment of their administrative structure; and
3. The creation of a stable economic and monetary environment.

It requested that the Commission present Opinions on the applications for membership submitted by the CEES as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC).⁽⁸⁾

Top | Contents | Bibliography

3. Agenda 2000

a. The Opinions

In April 1996 the Commission issued a questionnaire to each of the applicant states to assess their suitability for membership. The document was extensive, around 250 pages, and covered areas not raised in the White Paper. The main part of the questionnaire was common to all applicant states. There were additional annexes relating to particular states. For example, the Lithuanian questionnaire contained additional questions on fisheries.⁽⁹⁾ Polish officials complained that they were given insufficient time to respond to the questionnaire. It is clear that officials perceived that more time was taken to draw up the questions than the recipients were granted to submit their replies.⁽¹⁰⁾ The applicants were given the opportunity to present additional information at bilateral talks held in May 1997. The Commission prepared their Opinions using a variety of sources drawing not merely upon the questionnaires and bilateral reports but also upon Member States' assessments, European Parliament Reports and resolutions and reports from international organisations, non-governmental organisations and what are described as "other bodies". (Agenda 2000, volume I, p 41) In addition, progress in implementing the Europe Agreement, the White Paper and other aspects of the acquis was considered.

The resulting report was the lengthy Agenda 2000. The document contains the individual Opinions on the applicant CEES, a general assessment of accession requests, recommendations for a successful enlargement of the Union and an evaluation of the impact of enlargement on the Union's policies.

b. The Polish Opinion

An Opinion was prepared for each of the applicants assessing their ability to join the EU by measuring their performance under each of the Copenhagen Council criteria outlined above. The Opinions are based upon both factual evidence and predictions based on economic and political criteria and were all delivered at the same time because the Madrid Council had insisted that all the applicants were to be treated equally. None of the applicants was considered to satisfy all of the criteria. However, the Commission considered that Poland, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could reach the necessary standard in "the medium term" (five years) provided "they maintain and strongly sustain their efforts of preparation". An analysis of the Polish opinion is described in Table 1 of this article. The analysis reveals that whilst progress in certain areas was praised it is clear that certain areas such as the restructuring of the agricultural sector and the enforcement of environmental legislation would require long-term solutions.

Agenda 2000 contains a table illustrating progress in adopting the White Paper measures.(Annex 1,).The figures indicate that at the end of June 1997, Poland had made fairly good progress adopting 405 of the 899 directives and regulations contained in the White Paper. However, limited weight may be placed upon these figures. The Commission has stressed that publishing the table does not indicate that it agrees with this analysis. Moreover the figures indicate only adopted legislative measures. There are no indications as to how these measures are implemented and monitored in order to ensure their effectiveness.

Top | Contents | Bibliography

4. The Revised or Enhanced Pre-Accession Strategy

Agenda 2000 proposed that all forms of EU pre-accession support be brought together within a single framework, namely the accession partnership. This was endorsed by the Luxembourg Council meeting on 12-13 December 1997. The Council adopted the ten decisions establishing the principles, priorities, immediate objectives and conditions of each of the partnerships. (Council decisions 98/259/EC to 98/268/EC, OJ L121, 23/4/1998) The detailed content of each partnership was determined by the Commission. (EC Bull 3-1998, point 1.3.67)

The EU is pursuing a twin track approach towards enlargement. The process of accession for all ten applicant states was launched in March 1998. Each of the ten applicant states follows the pre-accession strategy discussed below. However, accession negotiations have begun only with the six candidate states selected in Agenda 2000.

The enhanced pre-accession strategy has seven elements. The first is the accession partnership which is designed to be the "key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy". It aims to prepare the candidate states for EU accession by articulating a number of short and medium term objectives. These cover areas which apply to all candidate states such as meeting the political criterion for membership, economic reform and agriculture. Each accession partnership is intended to reflect the specific situation and needs of individual candidate states. So for example, the Polish accession partnership includes a programme for steel sector restructuring.

The second element in the strategy is the Europe Agreement. All Europe Agreements concluded with the associated states are now in force. The importance of the Europe Agreement in the pre-accession process has grown with the introduction of the accession partnership for two reasons. First, the institutions established under the Europe Agreement have assumed the additional responsibility of overseeing the running and implementation of the accession partnerships. Secondly, the accession partnerships have made explicit the concept of conditionality in EU-CEES relations. EU financial assistance is conditional upon the fulfilment of the conditions imposed by the Europe Agreements, progress towards satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and working towards the implementation of the accession partnership. So the Europe Agreement is to be used both as a sword and a shield in the enhanced pre-accession strategy: failure to respect the standards of the Europe Agreement will result in a financial penalty for the associated state and the Europe Agreement conditions become a benchmark against which suitability for membership is measured.

Pre-accession aid forms the third element of the strategy. Each accession partnership specifies the amount of technical and financial assistance which may be received and provides details of the main instruments through which support may be received. The principal source of finance continues to be the PHARE programme; the total PHARE budget for 1998 was 1 308.4 million ECU of which 125 million was allocated to Poland. The Commission has proposed that after 2000, pre-accession aid should be re-enforced by additional aid for agricultural development and a structural fund designed to operate in the same way as the EU cohesion fund.

The fourth element is screening of the acquis. Negotiations with the six candidate states on the first seven of the thirty one negotiating chapters of the acquis were opened on 3 April 1998. Accepting that the seven chapters selected were "among the easier ones", Commissioner Van den Broek felt that this represented "a sound start" (Press conference Commissioner Van den Broek, 11 March 1999). A further eight chapters were opened by June 1999. It is anticipated that by the end of 1999 three-quarters of all negotiating chapters will be opened and that the remaining chapters will be opened by mid 2000. It has been agreed that negotiations can close in a number of areas for each of the candidate states. In Poland's case no further negotiations are required at this stage in the fields of statistics, industrial policy, consumer and health protection and telecommunications. This does not necessarily mean that negotiations in these chapters are closed indefinitely. They may be reactivated if, for example, the acquis were to change.

Agenda 2000 proposed a re-orientation of the PHARE programme focusing upon institution building and investment. The fifth element of the pre-accession programme, Twinning, is the instrument designed by the Commission to assist the candidate states improve their institutional capacity in order that they may have the ability to adopt and implement the acquis. 500 million ECU per year from the PHARE programme has been allocated to the Twinning project. Twinning is focused upon the acquis and will attempt to implement the priorities identified in the accession partnerships. EU experts will be seconded to the candidate states to work on specific projects. The aim is not only to provide technical assistance but also to build long-term relationships between the EU and the candidate states. The Europe Agreement already provided for participation in Community programmes and participation in certain programmes is already underway. Agenda 2000 and now the accession partnerships also propose that CEES participate in Community mechanisms to apply the acquis.⁽¹¹⁾ The motivation for extending participation to the applicants is an attempt to better prepare them for membership by helping with the adoption of the acquis and helping to resolve more technical problems.

The final element to the accession strategy is the adoption of a national programme for the adoption of the acquis by each candidate state. The EU-Poland Association Council welcomed the adopted of the Polish National Programme at its meeting on 10 November 1998.

Top | Contents | Bibliography

5. Accession: Remaining Problems

Poland's inclusion in the Commission's list does not mean that EU membership is now automatic. The Commission has adopted a monitoring procedure which produces annual progress reports on each candidate state's progress towards accession. These reports will provide the basis for any decisions which the Council takes in relation to accession, such as amendments to the accession partnerships. The first reports were published by the Commission in October 1998. (EC Bulletin Supplement 6/98). The Polish report was, on the whole, reasonably positive. The Commission considered that Poland continued to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, had a functioning market economy and that it should be in a position to cope with competitive pressures and market forces in the EU in the medium term.

However, progress in implementation was found to be "uneven". Administrative and institutional capacity in certain important areas such as the environment, standardisation and state aid control was considered to be inadequate. A dramatic example of institutional ineffectiveness was seen in 1998 when the EU withdrew 34 million ECU from Poland's PHARE budget. Fourteen of Poland's proposed projects were rejected by the EU on the grounds that they failed to comply with the priorities of the accession partnership or Poland's harmonisation programme or because they were insufficiently defined. (Warsaw Voice, 7 June 1998). It is clear that a lack of coordination between Polish administrative officials must have been at least partly to blame. There appears to have been an internal dispute as to which government department should have the responsibility for administering the funds. Moreover, the Polish government only submitted its PHARE programme to the EU 48 hours before the deadline; failure to submit on time would have resulted in the loss of Poland's entire PHARE budget for that year.

Additional difficulties persist for Poland in the restructuring and modernisation of certain sectors, particularly steel and agriculture. The Commission reported that "major efforts are required to ensure the effective implementation of the steel restructuring programme" and that "current provisions for a rural development policy fall very short of the requirements facing Poland in preparing for accession".

On balance though, Poland will be content with the outcome of Agenda 2000 and the first progress report. They are on course to be amongst the first wave of CEES to join the EU and they have won praise for much of the progress made towards economic and political reform. It would also appear that the much publicised trade disputes relating to implementation of the Europe Agreement have not hampered their progress. There was concern in Poland that there may have been a backlash in the Opinion against the strong stance which Poland had often adopted over implementation issues (Interview with Tabor/1996).

The Opinion may mask the true reality of Polish readiness to join. Whilst it is to Poland's credit that some 405 of the 899 regulations and directives contained in the White Paper have been adopted, the figures raise as many questions as they answer about Polish progress. Quantitative data can reveal little of the quality of the progress. How complex and controversial are the remaining pieces of legislation? In addition, in many crucial aspects, the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are inadequate .The Opinion makes it clear that the Commission has been unable to assess the quality of implementation which has taken place. This is a crucial issue; Polish civil servants feel that they are often unclear what the correct interpretation of EC legislation is. Maceji Gorka expressed concern that the Polish lawyers were not always clear as to whether their interpretation of the acquis was consistent with that of the Commission (Interview with Gorka/1996).

The Agenda 2000 documents have raised some more general issues about accession to the EU. The European Council has excluded the possibility of partial adoption of the acquis, although derogations agreed during the negotiations process will still be available. This is the same approach which had been adopted in all previous accession negotiations. The extent and complexity of the acquis at the end of the millennium means that accession for the next group of states will be more demanding than was the case with previous accessions.

Agenda 2000 has clarified the standard expected of new Member States in relation to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It had been feared by some commentators that full participation in the third stage of EMU would be required (Ramsey 2/1995 pp195-196). The Commission has stated that EU membership only implies acceptance of the goal of EMU; applicants will have to achieve the convergence criteria but not necessarily on accession (Agenda 2000, Polish Opinion, p57). The Commission considers that Poland is on course to comply with the third stage of EMU as a non-Euro participant. The ability to participate in the Euro area is dependent upon the success of structural transformation.

One of the Commission's recommendations which may prove to have a decisive impact upon the course of negotiations is the decision that the simultaneous opening of negotiations "does not imply that negotiations will be concluded simultaneously"(Agenda 2000, volume I, p69). The Visegrad states resented that they were required to sign Europe Agreements at the same time. Hungary considered that Poland was too confrontational and impeded its progress. All the applicants are fiercely competitive and eager to ensure that their state is the first to join. At the same time, a number of commentators have noted that greater concessions may have been achieved under the Europe Agreement had the Visegrad states adopted common negotiating positions. It will be interesting to see how these factors influence the leading group of applicants. Will they seek to achieve the most favourable deal by establishing negotiating pacts? Or, will they become adversaries in a bid to become the first CEES to join the EU? Experience of Polish-EC relations thus far would suggest that cooperation with the Visegrad states is unlikely.

Top | Contents | Bibliography

6. The Future for Poland's Accession Negotiations

Both the Europe Agreement negotiations and the subsequent implementation has been marked by dispute and conflict. Only in the Polish Opinion did the Commission draw attention to such disputes. Will the Poles become more measured in their negotiations? The Poles dislike feeling that they are not being treated as equal partners and prize their new role as an independent actor on the international political stage. As Krysztof Treczynski explains, Poland is not a "yes" partner and is very wary of attempts by the Commission to become the "older brother" imposing decisions. Polish sensitivities to such overtures run high because "they had an older brother under the old system". The forthcoming accession negotiations provide Poland with an opportunity to build upon the lessons of the Europe Agreements. Success is crucial not only to secure EU membership. The dynamics of the forthcoming negotiations and the derogations achieved will be pivotal to establishing Poland's role within the EU.

Annex One: Single Market - White Paper Measures
White Paper Chapters	Directives Stage Stage I II/III	Regulations Stage Stage I II/III	Total
1. Free movement of Capital Poland Number	3 1 3 1	0 0 0 0	4 4
2. FM and safety of industrial products Poland Number	27 77 56 104	3 0 4 1	107 165
3. Competition Poland Number	2 0 3 0	1 0 1 0	3 4
4. Social policy and action Poland Number	7 11 12 15	0 0 0 2	18 29
5. Agriculture Poland Number	75 30 93 46	25 0 62 2	130 203
6. Transport Poland Number	18 7 19 15	6 2 8 13	33 55
7. Audiovisual Poland Number	1 0 1 0	0 0 0 0	1 1
8. Environment Poland Number	9 2 31 7	4 0 7 0	15 45
9. Telecommunications Poland Number	7 2 9 7	0 0 0 0	9 16
10. Direct taxation Poland Number	2 1 2 2	0 0 0 0	3 4
11. Free movement of goods Poland Number	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0
12. Public procurement Poland Number	5 1 5 1	0 0 0 0	6 6
13. Financial services Poland Number	10 7 13 8	0 0 0 0	17 21
14. Protection of personal data Poland Number	0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0	0 2
15. Company law Poland Number	2 3 2 3	0 0 0 1	5 6
16. Accountancy Poland Number	3 2 3 2	0 0 0 0	5 5
17. Civil law Poland Number	0 1 1 1	0 0 0 0	1 2
18. Mutual recognition of prof. qual. Poland Number	0 6 2 16	0 0 0 0	6 18
19. Intellectual property Poland Number	5 3 5 3	0 0 0 3	8 11
White Paper Chapters	Directives Stage Stage I II/III	Regulations Stage Stage I II/III	Total
20. Energy Poland Number	7 0 10 2	0 0 3 0	7 15
21. Customs law Poland Number	0 0 2 1	13 0 14 184	13 201
22. Indirect taxation Poland Number	9 0 15 54	0 0 0 6	9 75
23. Consumer protection Poland Number	5 0 8 3	0 0 0 0	5 11
TOTAL Poland Number	197 154 295 293	52 2 99 212	405 899

Number means the number of White Paper measures to be adopted.

Top | Contents

Bibliography

Duff, Andrew (ed) (1997) The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary (London: Sweet and Maxwell).

European Commission (1993) Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, SEC(93) 648 final.

European Commission (1995) Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union COM(95) 163 final and annex COM(95) 163 final 2 (Brussels: European Commission).

European Commission (1997a) Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union COM(97) 2000 final (Brussels: European Commission).

European Commission (1997b) Commission's Opinion on Poland's Application for Membership of the European Union COM(97) 2002 final (Brussels: European Commission).

Menkes, Jerzy (1995), 'Evolution of the Europe Agreement and Changes in Poland-EU Relations' 41 Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 81-102.

Ramsey, Lynn E (1995a), 'The Implications of the Europe Agreements for an Expanded European Union' 44 International and Comparative Legal Quarterly 161-171.

Ramsey, Lynn E (1995b), 'Towards a Wider European Union: A Commentary on the Possible Accession of Hungary and Poland to the European Union' 1 European Public Law 189-200.

Wallace, Helen and Wallace William (1996), Policy-Making in the European Union (3^rd ed)(Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Newspaper Articles:

"Row Threatens EU Enlargement Plans" Financial Times, 15/9/97.

"Europe's Myopia" Financial Times, 17/9/97.

"Getting our PHARE Share" Warsaw Voice, 24/5/98.

"PHARE Fallout: How Did the European Integration Committee Fumble Away 34 Million ECU?" Warsaw Voice, 7/6/98.

Interviews:

Maieji Gorka, lawyer in the legal department of the Polish Ministry for European Integration, 7 November 1996, Warsaw.

Jorgen Mordenstein, Centre for European Policy Studies, 25 September 1996, Brussels.

Marek Tabor, Polish Ministry for European Integration, 6 November 1996, Warsaw.

Krysztof Trepcznski, Counsellor, Mission of Republic of Poland to the European Union, 24 September, Brussels.

(1) The Visegrad Group countries: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia ( now the Czech and Slovak Republics).

(2) In a mixed agreement both the EC and its Member States share the legal competence to conclude the international agreement.

(3) These conditions were first proposed by the Commission in 1993 (European Commission 1993).

(4) Market access to sensitive sectors was also increased although to a more limited degree; OJ L25, 29/1/94.

(5) The acquis is the collective name given to all obligations arising under the EC treaties and secondary legislation. Wallace and Wallace (1996, p 382) suggest that in drawing up the White Paper in this way implies that certain aspects of the acquis, that is those aspects directly relating to the more commercial aspects, are more important than others.

(6) PHARE, Poland and Hungary Aid for Restructuring and Development, was established in December 1989. It was originally designed to assist economic restructuring in Poland and Hungary but the programme quickly developed in order to help these states prepare for EU membership. There are now eleven CEES included in the programme.

(7) DGXV is the division within the Commission with responsibility for the internal market and financial services. DG1A was established by the Commission in 1993 to reflect the wider dynamics of Common Foreign and Security Policy. It deals with EU relations with European states which are not members of the EU.

(8) The IGC, which was held pursuant to Article 48 (ex Article N) TEU to review certain aspects of that Treaty, commenced in March 1996 and concluded in June 1997.

(9) Interview with Jorgen Mordenstein, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 25 September 1996.

(10). Interview with Krzysztof Treczynski, Counselor, Polish Mission to the EU, Warsaw, 24 September 1996.

(11). The various Association Councils have taken a number of decisions enabling the CEES to participate in EU programmes such as: LIFE (the financial instrument for the environment); programmes in the field of culture; programmes in education, training and youth; equal opportunities programmes; public health programmes; and energy efficiency programmes.