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High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions >> Hawthorne's (Thomas Ronald) and White's (Raymond) Application (Rev 1) [2018] NIQB 5 (19 January 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2018/NIQB5.html Cite as: [2018] NIQB 5 |
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Neutral Citation No: [2018] NIQB 5
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down subject to editorial corrections. NO EMBARGO)* |
Ref: McC10504
JR 16/68976/01
Delivered: 19/01/2018 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION (JUDICIAL REVIEW)
________
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THOMAS RONALD HAWTHORNE AND RAYMOND WHITE
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
-v-
POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
________
INDEX
Introduction ……………………………………………….. [1] – [4]
Statutory Framework ……………………………………... [5] – [6]
Chronology …………………………………………………. [7]
The Impugned Public Statement …………………………. [8] – [23]
Thomas Ronald Hawthorne ………………………………. [24] – [27]
Raymond White ……………………………………………. [28] – [30]
The Families’ Evidence ……………………………………. [31]
Pre-publication Events …………………………………….. [32] – [39]
The Police Ombudsman’s Evidence ……………………… [40] – [48]
The Applicant’s Challenge ………………………………… [49]
The “Implication/Identification” Issue ………………… [50] – [69]
The Vires Ground of Challenge …………………………… [70] – [103]
The Second Ground: Procedural Unfairness ……………….. [104] – [115]
Irrationality ……………………………………………………. [116] – [117]
Conclusions Summarised ………………… [118] – [121]
Remedy …………………………………………………………. [122] – [137]
Recusal? ………………………………………………………… [138] – [181]
Further Consideration …………………………………………..[182] – [193]
Costs …………………………………………………………….. [194]
Recusal Applications Generally ……………......… [195] – [198]
Addendum: Final Order ………………………………….. [199] - [200]
Appendix 1: Statutory Provisions.
Appendix 2: Police Ombudsman’s Report, Appendix 1.
Appendix 3: Applicants’ Schedule and Respondent’s Reply.
NOTE
This judgment was promulgated in three stages:
[1] – [121], the substantive judgment: 21 December 2017
[122] – [198], ancillary issues: 26 January 2018
[199] – [200], final Order: 09 March 2018
McCLOSKEY J
Introduction
Statutory Framework
(a) Section 51(4): “The Ombudsman shall exercise his powers under this Part in such manner and to such extent as appears to him to be best calculated to secure-
(a) the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the police complaints system; and
(b) the confidence of the public and of members of the police force in that system.”
(b) Section 58(2): where, following consideration of a formal investigation report, the Police Ombudsman “determines” that an investigation report indicates that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force, he shall transmit the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) with such accompanying recommendations as appear to him appropriate.
(c) Section 59(1B): where the DPP decides not to prosecute, the Police Ombudsman shall consider the question of disciplinary proceedings and shall report in specified terms to the “appropriate disciplinary authority”, which report shall incorporate his recommendations as to disciplinary proceedings concerning “the conduct which is the subject of the investigation”.
(d) Section 62, which is of pivotal importance in these proceedings:
“The Ombudsman may, in relation to any exercise of his functions under this Part, publish a statement as to his actions, his decisions and determinations and the reasons for his decisions and determinations.”
Chronology
[7] The following is an outline of the material dates and events:
(i) 18 June 1994: The murder of six innocent civilians and injury of five others at the Heights Bar, Loughinisland, Co Down.
(ii) From 2001: Interaction between representatives of the victims and the Police Ombudsman.
(iii) March 2006: Formal complaint to the Police Ombudsman by the families.
(iv) 2006 – 2009: The Police Ombudsman’s first Loughinisland investigation.
(v) September 2009: exchanges between the Police Ombudsman and others prior to promulgation of the first Loughinisland “public statement”.
(vi) November 2009: Allegations about the conduct of a serving police officer in relation to the vehicle believed to have been used by the killers, culminating in a Public Prosecution Service (“PPS”) decision, in November 2010, that there would be no prosecution applying the “evidential” test.
(vii) June 2011: Publication of the Police Ombudsman’s first Loughinisland “public statement”.
(viii) September 2011: Judicial review challenge by the families to the Ombudsman’s first Loughinisland “public statement”.
(ix) July – December 2012: Review of the “public statement” by the Police Ombudsman.
(x) December 2012: The Police Ombudsman consented to the quashing of the “public statement”.
(xi) 2013 – 2016: The Police Ombudsman’s second Loughinisland investigation.
(xii) 09 June 2016: Publication of the Police Ombudsman’s second Loughinisland “public statement”, which is impugned in these proceedings.
(xiii) July 2016: PAP correspondence.
(xiv) August 2016: Commencement of these proceedings.
The impugned “Public Statement”
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a. “To establish if a member of the RUC or agent of the RUC was directly culpable in the attack and/or any other dimension of the matter such as provision of alibis, disposal of evidence, coaching of witnesses/suspects.
b. To establish if the RUC was in possession of intelligence from any sources, including casual contacts, registered informants, other agencies and/or other covert sources which, if acted on, might have prevented the attack. This should extend to knowledge of the activities of the group or individuals suspected of involvement in the preparation, planning or execution of the attack and include the supply or handling of articles used in connection with the incident such as firearms and vehicles.
c. To identify those structures and individuals within the UVF suspected of having performed roles relevant to the sanctioning, planning, preparation, execution and post incident acts connected to the attack and whether any of these groups/individuals presented the RUC with intelligence and/or evidence gathering opportunities, which were not acted on by police.
d. To establish if the police murder investigation was adversely impacted by the non-dissemination of intelligence or otherwise obstructed.
e. To identify all precursor events, which may be linked to the attack with a view to establishing whether police were presented with intelligence or evidential opportunities which, if properly exploited, might have resulted in law enforcement intervention and prevented escalation of activities, which culminated in the murders at Loughinisland.
f. To identify missed investigative opportunities by police, which may have resulted in the continued involvement in serious crime of those loyalist paramilitaries responsible for sanctioning, planning, preparation, participating in, or post incident acts relating to the attack at Loughinisland.
g. To establish if police senior command allocated sufficient levels of resourcing to the murder investigation and implemented oversight mechanisms so as to enable an effective investigation to take place.
h. To identify the investigation strategy of the police investigation(s) and establish if all reasonable lines of enquiry were pursued in an effective manner, including those relating to forensic opportunities (incorporating ballistics and crime scene examination), telecommunications, passive generators (such as CCTV), intelligence (including tasking of assets known to police, whether under the control of police or other agencies), witnesses and suspects.
i If serious, repeated or widespread criminality, misconduct or other failings by police are indicated, identify individual and/or corporate accountability, extending to police senior command.”
|
“Within a relatively short period of time the police had reliable intelligence on who committed the murders. They recovered the getaway car, the murder weapons and the clothing believed to have been used by the killers. Despite the high profile nature of the killings, the continued demands by families of the deceased for justice, and the many thousands of hours of investigative action by the police not one person has been prosecuted for the killings.”
The impetus for the second of the Ombudsman’s Loughinisland atrocity investigations conducted by the Ombudsman was the receipt of the families’ concerns about inadequacies in the police investigation, conducted by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”) and collusion between the RUC and the perpetrators.
[11] The Executive Summary formulates the following conclusions [p 4]:
“The families have complained that the police failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the murders. My conclusion is that the initial investigation into the murders at Loughinisland was characterised in too many instances by incompetence, indifference and neglect. This despite the assertions by the police that no stone would be left unturned to find the killers. My review of the police investigation has revealed significant failures in relation to the handling of suspects, exhibits, forensic strategy, crime scene management, house to house enquiries and investigative maintenance. The failure to conduct early intelligence-led arrests was particularly significant and seriously undermined the investigation into those responsible for the murders.”
It continues [page 5]:
“In addition, an important evidential opportunity was lost by the handling of the car used in the killings.”
[12] Under the rubric “Collusion”, the report states [p 5]:
“The failures to bring the killers to justice cannot be explained solely by a failure or otherwise of investigative actions. It was a central complaint of the families that there was ‘collusion’ between elements within the police and loyalist paramilitaries. It is clear that discussion around the issue of collusion in Northern Ireland is extremely controversial and politically sensitive.”
It continues [p 6]:
“A critical element of my investigation has been the police use of informants within loyalist paramilitaries. The investigation considered the extent to which the Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) / police relationship undermined policing prior to the Loughinisland murders and the investigation into that attack. It is my view that the nature of the relationship between the police and informants undermined the investigative process in a number of ways …
There were many examples of failures to pass on intelligence to investigators. This meant that investigative lines of inquiry were not followed and individuals, who might have been subject to detailed and robust investigation, were effectively excluded from consideration. In the case of the incidents prior to the Loughinisland murders, limited action was taken against the UVF unit suspected of a series of serious crimes.
In addition, investigative opportunities were undermined by the way in which information relating to those involved in the ownership chain of the car used in the Loughinisland attack was handled.
The police also had intelligence that in August 1994 the murder suspects were warned – by a police officer – that they were going to be arrested. It is unacceptable that if such actions occurred, police failed to act on the information received and did not investigate this allegation further.
|
The investigation also identified the existence of intelligence sources within loyalist paramilitaries, who were not tasked effectively to obtain information on who committed the attack and to provide information that could further shape investigative action by the Murder Investigation Team. This was a ‘hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil’ approach to the use of informants, which potentially frustrated the police investigation into the attack and restricted investigation opportunities and lines of inquiry.
|
I have found that Special Branch held intelligence that paramilitary informants were involved in a range of activities, including command and control of loyalist paramilitaries; the procurement, importation and distribution of weapons; murder; and conspiracy to murder. They have not been subject to any meaningful criminal investigation.
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It is of particular concern that Special Branch continued to engage in a relationship with sources they identified in intelligence reporting as likely to have been involved at some level in the Loughinisland atrocity. If these individuals were culpable in the murders they took every opportunity to distance themselves by attributing various roles in the attack to other members of the UVF. The continued use of some informants who themselves were implicated in serious and ongoing criminality is extremely concerning.” |
[13] Following this lengthy preamble the Executive Summary expresses the following conclusion [p 7]:
“Many of the issues I have identified in this report, including the protection of informants through both wilful acts and the passive ‘turning a blind eye’; catastrophic failures in the police investigation; and destruction of exhibits and documents are in themselves evidence of collusion ………….
When viewed collectively I have no hesitation in unambiguously determining that collusion is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders.”
[Emphasis added.]
This is, by a distance, the headline passage in the Ombudsman’s report.
(i) Arms importation and the firearm used in the murders.
(ii) Events preceding the attack.
(iii) Intelligence available immediately prior to the attack and the response of the RUC.
(iv) The RUC investigation of the attack.
(v) Resourcing and subsequent developments in the murder investigation.
The other components of the impugned report are, in summary:
(a) The “Executive Summary” and “Introduction”, both considered above.
(b) Chapter 2: “Background of Complaint”.
(c) Chapter 3: “The Public Complaint and Terms of Reference” (considered above).
(d) Chapter 9: “Conclusions”.
(e) Appendix 1: “Summary of Findings in relation to Core Complaints” (reproduced in its entirety in Appendix 2 to this judgment).
(f) Four other Appendices.
[18] I now turn to chapter 9 (“Conclusions”) which contains the following criticisms in particular:
(i) The RUC were pre-occupied with the protection of informants, giving this priority over the prevention and detection of crime.
(ii) There were corrupt relations between members of the security forces in South Down and the UVF unit to which the RUC attributed the Loughinisland murders.
(iii) There was an inexcusable failure by the RUC to investigate intelligence that the perpetrators of the murders had been warned by a police officer of their imminent arrest.
(iv) The multiple and fundamental failings in the RUC investigation of the Loughinisland murders included a “catastrophic” failure in the “suspect strategy”; inadequate investigation of an arrested suspect’s alibi; an inconsistent approach to the collection of forensic samples; inadequate investigation of the ownership history of the suspect murder vehicle; an inadequate response to an anonymous telephone call and letter; and an inappropriate willingness to;
“…. accept intelligence reporting, which was almost certainly designed to exculpate individuals, who may have been involved and other information designed to distance individuals from the murders.”
[19] The report continues, in trenchant terms:
“The failure to investigate adequately the role of state agents in a range of criminal activities at a strategic and operational level effectively meant that they were protected from serious investigation and continued in their criminal activities.”
This is followed by the statement:
“I can only conclude that the desire to protect informants may have influenced policing activity and undermined the police investigation into those who ordered and carried out the attack. When combined with a flawed investigation of the Loughinisland murders, this has undermined the investigation into those responsible for these crimes and ultimately justice for the victims and survivors.
This is one of the passages of which Mr Hawthorne complains. The next section of the concluding chapter addresses the familiar conundrum and conflicts which habitually arise in police activities involving informants. It quotes from –
“… an ‘open letter’ written by a former Assistant Chief Constable (ACC), and representative of the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association, in response to Sir John Steven’s investigation.”
[20] The gist of the passages then quoted emerges in the following sentence:
“As the intelligence world never viewed its existence as being solely a vehicle by which to serve the needs of crime investigation it, therefore, on specific occasions, quite justifiably adopted, in its opinion, the position that the priority to preserve life and secondly property came at the expense of solving crime.”
It is evident that the population of the “intelligence world” included those members of the RUC who were active in the generation of intelligence and interactive with so-called informants, or State agents.
“Thus, in this context, the protection of police informants is not a sinister act but one which is entirely reasonable in order to protect the life of an informant. The Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association has also raised the issue in relation to the failure of government to provide clear and meaningful guidance on the participation of informants in criminal acts.”
“A critical element of this investigation has been the police use of informants. I accept that the use of police informants is an integral part of policing and that their involvement during the ‘Troubles’ saved many lives. Police, particularly in the heightened circumstances of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland could not have undertaken their duties effectively unless they had informants providing information to them ……
Notwithstanding my criticism at paragraphs 9.3 and 9.4 of this statement, the police who were responsible for the retrieval of a large number of weapons, which were imported into Northern Ireland, are to be commended. It is unlikely that these weapons would have been discovered if there had not been informers within the ranks of Loyalist paramilitaries reporting to the police.”
“Informant handling requires the balancing of the potential value of the informant (which may save lives) and the nature and scope of activities, in which they are likely to be involved. Modern policing practice attempt to resolve these difficulties through application of the law and specifically RIPA, intensive frontline supervision of officers, clear internal guidelines and authorisation procedures, performance management and integrity testing of individuals. Some of these ‘checks and balances’ did not appear to exist in Northern Ireland at the time. Indeed I have seen evidence from a senior informant handler (interviewed as part of a different investigation by my Office), that he had so many registered informants that it was difficult to “manage” them effectively and consistently in relation to their criminality.”
In the immediately ensuing passages the Ombudsman, while sympathising with the difficulties posed by “a lack of suitable guidance” states [9.32]:
“However, a lack of suitable guidance does not excuse the actions of the “intelligence world” if it meant that individuals were protected from investigation into serious crimes as a consequence of their participation as informers.”
“These failings represent more than ‘intelligence failures’. At best they are indicative of an ‘intelligence mindset’, which placed the collection of information before the prevention and detection of crime. At worst they indicate a disregard by some for the suffering of the families involved at the hands of loyalist paramilitary gangs and a corrupting involvement, tacitly or otherwise, in serious criminal acts.”
In the final paragraph of the report the Ombudsman repeats the passage reproduced in [13] above.
Thomas Ronald Hawthorne
[25] Mr Hawthorne was the first ever Northern Ireland recipient of the Queen’s Gallantry Medal. During his lifetime of police service, he was shot and injured by terrorists and his home was attacked by a terrorist bomb. He avers, inter alia:
“All of my actions as a dedicated police officer were to serve the community …
I took great pride in serving all of the community and providing the best possible service and leadership to ensure that those responsible for criminal acts were brought before the Courts, in the face of tremendous challenges presented by terrorism and the lack of support from some sections of society. In particular, I sought to ensure that every crime was investigated fairly and without fear or favour. It is particularly upsetting that the Ombudsman has found that the investigation entailed collusion with terrorists.”
Mr Hawthorne further avers that the publication of the report and its aftermath have revived psychological symptoms from which he previously suffered.
“In this case, the procedure adopted by the Ombudsman means that he is the investigator and the final decision maker. Those investigated have no opportunity to test evidence at a hearing, to make meaningful submissions or have any other protections before being found guilty of serious failings or positive wrong doing ….
Before a former officer is to be publicly criticised, he is entitled to be afforded the protections of a “PACE” compliant investigation and a full hearing before an impartial body …
[These failings] ….. have been compounded by the fact that I was not afforded advance notice of the nature of the criticism and the opportunity to comment, other than in relation to the disposal of the car used by the terrorists.”
He further avers:
“I was never interviewed or spoken to in relation to matters other than the disposal of the vehicle used in the murders.”
“I further believe that the Ombudsman misunderstood how policing operated in that area at the relevant time. Whilst he made statements purporting to acknowledge these factors, it is clear that he did not. Instead he applied present day standards of policing to a situation where those standards and procedures were unknown.”
He then criticises the statement in the Ombudsman’s report that the focus of the police was confined to “Republican” violence, excluding Loyalist criminality, pointing out that much evidence challenging this assertion could have been provided if a fair opportunity to do so had been afforded.
Raymond White
“… the Ombudsman considers that he has a very wide remit to examine any issue with regard to policing so long as he can point to a complaint to support the same. The consequence of this is that the Ombudsman has published a report that criticises retired police officers. The manner in which the Ombudsman has gone about this has had the effect that his criticisms cannot be tested. In effect, retired police officers are subject to scathing criticism, which they believe to be misguided and unjustified, yet they have no opportunity to defend themselves or their reputations.”
As a result, Mr White avers, the confidence of retired police officers in the Police Ombudsman has been undermined.
[29] Turning his focus to the impugned “public statement”, Mr White deposes:
“The Association believe that within this report the Ombudsman has improperly accused former police officers and the (RUC George Cross) of partiality, ineptitude and collusion ….
The impact on this on individual members and the ongoing exposure to such accusations contained in previous reports is a matter of grave concern to the Association. It has had the collective effect on both retired members and their families of reigniting personal anxieties and fear over personal security. In some instances it has aggravated psychiatric conditions and symptoms as memories of the scenes of atrocities visited and the recollection of dealing with both survivors and the families of victims are once again brought to the fore …”
The following passage in Mr White’s affidavit evidence is especially noteworthy:
“I respectfully submit that before a former officer is to be publicly criticised, he is entitled to be afforded the protections of a PACE compliant investigation and a full hearing before an impartial body …. Whilst some police officers were given advance notice of the subject matter of specific criticism directed towards them, their response was not detailed within the subsequent report.”
The following discrete complaint is then formulated:
“In addition, the Ombudsman has made determinations about the RUC as a body corporate, which is outside the bounds of his statutory remit.”
The Families’ Evidence
“… allowed us to see precisely what the Ombudsman had considered, the conclusions he reached and the means by which he reached those conclusions.”
Mr O’Toole deposes that both the Chief Constable and the Prime Minister have unreservedly accepted the impugned report. His affidavit concludes in these terms:
“I am deeply distressed by the actions of the Applicants in bringing these proceedings. We waited a very long time for the publication of a statement which properly considered our complaints and that delay …. has been the source of much anxiety for me and for others who were bereaved or injured.
The uncertainty caused by these proceedings has just added to that anxiety and has meant we are again in a state of limbo in relation to our position.”
The balanced and dignified conduct of the families in these proceedings must be unreservedly acknowledged.
Pre – Publication Events
[32] Mr Hawthorne had some material involvement in the process culminating in the first of the Police Ombudsman’s Loughinisland reports in 2011. This is documented in three letters. First, by letter dated 05 December 2007 to Mr Hawthorne, the Ombudsman’s Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”) stated:
“Police records show that you were one of a number of officers who had some involvement with the investigation into this incident. As part of our investigation, it is my desire to speak to as many retired officers as possible in order that a complete overview of the investigation can be established. I therefore request a meeting with you to discuss a number of issues that I believe you can clarify surrounding this multiple murder investigation ….
I wish to make it perfectly clear that your status within my investigation is that of potential witness.”
[Emphasis added.]
The second letter, dated 24 August 2009, contains the following passage:
“I enclose for your attention sections of the report relevant to you which the Police Ombudsman intends to provide to the victims’ families and their legal representative …. [in] week commencing 14 September 2009. This is in response to their numerous allegations as contained within the report that police failed to properly investigate the incident …..
I should be grateful if you would consider these sections and report back within 14 days any areas of concern or inaccuracy of facts that you consider relevant in accordance with our agreed signed protocol.”
(It is agreed between the parties that the reference to “our agreed signed protocol” is erroneous.)
(a) The report should address “… the local operational policing strategy and tactics prior to the massacre and how my officers, at great personal risk, provided a local policing service while keeping the prevention of terrorist offences as the number 1 priority …. [thereby] … giving the general public a more balanced view of policing at that time.”
(b) Many readers would, inevitably, associate Mr Hawthorne with numerous aspects of the report.
(c) Having expressed his “certain” view that a particular sergeant had acted with the utmost propriety in the disposal of the suspect vehicle, Mr Hawthorne made a series of practical suggestions designed to exhort the SIO to search further for a relevant file which had not been located. Furthermore, the vehicles evidential value had been extinguished and its disposal would have required written CID authorisation.
(d) In addition, the vehicle storage facilities were inadequate, and by reason of volume, indefinite storage was not feasible.
(e) Mr Hawthorne proposed that, given the foregoing, the conclusion in the draft report that the families’ complaint of improper police conduct in the storage of the vehicle had been “substantiated” was not tenable.
(f) Rebutting a discrete allegation, Mr Hawthorne stated forcefully that he was not related to any of the murder suspects.
(g) “To insinuate that I was attempting to pervert the course of justice by assisting terrorists is highly insulting and offensive, but my hurt and pain at this is not on the same level as those who lost loved ones. Like the relatives of the murdered at Loughinisland and the relatives of all those murdered by both Loyalists and Republican terrorists in South Down area, I too would like to see justice served and I will gladly meet with anyone and assist as best I can.”
“In the near future the Police Ombudsman intends to publish a public statement in respect of his investigation into the complaint by the victims and survivors of the murders at the Heights Bar, Loughinisland on 18 June 1994. As you were involved in the police investigation into this incident … I am forwarding [to] you relevant extracts from the draft statement which contains material which could be considered as criticism of your role. You are referred to as Police Officer 14 in the draft statement …
The extracts are supplied to you in advance of the release of the public statement to afford you notice of what will be placed in the public domain and to allow you to respond in writing to this Office should you wish to do so.”
[My emphasis.]
[36] The excerpts from the draft Ombudsman’s report provided to Mr Hawthorne were in these terms:
“7.111 Although the written authority for destruction of the car cannot be located, it is believed that Police Officer 14, a Police Superintendent responsible for Saintfield Police Station, sanctioned the destruction following submission of a report from Police Officer 13. The bereaved families raised concerns that Police Officer 14 may have been related to one or more of the suspects of the Loughinisland murders. I can confirm that this is not the case.
7.113 The [vehicle] should not have been stored in a manner which exposed it to the elements and certainly should not have been destroyed without the express permission of Police Officer 8.”
Nothing else from the draft report was disclosed to Mr Hawthorne in advance of promulgation of the Police Ombudsman’s finalised public statement.
[37] Mr Hawthorne replied by letter dated 04 May 2016. At the outset he stated:
“I’ve resided in close proximity to Loughinisland for over 30 years and irrespective of what number you give me, I will be immediately identified by a large number of the local population, both law abiding and dissident terrorists…
During my tenure at Downpatrick I held command positions for some 13 years.”
The remainder of the letter contains the following salient elements:
(i) There was no evidence that he had sanctioned the destruction of the suspect murder vehicle and he denied this emphatically in any event.
(ii) The Ombudsman had failed to implement Mr Hawthorne’s suggestions to investigators regarding “where they should look”.
(iii) The Ombudsman had failed to make any enquiries of Mr Hawthorne’s deputy about evidence that a RUC Superintendent, on behalf of the Chief Constable, had “signed papers in relation to the said vehicle”.
(iv) Mr Hawthorne (for the reasons elaborated) had no conceivable responsibility for the (admittedly) inadequate arrangements for the storage of suspect crime vehicles at Saintfield RUC Station.
[38] Mr Hawthorne’s detailed letter continues:
“As you are aware, the vehicle in question was examined at the Forensic Science facility at Seapark. I recall being told it was examined with a fine-tooth comb with all evidence retained by the scientists. The vehicle was taken to Saintfield station, on direction of CID, as it was no longer required for forensic examination …..
I wasn’t even made aware at the time that the vehicle had been deposited at Saintfield as it was the CID who directed that course of action knowing what the storage limitations were …
I assume you do realise that in 1994 CID, even at a local level, had their own command and control structure, totally removed from me as the operational commander?
As a result of my complaints to divisional authorities of the totally unsatisfactory arrangements for the storage of vehicles at Saintfield, a purpose build secure compound was eventually created at Newtownards.”
Mr Hawthorne’s letter concludes in these terms:
“In the interest of the families, the survivors and all of the police involved in any way whatsoever, and for the credibility of your office, your report should be unbiased and based on evidence and not supposition, rumour or unsubstantiated opinion ….
I reserve the right to take whatever action deemed necessary, including making this letter public at the time of my choosing.”
[39] The Ombudsman rejoined by a further letter dated 23 May 2016:
“Thank you for your letter of 04 May 2016 in which you detail your response to passages from the Police Ombudsman’s proposed public statement on Loughinisland which make reference to your role in disposal of the car believed to have been used by those responsible for the murders at Loughinisland …
The Police Ombudsman has reflected on your observations and amended the narrative in the public statement as follows ….”
This is followed by four paragraphs of finalised text (an enlargement of the initial two paragraphs, supra). The first, 7.110, recounts that Mr Hawthorne had authorised disposal of the vehicle in response to a police sergeant’s request for this “due to its poor condition”. The second paragraph, 7.111, states that Mr Hawthorne “… advised my investigators that he was not responsible for authorising its disposal …” and asserted that this could only have occurred on the “instructions of a higher authority”. This is followed by the third paragraph, 7.112:
“Both police officers 13 and 14 told my investigators that they believed the SIO of the Loughinisland murder investigation, police officer 8, had given his permission for disposal of the car. As police officer 8 has not engaged with my investigation, I have been unable to verify this with him. I have not identified any documentary record to confirm the murder investigation team were consulted and agreed with disposal of the car.”
There is no statement of whether the two officers’ accounts of the disposal of the suspected murder vehicle had been believed or disbelieved. There follows paragraph 7.113, couched in terms identical to the initial formulation furnished to Mr Hawthorne (per [36] supra). The letter finishes
“I trust you will find this clarification in order.”
The next material event was the publication of the Police Ombudsman’s “public statement” on 9 June 2016.
The Police Ombudsman’s Evidence
“… I forwarded a copy of the report to the Public Prosecution Service in September 2015 …
I did not believe that an identifiable officer may have committed a criminal offence but I wanted to satisfy myself that the PPS were offered an opportunity to read the investigation report ….
I met with the PPS on 14 April 2016. The PPS confirmed to me that having reviewed the investigation report they had not identified sufficient evidence to charge or report any police officer for any offence in connection with the Office’s investigation.”
The Director’s letter of 17 September 2015 to the PPS states, inter alia:
“While I do not believe either Operation Sutton or Operation Boston has identified evidence that would support submission of a ‘file for direction’ to the PPS in relation to a specific, identifiable officer, our enquiries have revealed what would be better described as significant concerns in respect of disciplinary and corporate matters for the RUC which will be detailed in the public statement. However, I would be grateful for your views as to whether you are satisfied, on the basis of the evidence presented in the attached files, with this assessment.”
[Emphasis added.]
“(12) There are three reasons for this conclusion, which has been raised as an issue by Mr Hawthorne in the affidavits he has sworn in these proceedings. All three reasons are outlined clearly within the public statement. It should also be clear that none of the three reasons is as a result of the actions or inactions of Mr Hawthorne.
(13) First, the Ombudsman had particular concerns over the failure to retain the yellow twine from the Triumph Acclaim vehicle. This would not have been the responsibility of Mr Hawthorne.
(14) Second, the Ombudsman had concerns about the decision to leave the vehicle in the elements, thus leading to its deterioration and contributing to the decision to destroy it. Police Officer 13 advised that it was its poor condition which led to his requesting that it be destroyed. The Ombudsman was of the opinion that the vehicle should not have been retained in such poor conditions.
(15) Third, the failure to retain any record relating to the destruction decision (and in particular whether the RUC SIO had approved the decision) was a further element in the Ombudsman’s decision-making.
(16) A combination of these three elements led the Ombudsman to the determination which he reached in relation to the allegation, namely that there was “negligence associated with its disposal”. The appropriate elements of concern which related particularly to Mr Hawthorne were identified to him in the correspondence outlined above; and he was afforded an opportunity to comment in advance of the publication.”
The Director further avers, without elaboration, that the Chief Constable received, and responded to, a draft of the June 2016 report.
(a) The Director appointed a senior investigating officer in late 2013.
(b) The terms of reference for the investigation took effect initially in January 2014 and were adjusted in August 2014.
(c) During the ensuing year the post of senior investigating officer changed hands twice.
(d) The final investigation report was provided to the Director in August 2015.
The Director continues the narrative thus:
“I did not believe that an identifiable officer may have committed a criminal offence but I wanted to satisfy myself that the PPS were afforded an opportunity to read the investigation report ….”
“While I do not believe either Operation Sutton or Operation Boston have identified evidence that would support submission of a ‘file for direction’ to the PPS in relation to a specific, identifiable officer, our enquiries have revealed what would be better described as significant concerns in respect of disciplinary and/or corporate matters for the RUC which will be detailed in the public statement.” [Emphasis added.]
Continuing, the Director explains that at a meeting in April 2016 the PPS concurred with his assessment: they –
“… had not identified sufficient evidence to charge or report any police officer for any offence in connection with the Office’s investigation.”
The Director further avers:
“It became clear during the course of the Operation Sutton investigation that none of the RUC officers who may have been impacted by the investigation were still serving police officers. As such, I did not prepare a memorandum for the appropriate authority in the terms of the Police (NI) Act 1998.”
The latter is a reference to the procedures prescribed by section 59(1B) and (2) of the 1998 Act.
“(8) When I came into the post I asked the Court for some time to consider the legal challenge as I wanted to conduct a review of the investigation which had previously taken place. After conducting my own inquiries, reading the relevant material and taking legal advice, I decided that the most appropriate course of action was to consent to an order quashing the previous public statement and to commence a new investigation into the complaints made by the next of kin and survivors.
(9) I had considerable reservations about some aspects of the previous investigation and the decisions and determinations which arose from it – although not, I should emphasise, either the decision to investigate or, in principle, the decision to issue a public statement in relation to the investigation.”
The next ensuing averments shed light on the test which Dr Maguire applied in embarking upon the second, post-2012, Police Ombudsman’s Loughinisland investigation:
“Once the public statement was quashed, there remained the outstanding issue of how the complaint should be dealt with. I exercised my own judgment to decide what the most appropriate course should be.
(10) I was satisfied that the material at my disposal at that stage provided me with the reasonable belief that a member of the RUC may have committed a criminal offence and may have behaved in a manner which would justify disciplinary proceedings (even if such proceedings would not have been possible). Further, I also believed that the complaint should be investigated because of both the gravity of the matter and the exceptional circumstances arising in all the circumstances. The material which founded this belief is cited throughout the content of the June 2016 public statement from this office.”
[46] Dr Maguire addresses the discrete issue of pre-publication consultation in these terms:
“I disagree with any contention by Mr Hawthorne or Mr White that relevant officers were not given an opportunity by this office to comment on criticisms made against them in advance of the publication of the public statement in relation to Loughinisland. A number of such letters were sent and any replies received were considered by the Office and, where appropriate, led to amendments to the text. Indeed, in respect of Mr Hawthorne, one can see a clear example of how this process worked, in practice, to give an opportunity to make representations to those who may be affected by a public statement.
(16) Where it is thought that the content of a public report could be construed as a criticism of an officer, the relevant officer was provided with an opportunity to comment prior to publication of the final public statement. Where an individual officer could not be identified but the criticism could be considered as against the RUC as a whole, the PSNI was given an opportunity to, and did, draw matters to our attention in relation to such criticism.”
Addressing the issue of “public statements” generally, Dr Maguire deposes:
“They are a vital function of the Office in meeting its statutory obligations to ensure that both the public and the police can have confidence in the police complaints system.”
He then explains that since the creation of the Office an array of such statements has been released into the public domain. Some of these take the form of compact “press releases”, while others are in the form of conventional reports of varying length.
“(26) In accordance with the statutory scheme, an officer (where he or she is still serving) will be notified of the complaint and when the investigation has commenced. They will be made aware of the allegations and given an opportunity to comment. At the conclusion of the investigation a report is compiled and it is decided if a file is to be submitted to the PPS and/or the appropriate authority (usually the PSNI). However, a decision will also be reached (regardless of the obligations regarding the criminal/disciplinary aspects) as to whether or not the complaints will be substantiated. Whilst this may depend on the outcome of the criminal/disciplinary proceedings, there will be numerous occasions when it will not.
(27) By way of example, if a decision is taken not to submit a file to the PPS or PSNI in relation to an allegation of incivility, the complainant will be informed that his complaint has not been substantiated. Alternatively, there are instances where an allegation of inappropriate use of force is substantiated even though the appropriate officer could not be identified to allow for criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
(28) Parliament clearly considered that the Ombudsman has the ability to substantiate a complaint, as can be seen in regulation 27 of the RUC (Complaints etc) Regulations 2000, which I understand will be the subject of submissions on my behalf in due course.
(29) Indeed, regulation 27(3) of the 2000 Regulations makes it clear that an Ombudsman has the power to substantiate a complaint in advance of (and separate from) the criminal and disciplinary processes.”
“(30) When read along with the numerous references to substantiation (or non-substantiation) of complaints contained within the NIO Guidance on Police Unsatisfactory Performance Complaints and Misconduct Procedures (see, for instance, sections 2.36-2.38 and 2.42 of the Guidance as exhibited at pages 665 and 666 of the exhibited bundle) I believe that it is clear that the functions of the Office extend far beyond those outlined by the Applicants.”
While this latter averment is a classic illustration of inappropriate sworn argument, I shall explain in [96] infra why I consider it fallacious.
The Applicants’ Challenge
(a) The report exceeds the Police Ombudsman’s statutory powers.
(b) Mr Hawthorne was denied the common law procedural fairness protections guaranteed to him by the common law.
I shall examine each ground in turn. Before doing so, however, I consider it necessary to address a discrete issue of some importance.
The “Implication/ Identification” Issue
“During the period considered by the report, I was a Superintendent and held the position of Sub Divisional Commander for Downpatrick Sub Division. I was the person ultimately responsible for all policing issues in the Sub Division. As such I had detailed and daily briefings and knowledge into the investigation. I note that officers are only identified by cyphers. Despite this, my family and friends (that include other former officers) and people within the area in which I currently reside are well aware of my role within Downpatrick Sub Division and that I have been publicly and severely criticised.”
In the span of three affidavits, including one sworn mid-hearing, the Police Ombudsman did not challenge any of these averments. Nor was there any challenge to the description of Mr Hawthorne in the pre-proceedings correspondence as a retired police officer. While it is correct that Mr Hawthorne was not identified in this letter, this was rectified some two weeks later when these proceedings were initiated.
[52] The Police Ombudsman’s comments on the Schedule fall into three main groups:
(a) Some of the passages relate to matters which were outwith Mr Hawthorne’s remit qua Sub Divisional Commander for the area in question.
(b) Others, if relevant to his sub division, were the responsibility of other specialist units within the RUC.
(c) The passages relating to the handling and disposal of the suspected murder vehicle had been the subject of pre-publication exchange between the Police Ombudsman and Mr Hawthorne.
Notably, no express reliance is placed on the rationalisation contained in the Director’s first affidavit ([41] supra).
[54] One of the virtues of this further hearing was the following. It enabled the Court to canvas with the parties’ respective counsel the legal test to be applied in the exercise of construing the impugned report. I consider the starting point to be the well-established principle that the construction of every document is an issue of law for the Court: see, for example, Re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17, per Lord Steyn at [24]:
“Such policy statements must be interpreted objectively in accordance with the language employed by the Minister. The citizen is entitled to rely on the language of the statement, seen as always in its proper context. The very reason for making the statement is to give guidance to the public. The decision-maker, here a minister, may depart from the policy but until he has done so, the citizen is entitled to ask in a court of law whether he fairly comes within the language of the publicly announced policy. That question, like all questions of interpretation, is one of law. And on such a question of law it necessarily follows that the court does not defer to the Minister: the court is bound to decide such a question for itself, paying, of course, close attention to the reasons advanced for the competing interpretations.”
This principled approach must, in my view, apply a fortiori to every Police Ombudsman’s statutory “public statement”
“This was the negligence issue which as Mr Holmes [Director of Investigations] has averred was not attributable to Mr Hawthorne.”
This invites two observations. First, neither the averments in the Director’s first affidavit to this effect – see [41] above - nor anything equivalent are to be found in the impugned report. Second, I find these averments quite unsatisfactory. They constitute an attempt to distance the relevant passages in the report from Mr Hawthorne (or vice-versa) which, applying the test formulated above, I consider manifestly unsustainable. I consider that no impartial, fair minded and reasonably informed reader of the report would construe these passages as the Director has purported to do in his affidavit. Furthermore, the Director’s emphasis on the words “associated with its disposal” is at best opaque, conveying nothing clearly to the court. And the final sentence in these averments (“The appropriate elements ….”) is, in its full context, a mixture of the superfluous and the bizarre. In short I consider that the relevant averments in the Director’s first affidavit to amount to unimpressive and unsustainable ex post facto rationalisation, imbued with the unintelligible.
(a) The statement in paragraph 7.133 of the impugned report was highly critical of police “follow-up enquiries” in particular in the interviewing of residents, after the murders. The Police Ombudsman’s response to this is:
“Relates to detectives responsible for the investigation (for which Mr Hawthorne has advised in correspondence he had no responsibility).”
The simple rejoinder, it seems to me, is that the Police Ombudsman is seeking to distance Mr Hawthorne from the criticisms in these two passages by reliance upon sources, namely an affidavit sworn in these proceedings and a letter written by Mr Hawthorne, which feature nowhere in the report. Furthermore, once again, there is no engagement with the relevant averments in Mr Hawthorne’s affidavit.
(b) Similarly, two of the Police Ombudsman’s responses to the Schedule regarding passages in the Executive Summary are based on two separate letters written by Mr Hawthorne (considered above) which do not feature in the impugned report in substance or at all.
(c) Certain passages in paragraphs 5.7 and 5.82 of the impugned report also feature in the Schedule. I reject the Police Ombudsman’s riposte that these passages are confined to criticism of unnamed Special Branch officers. Applying the test of the impartial, fair minded and reasonably informed reader, I consider that both textually and in substance they are couched in sufficiently broad terms to encompass the incumbent of the post of Subdivisional Commander in the relevant geographical area during the period under scrutiny, namely Mr Hawthorne.
“A major exhibit in the Loughinisland murder enquiry, the Triumph Acclaim car used by the offenders, was ‘wilfully destroyed’ some ten months after the attack and the destruction was authorised by a senior police officer, who may be related to individuals implicated in the attack.”
The report concludes:
“My public statement outlines the investigation undertaken by my Office to establish the circumstances in which the car was disposed of by police some ten months after the murders at Loughinisland occurred. I have established that the officer responsible for the station yard at Saintfield Police Station sought authority to have the vehicle removed and scrapped. This authority was granted by a senior police officer in charge of the police station and who I am satisfied is not related to individuals suspected of having been responsible for the attack. Both of these officers stated that they believed that the SIO had authorised the destruction. There is no evidence, however, to corroborate these decisions, which I have determined to have been an act of negligence.
Whether or not subsequent examination of the car might have yielded further forensic opportunities which, given the conditions in which it had been retained, appears unlikely, the car should not have been destroyed without proper consideration by the SIO in consultation with his forensic advisers. Whilst I have not found evidence of a sinister motive behind the destruction of the vehicle, I have identified negligence associated with its disposal.”
It is common case that the “senior police officer” mentioned in these passages is Mr Hawthorne.
“7.111 The written authority for disposal of the car cannot be located. Police Officer 14 advised my investigators that he was not responsible for authorising its disposal, making the observation that it would only have taken place on the ‘instructions of a higher authority’. The bereaved families speculated that Police Officer 14 could be connected to one or more of those responsible for the murders at Loughinisland, however, I am satisfied that there is no basis for such concerns.
|
7.112 Both Police Officers 13 & 14 told my investigators that they believed the SIO of the Loughinisland murder investigation, Police Officer 8, had given his permission for disposal of the car. As Police Officer 8 has not engaged with my investigation I have been unable to verify this with him. I have not identified any documentary record to confirm the murder investigation team were consulted and agreed with disposal of the car. |
7.113 The Triumph Acclaim should not have been stored in a manner which exposed it to the elements and certainly should not have been destroyed without the express permission of Police Officer 8. |
7.114 The forensic examination of this important exhibit was thorough and carried out appropriately. However, the integrity of the exhibit was compromised as I have described. An important exhibit (the yellow twine) was lost.” |
The next link in this discrete analysis is the Police Ombudsman’s “unambiguous determination” in the Executive Summary, repeated in paragraph 9.40, that “… collusion is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders”.
[68] The above conclusions are made only after an elaborate and painstaking analysis of a forensic nature. They vindicate Mr Hawthorne unreservedly. However, it should not have been necessary for Mr Hawthorne to initiate legal proceedings of this kind in order to secure the judicial analysis, conclusions and vindication of which he is now the beneficiary. The Police Ombudsman’s “unambiguous determination” that police officers were guilty of collusion is a determination that such officers participated in the murder of six innocent civilians and the injuries suffered by five innocent civilians on 18 June 1994 at the Heights Bar, Loughinisland. The determination is expressed in unqualified terms. It is a statement of the most damming kind. The Police Ombudsman’s report should have made abundantly clear to the reader that the unequivocal determination of police collusion with UVF terrorists in the murders did not apply to Mr Hawthorne. However, it signally failed to do so. The authors of the report were careless, thoughtless and inattentive in the language and structuring of the document in this respect. While this is quite unacceptable by any standard, more disturbingly it is also antithetical to the statutory purposes.
The Vires Ground Of Challenge
“Many of the issues I have identified in this report, including the protection of informants through both wilful acts and the passive ‘turning a blind eye’; catastrophic failures in the police investigation; and destruction of exhibits and documents are in themselves evidence of collusion ………….
When viewed collectively I have no hesitation in unambiguously determining that collusion is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders.”
[Emphasis added.]
The contents of other passages in the report reproduced above and Appendix 2 (reproduced in Appendix 1 hereto) speak for themselves. All of them can be related in one way or another to the headline passage.
[72] Some further examination of the collusion “mini chapter” in the impugned report is appropriate. First, the Ombudsman addresses the definition of “collusion”. This is followed by a consideration of the interaction between police and informants within Loyalist paramilitaries. Next there is a reference to multiple failures to “pass on intelligence to investigators”. The report then states without qualification that “... investigative opportunities were undermined by the way in which information relating to those involved in the ownership chain of the car used in the Loughinisland attack was handled”. This is followed by another unqualified statement that in August 1994 the police were in possession of intelligence that “… the murder suspects were warned – by a police officer – that they were going to be arrested”. These two damning statements, expressed without ambiguity or qualification, are followed by something which simply does not chime with what immediately precedes it:
“It is unacceptable that if such actions occurred, police failed to act on the information received and did not investigate this allegation further.”
[Emphasis added.]
The “if” is incongruous, as are the references to the “actions” (plural) and “allegation” (singular).
[74] It is difficult to conceive of a more withering and damning condemnation of professional police officers. “Collusion” in this context is to be understood in a straightforward, uncomplicated way. Its dictionary definition is to “make a secret plan with someone to do something illegal or dishonest”. This does not differ in material substance from the definition adopted by the Police Ombudsman (borrowed from Judge Smithwick’s report) namely “to conspire, connive or collaborate”, whether actively or passively. Collusion, in common with every member of the English language, will always take its colour from the context in which it appears. Duly dismantled and unpacked I consider that in this context “collusion” connotes, or denotes, varying degrees of participation by police officers in the murder of six innocent civilians and the infliction of injury on five others in the atrocity in question. Collusion by police officers with terrorists in the murder of innocent civilians could also entail the commission of offences such as misfeasance in public office and, especially as regards some of the subsequent police conduct which features in the Ombudsman’s findings, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
[83] The issue is one of statutory construction, in a context where no individual provision of the statutory regime under consideration, namely Part VII of the 1998 Act, provides a clear answer to the question. Every exercise in statutory construction is, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Z [2005] UKHL 35 at [17]:
“….. directed to a particular statute, enacted at a particular time, to address (almost invariably) a particular problem or mischief.”
In R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687, Lord Bingham stated at 695:
“The court’s task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment.”
[87] I accept the submission that judicial review of the Police Ombudsman’s actions tends to be (in Mr McGleenan’s words) of the “light touch” variety. However, this submission is based upon decisions such as R v Parliamentary Commissioner, ex parte Dyer [1994] 1 WLR 621, R (M) –v Commissioner for Local Administration [2006] EWHC 2847 and Re Martin [2012] NIQB 89, all of which were concerned with the breadth of the discretion engaged in decisions whether to conduct an investigation and issues (as in Martin) such as when to begin the exercise. Furthermore these cases do not speak to the issues of statutory construction raised by the present challenge. Therefore I derive limited assistance from this line of case law. Furthermore, I derive no assistance from the evidence of what the Police Ombudsman or his predecessors have done in the exercise of their power under section 62 in other cases. This evidence, in my judgement, has no bearing on the pure question of statutory interpretation to be determined.
“…. believe(s) that a member may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner which would justify disciplinary proceedings.”
It was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to form this belief prior to embarking upon the exercise culminating in the impugned “public statement” and, in his affidavit, he deposes specifically that he did so.
The Second Ground: Procedural Unfairness
[106] Copious citation of authority in identifying the governing legal principles is unnecessary in this kind of procedural fairness context. In Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297, Lord Morris drew attention to the juridical truism that natural justice is “fair play in action”, at 309B. Lord Reid, for his part, highlighted the long established principle whereby the court supplements statutory procedures in order to ensure that natural justice is delivered: see page 308C. To like effect, Lord Guest stated:
“… The Courts will imply into the statutory provision a rule that the principles of natural justice should be applied. This implication will be made upon the basis that Parliament is not to be presumed to take away a party’s rights without giving them an opportunity of being heard in their interest.”
“The second rule requires that any person represented at the enquiry who will be adversely affected by the decision to make the finding should not be left in the dark as to the risk of the finding being made and thus deprived of any opportunity to adduce additional material of probative value which, had it been placed before the decision maker, might have deterred him from making the finding even though it cannot be predicted that it would inevitably have had that result.”
Finally, in the memorable words of Lord Mustill in Re D (Minors) [1996] AC 593 at 603:
“My lords, it is a first principle of fairness that each party to a judicial process shall have an opportunity to answer by evidence and argument any adverse material which the Tribunal may take into account when forming its opinion. This principle is lame if the party does not know the substance of what is said against him (or her), for what he does not know he cannot answer.”
[My emphasis.]
[110] Fifthly, Mr Hawthorne’s defence is inadequately and inaccurately portrayed in the report. It is condensed to the following short sentence:
“Both of these officers stated that they believed that the SIO had authorised the destruction.”
(Appendix 1, Allegation 7)
In the body of the report, this is described variously in the terms of “belief” and “observation” (7.111 – 7.112). I consider that the report misrepresents the defence advanced by Mr Hawthorne in his written representations, the kernel whereof was:
“You have failed to provide evidence that I authorised the disposal. I can say without any shadow of doubt that whoever authorised disposal at Downpatrick Station only did so on the instructions of a higher authority.”
Furthermore, there is no indication of whether Mr Hawthorne’s defence was believed. Finally, Mr Hawthorne’s status of (mere) “witness” was at no time altered.
Irrationality
[117] Given these facts and considerations further submissions were invited and these have been duly considered. It is in this context viz the examination of possible irrationality by a court of supervisory jurisdiction that the “light touch” submission, which I have accepted – see [86] above – has particular purchase. I am of the opinion that the Police Ombudsman’s determination that Mr Hawthorne committed an act of negligence is suspect and questionable. However, the elevated threshold of Wednesbury irrationality, emphasised in recent decisions of the Supreme Court, is not in my opinion overcome: see Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 and Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs {2015] UKSC 69.
Conclusions Summarised
[118] The effect and outcome of the extensive exercise which the court has undertaken are that the severe public criticism described by Mr Hawthorne in his first affidavit was not justified, for certain fundamental reasons. First, the Police Ombudsman’s damming condemnation of RUC collusion with UVF murderers does not implicate Mr Hawthorne. This, regrettably, would not in my opinion have been apparent to most readers. Second, there is no finding in the Police Ombudsman’s report that Mr Hawthorne was culpable of any of the catastrophic investigative failures assessed. Third, the Police Ombudsman’s “determination” of police collusion in the Loughinisland murders is unsustainable in law as it was not in accordance with the Ombudsman’s statutory powers. Fourth, the offending sections in the Ombudsman’s report identified above, including the “determination” that Mr Hawthorne was guilty of an “act of negligence”, are in breach of the legal requirements of procedural fairness and unlawful in consequence.
Remedy
“Certiorari is a discretionary remedy and does not usually issue if it will beat the air and confer no benefit on the person seeking it.”
(R (McPherson) v Ministry of Education [1980] NI 115 at 121 G.) Some further guidance is also available from the approach of the Supreme Court in Hunt –v– North Somerset Council [2015] UKSC 51 and in particular the observation of Lord Toulson at [12]:
“….. in circumstances where a public body has acted unlawfully but where it is not appropriate to make a mandatory, prohibitory or quashing order, it will usually be appropriate to make some form of declaratory order to reflect the Court’s finding … simply to dismiss the claim when there has been a finding of illegality is likely to convey a misleading impression and to leave the claimant with an understandable sense of injustice. That said, there is no ‘must’ about making a declaratory order ….”
“[49] Against the statutory and evidential background outlined above, the two permitted grounds of challenge are:
(a) The report exceeds the Police Ombudsman’s statutory powers.
(b) Mr Hawthorne was denied the common law procedural fairness protections guaranteed to him by the common law.”
(a) The “Collusion” section spanning pages 5 – 7 of the report.
(b) The related passages in chapter 9 (“Conclusions”) of the report, namely paragraphs 9.14 – 9.19.
(c) The “Allegation 6” conclusion in Appendix 1, which repeats the headline passage in the above section.
(d) The “Allegation 7” conclusion, also in Appendix 1 (“My public statement ……… negligence associated with its disposal.”)
(e) The corresponding offending passages in chapter 7 of the report at paragraphs 7.113 and 7.114.
(f) Paragraphs 5.7 and 5.82 of the report: these too cannot stand given my finding – in [60](c) above – that these passages apply to, amongst others, Mr Hawthorne. As he was given no advance opportunity to consider and comment upon them, they are vitiated by procedural unfairness.
Recusal?
[139] One of the striking features of this application is its timing;
(a) These are proceedings of some vintage, having been commenced in August 2016.
(b) Leave to apply for judicial review was granted by order dated 6 June 2017.
(c) At the beginning of October 2017, I became directly involved in the case management of this challenge. During the period October/December 2017 there were two listings before me and I promulgated both written and oral directions.
(d) The substantive hearing dates were 06 – 07 and 14 December 2017.
(e) On 21 December 2017 the court delivered its written judgment, together with a specially devised summary. This entailed the promulgation of paragraphs [1] – [121] of this judgment.
(f) On the same date, the Court gave directions relating to the two ancillary issues to be determined namely remedy and costs.
(g) Between 21 and 28 December 2017 the parties’ representatives complied with the Court’s request for assistance in identifying typographical and kindred errors.
(h) The parties’ representatives duly complied with the court’s directions for the provision of written submissions relating to the twin issues of remedy and costs.
(i) The directions given by the Court when promulgating its substantive judgment on 21 December 2017 made provision for (inter alia) a further listing on 12 January 2018 for the purpose of completing the judgment by pronouncement of the Court’s determination of the issues of remedy and costs.
Governing Principles
[147] I had occasion to consider the governing principles extensively in R –v- Jones [2010] NICC 39, in the following passages:
“Governing Principles
[6] While the importance of judge and jury being entirely impartial is a longstanding feature of the common law, it has been reinforced by Article 6 ECHR, in an era of sophisticated technology and mass communication. In the contemporary setting, the modern jury is in some ways the antithesis of its predecessor of several centuries ago, as highlighted by Campbell LJ in Regina –v- Fegan and Others [unreported]. See also Regina –v- McParland [2007] NICC 40, paragraph [20] especially. I consider that the modern law differs in no material respect from the pronouncement of Maloney CJ almost a century ago, in Regina v Maher [1920] IR 440:
‘The rule of law does not require it to be alleged that either A or B or any number of jurors are so affected, or will be so affected; but if they are placed under circumstances which make it reasonable to presume or apprehend that they may be actuated by prejudice or partiality, the court will not, either on behalf of the prosecutor or traverser, allow the trial to take place in that county … It is a wise and jealous rule of law to guard the purity of justice that it should be above all suspicion’”.
[Emphasis added].
Thus perceptions are all important: the terms of the immutable rule that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done are familiar to all practitioners. These principles apply to both trial by judge and jury and trial by judge alone.
[7] In considering whether the composition of any court or tribunal poses any threat to the fairness of a given trial, the test to be applied is that of apparent bias, as articulated by the House of Lords in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 : would a fair-minded and informed observer conclude that, having regard to the particular factual matrix, there was a real possibility of bias? In Regina v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118, the question formulated by Lord Hope was whether a juror had "knowledge or characteristics which made it inappropriate for that person to serve on the jury": see paragraph [107]. Bias, in my view, connotes an unfair predisposition or prejudice on the part of the court or tribunal, an inclination to be swayed by something other than evidence and merits”.
[148] The following passage in Locabail is also of some significance:
“ The mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous case, had commented adversely on a party or witness, or found the evidence of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without more found a sustainable objection. In most cases, we think, the answer, one way or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal. We repeat: every application must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. The greater the passage of time between the event relied on as showing a danger of bias and the case in which the objection is raised, the weaker (other things being equal) the objection will be”.
The judgment in Jones draws attention to certain further considerations:
“… there will always be a risk in every litigation context that some recusal applications are made on flimsy , though superficially attractive, grounds and are granted without rigorous scrutiny by an overly sensitive and defensive tribunal…
[10] It is trite that where an application of this kind is made, an asserted risk to the fairness of the trial which is flimsy or fanciful will not suffice. However, the converse proposition applies with equal force. The court is required to make an evaluative judgment based on all the information available. This requires, in the words of Lord Mustill, the formation of "what is essentially an intuitive judgment" (Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1993] 3 All ER 92, p. 106e). In making this judgment, the court will apply good sense and practical wisdom. Ultimately, the court's sense of fairness, as this concept has been explained above, and its grasp of realities and perceptions will be determinative.”
The final noteworthy passage in Jones is the following:
“[17] In every context, the test for apparent bias requires consideration of a possibility, applying the information known to and attributes of the hypothetical observer. Some reflection on the attributes of this spectator is appropriate. It is well established that the hypothetical observer is properly informed of all material facts, is of balanced and fair mind, is not unduly sensitive and is of a sensible and realistic disposition. Such an observer would, in my view, readily discriminate between a once in a lifetime jury and a professional judge. The former lacks the training and experience of the latter and is conventionally acknowledged to be more susceptible to extraneous factors and influences. Moreover, absent actual bias (a rare phenomenon), the proposition that a judge will, presumptively, decide every case dispassionately and solely in accordance with the evidence seems to me unexceptional and harmonious with the policy of the common law.”
“….. will well and faithfully serve in the office of [name] and that I will do right to all manner of people without fear or favour, affection or ill-will according to the laws and usages of this realm.”
It may be said that while the oath, or affirmation, has several identifiable components that which shines brightest is the solemn undertaking of judicial impartiality. While the statutory oath (or affirmation) is not determinative of recusal issues, I consider that it must, nonetheless, rank as a factor of some potency, though not a complete answer. This was acknowledged in Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34 at [] and [57].
[150] In Smith v Kvaerner Cementation Foundations and Bar Council [2006] 3 All ER 593, the central issue was that of waiver of objection by a litigant to a part-time judge trying his case. The Court of Appeal held that an effective waiver had not been made. Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lord Phillips CJ cited an earlier decision of the Court in Jones v DAS Legal Expenses Insurance [2004] IRLR 218:
“[35] (i) If there is any real as opposed to fanciful chance of objection being taken by that fair-minded spectator, the first step is to ascertain whether or not another judge is available to hear the matter. It is obviously better to transfer the matter than risk a complaint of bias. The judge should make every effort in the time available to clarify what his interest is which gives rise to this conflict so that the full facts can be placed before the parties.
(ii) Some time should be taken to prepare whatever explanation is to be given to the parties and if one is really troubled perhaps even to make a note of what one will say.
(iii) Because thoughts that the court may have been biased can become festering sores for the disappointed litigants, it is vital that the judge's explanation be mechanically recorded or carefully noted where that facility is not available. That will avoid that kind of controversy about what was or was not said which has bedevilled this case.
(iv) A full explanation must be given to the parties. That explanation should detail exactly what matters are within the judge's knowledge which give rise to a possible conflict of interest. The judge must be punctilious in setting out all material matters known to him. Secondly, an explanation should be given as to why the problem had only arisen so late in the day. The parties deserve also to be told whether it would be possible to move the case to another judge that day.
(v) The options open to the parties should be explained in detail. Those options are, of course, to consent to the judge hearing the matter, the consequence being that the parties will thereafter be likely to be held to have lost their right to object. The other option is to apply to the judge to recuse himself. The parties should be told it is their right to object, that the court will not take it amiss if the right is exercised and that the judge will decide having heard the submissions. They should be told what will happen next. If the court decides the case can proceed, it will proceed. If on the other hand the judge decides he will have to stand down, the parties should be told in advance of the likely dates on which the matter may be re-listed.
(vi) The parties should always be told that time will be afforded to reflect before electing. That should be made clear even where both parties are represented. If there is a litigant in person the better practice may be to rise for five minutes. The litigant in person can be directed to the Citizen's Advice Bureau if that service is available and if he wishes to avail of it. If the litigant feels he needs more help, he can be directed to the chief clerk and/or the listing officer. Since this is a problem created by the court, the court has to do its best to assist in resolving it.”
The Lord Chief Justice also observed:
“[29] This is useful guidance but, as the court made plain, it should not be treated as a set of rules which must be complied with if a waiver is to be valid. The vital requirements are that the party waiving should be aware of all the material facts, of the consequences of the choice open to him, and given a fair opportunity to reach an un-pressured decision.”
[151] In the Smith case [supra], the issue concerned the composition of an employment tribunal. In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, one finds the following passage:
“[28] …(vi) Without being complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious, the observer would appreciate that professional judges are trained to judge and to judge objectively and dispassionately. This does not undermine the need for constant vigilance that judges maintain that impartiality. It is a matter of balance. In Locabail , paragraph 21, the court found force in these observations of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in President of the Republic of South Africa & Others v South African Rugby Football Union & Others 1999 (7) BCLR (CC) 725, 753:−
‘The reasonableness of the apprehension [for which one must read in our jurisprudence "the real risk"] must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer justice without fear or favour, and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or pre−dispositions. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial’
vii) Moreover, in this particular case, the charge of impartiality has to lie against the tribunal and this tribunal consisted not only of its chairman but also of two independent wing−members who were equal judges of the facts as the chairman was. Their impartiality is not in question and their decision was unanimous.”
[152] Also noteworthy is the statement in Re Medicaments [2001] 1 WLR 700:
“ [86] The material circumstances will include any explanation given by the judge under review as to his knowledge or appreciation of those circumstances. Where that explanation is accepted by the applicant for review it can be treated as accurate. Where it is not accepted, it becomes one further matter to be considered from the viewpoint of a fair−minded observer. The court does not have to rule whether the explanation should be accepted or rejected. Rather it has to decide whether or not the fair−minded observer would consider that there was a real danger of bias notwithstanding the explanation advanced.”
It has also been said that while the properly informed hypothetical observer is presumptively aware of the legal traditions and culture of the United Kingdom, he will be neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious. Finally, I draw attention to the words of Lord Hope in Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 WLR 781:
“[17] The fair-minded and informed observer can be assumed to have had access to all the facts that were capable of being known by members of the public generally, bearing in mind that it is the appearance that these give rise to that matters, not what is in the mind of the particular judge or tribunal member who is under scrutiny. It is to be assumed … that the observer is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious when he examines the facts that he can look at. It is to be assumed too that he is able to distinguish between what is relevant and what is irrelevant and that he is able when exercising his judgment to decide what weight should be given to the facts that are relevant”.
[153] There is one further consideration worthy of highlighting which, in my view, has not been sufficiently emphasized in the leading cases in this field. It is that no litigant has a right to select or dictate the composition of the court or tribunal in the litigation in which he is involved. The corollary of this is that in every case where a question is raised about the impartiality of the judge or tribunal, a point of substance is necessary and the objection must be substantiated. I consider that this flows from the statement of Laws LJ in Her Majesty’s Attorney General v Pelling [2006] 1 FLR 93:
“[18] In determining such applications, it is important that judicial officers discharge their duty to do so and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour”.
There may be cases where, either in the context of an objection or of the court’s own motion, no further enquiry is necessary because the fact or factor giving rise to concern is so plainly potent. In passing, it was not submitted by the moving party that this was such a case. It seems to me that paragraph [25] of Locabail can be readily linked to the exhortation of Laws LJ in Pelling, that, in circumstances of this kind, the court must be alert to ensure that its process is not the subject of “manipulation and contrived delay”.
(a) The presumed independence of the judiciary.
(b) The statutory judicial oath of office.
(c) The crucial distinction between a part time judge in legal practice and a full time professional judge.
(d) The passage of time separating the relevant previous event/s from the date upon which the recusal issue arises (some 16 years in this instance).
(e) The likely impact on the hypothetical observer of my reactions and replies in open court, in response to the issues as they were raised by the moving party of the Judge’s initial response and reaction to any suggestion of recusal.
(f) Any evidence assembled relating to the Judge’s reputation and standing generally.
(g) The character of judicial review litigation, which involves no lis inter-partes.
(h) Linked to (g) whether the case to be tried will involve the resolution of disputed factual issues or credibility assessments or fact finding.
(i) The over-riding objective.
(j) (Self-evidently) the contours of the principle of apparent bias and its title deeds, namely fairness to all parties.
(k) Finally, the intrinsically fact sensitive matrix of every case.
The Principles Applied
[156] Certain distinctive features of the factual matrix fall to be highlighted:
(a) Approximately one month in advance of the substantive hearing, senior counsel representing the Applicants and the Ombudsman discussed the question of whether recusal of the trial judge might be appropriate. They clearly concluded that it would not.
(b) On 14 December 2017, the date upon which the substantive hearing was completed, the Ombudsman’s Director of Legal Services requested counsel to advise on the same issue. The written advices of counsel, provided within 24 hours, were that there was no basis for recusal.
(c) The Ombudsman and his Director of Legal Services accepted this advice.
(d) The Ombudsman’s legal team at all material times consisted of senior counsel, junior counsel, his Director of Legal Services and a highly reputable firm of solicitors instructed to have carriage of the judicial review proceedings.
(e) From 21 December 2017 the interested party’s solicitors and counsel were in possession of the same information which prompted the Ombudsman’s request for counsel’s advice about one week beforehand. The outcome of their consideration and deliberations was the same as that of the Ombudsman one week previously: no action was to be taken.
(f) The Ombudsman’s legal team reaffirmed their previous stance circa 08 January 2018.
(g) Though possessed of expanded material information relating to the 2002 litigation, as of 12 January 2018, the scheduled date for promulgation of the court’s determination of the issues of remedy and costs, neither the Ombudsman nor the interested party had made any application to the court.
(h) It was only upon the court’s insistence on clarity that applications to adjourn (not to recuse) were made later that morning.
(i) In circumstances where the interested party’s solicitors have, throughout the flurry of recent correspondence, been especially keen to establish any connections between the second Applicant (Mr White) via the medium of consultations with his counsel relating to the 2002 litigation, the solicitors who represented the judicial review applicant (the Police Association) have stated:
“We have no record of Mr Raymond White’s role ….
Attendance at consultations with counsel and at Court whereby [Mr X – not Mr White] and a Police Federation and Superintendent’s Association representative.”
[157] In R v Canning [2010] NICC 41, in a ruling consisting of 128 paragraphs, I made a decision staying the prosecution of the accused person on the ground of abuse of process. The case had some notoriety, the trial and the court’s decision attracting much publicity. The material features of the course of the trial are set forth in [87] – [91] of the judgment. The essence of the Court’s ruling was that the prosecution had become an abuse of process having regard to serial failures in the matter of disclosure to the Accused. The court stated in the final section of its judgment, at [128]:
“[128] Finally, the handling of disclosure throughout the history of this prosecution and trial is to be lamented and must be strongly deprecated. It reflects poorly and adversely on the police officers concerned and the police organisation as a whole. It has been the cause of enormous disruption and delay in the transaction of this trial, coupled with associated increased cost to the public purse in an era of acute economic stringency. The failures which have occurred are of some gravity and it is to be expected that the Chief Constable will ensure that their origins and causes are scrupulously investigated, with a view to correcting any weaknesses, cultural or endemic or otherwise, in the police system so as to ensure that there will be no comparable recurrence.”
The blistering nature of this judicial criticism of the police requires no elaboration.
[158] The decision of this court in R v Canning had a sequel of some significance. As appears from the judgment of Maguire J in Re Canning’s Application [2016] NIQB 73 the several public authorities who became involved in the wake of this court’s damming criticism of the police included the Police Ombudsman. The judgment states at [7]:
“PONI responded to various letters over a substantial period. It confirmed that it did investigate the matter. What is said to be a summary of its report was provided to the applicant’s solicitor. The court has not seen the full report. The summary, in broad terms, notes the referral of the judge’s comments to it by the PSNI. As a result PONI investigators spoke to the senior PSNI officer who had reviewed the case. The review apparently concluded that in the case the relevant disclosure officer had no grasp of his obligations under the 1996 Act and had failed to recognise the issues which arose. Two officers, in particular, accepted that they failed to comply with disclosure requirements. As a remedial step, an action plan had been developed to prevent such failings in the future. The summary indicates that the PSNI had since overhauled their disclosure system. The changes were welcomed by PONI in the summary. PONI’s conclusion was that the matter had been addressed by PSNI which had identified failings and put new training systems in place to prevent a recurrence.”
A perusal of the remainder of the judgment indicates that in a substantial body of correspondence involving the judicial review applicant’s solicitors, there were repeated references to the judgment of this court in R v Canning.
[162] Similarly the court’s attention was not drawn to the decision in In the Matter of Appeals Pursuant to Section 28(2D) of the Criminal Appeal (NI) Act 1980 v Decisions of the Taxing Master [2011] NIQB 80. Given the issues raised in the present application, this decision may be considered a little more relevant than some of the anecdotal and unattested examples which counsel sought to bring to the court’s attention. It suffices to draw attention to the protagonists (without elaboration), the nature of the issue involved and what was at stake for the challenging parties. The case has several thought provoking features in the context of the small jurisdiction that is Northern Ireland, an issue to which I shall return presently.
[177] I interpose at this juncture the following passage from the opinion of Lord Rodger in R (Al–Hassan) v SSHD [2005] 1 WlR 688, at [9]:
“As the facts of the present case demonstrate, however, people who are called on to adjudicate will often have substantial experience in the relevant field and will therefore be familiar with the background issues which they may have encountered previously in various roles. Indeed, the individuals concerned will often be particularly suited to adjudicate on the matter precisely because of the experience and wisdom on the topic which they have accumulated in those other roles. In many continental systems, at various stages of their careers judges spend time as legal civil servants in ministries, drafting and advising on legislation. Undoubtedly, when they return to the bench, it is expected that they will use their experience to enrich their work. Today, British judges draw on their previous work, whether as advocates, legal civil servants or academic lawyers. Therefore, they may well have to decide a point which they had argued as counsel, or on which they had written an article-or, even, which they had decided in a previous case. In various political or other contexts, judges may have publicly advocated or welcomed the passing of the legislation which they later have to apply. Judges who have served in some capacity in the Law Commissions may have to interpret legislation which they helped to draft or about which they helped to write a report. The knowledge and expertise developed in these ways can only help, not hinder, their judicial work.”
[178] Continuing, Lord Rodger stated, at [10]:
“It would be absurd, then, to suggest that in such situations their previous activities precluded the judges from reaching an independent and impartial judgment, when occasion demanded. The authoritative decision in Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451 is a resounding rejection of any such approach. In any event, if proof were needed, experience confirms that judges are quite capable of acting impartially in such cases.”
Baroness Hale described these passages as “powerful”, at [13]. No member of the panel disagreed with them. Al–Hassan is yet another decision – of obvious relevance – to which my attention was not drawn.
[180] It has been repeatedly observed at the highest levels that formation of the evaluative judgment required to determine an application of this kind can be a difficult and challenging exercise. The only absolute rule is that there are no absolute rules: see for example Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 2) [2004] UKHL 34, at [17] per Lord Bingham. An added difficulty is that the core legal principles, coupled with the general rules framed in extenso in Locabail, as endorsed in Al–Hassan, are formulated in open textured terms providing little concrete guidance. I reiterate that the timing of this application, which to many spectators may appear extraordinary, is not in my estimation a ground for refusing it. I address in [195] – [198] below one of the indispensable counterbalances.
Further Consideration
[182] A broad range of facts, considerations and issues has emerged during the most recent phase of these proceedings. While I have concluded that the test for apparent bias is not satisfied, that in my view is not, in the unique circumstances of this case, dispositive of the question of whether judicial withdrawal at this stage should occur. The High Court has at its disposal a rich reservoir of powers stored in its inherent jurisdiction: see Ewing v Times Newspapers [2010] NIQB 65 at [10]–[11] especially. I consider that judicial withdrawal from a given case is not necessarily dependent upon, or confined to, a successful recusal application. To instance but one example, a judge could legitimately withdraw from a case notwithstanding that all parties and their legal representatives were unanimous in the view that no grounds for doing so existed.
[188] The practical and legal effects of the foregoing are the following:
(i) I decline to draw up an order giving effect to my substantive judgment and assessment of the appropriate consequential remedy.
(ii) There will be a fresh hearing before a differently constituted court.
(iii) The judgment of this court will be neither binding on any party nor executory in nature. It will not bind a future court. It will, rather, assume a hybrid status, somewhat akin to that of an advisory opinion, which features in legal systems other than ours.
(i) The crucial issue from the Ombudsman’s perspective is this court’s construction of the relevant statutory provisions.
(ii) It seems highly unlikely that there could be any legitimate dispute about how this court has formulated the requirements of procedural fairness generally and those pertaining to Mr Hawthorne specifically.
(iii) The Police Ombudsman, as a responsible public authority who, in common with all other litigants, owes to the court the duties of assistance and co-operation enshrined in the overriding objective, will doubtless reflect carefully and conscientiously on each of the foregoing matters.
(iv) This court has devoted a lengthy chapter of this judgment to what it has termed the “implication/identification” issue: see [50] – [69], which is quite separate from its conclusions on the two central legal issues. It would, I apprehend, be surprising to most if the Ombudsman were to dissent from the court’s analysis and conclusions pertaining to this issue. Indeed, most fair minded and right thinking members of society would probably expect the Ombudsman to welcome them, given the measure of clarity which they import vis-à-vis his report and the deserved fairness and vindication for Mr Hawthorne which they provide.
Costs
Recusal Applications Generally
Addendum: Final Order
1) By its judgment delivered on 22 December 2017 this Court decided as follows:
(a) The first Applicant, Mr Hawthorne, is readily identifiable in the Police Ombudsman’s Loughinisland “Public Statement” (the “Report”) as the person to whom various criticisms and negative findings relating to the storage and disposal of the suspected murder vehicle and the simultaneous loss of an interior exhibit apply: see [67].
(b) Mr Hawthorne is vindicated unreservedly of any accusation, finding or determination of catastrophic failures in the original police investigation or collusion: [67] – [68].
(c) The report fell short of acceptable standards and quality and was thus antithetical to the statutory purposes: [68] – [69].
(d) In consequence of these failings on the part of the Police Ombudsman Mr Hawthorne has suffered unjustified severe public criticism: [118].
(e) The Police Ombudsman’s portrayal of Mr Hawthorne’s response to the inadequate disclosure made to him before publication of the report was inadequate and inaccurate: [110].
(f) The report’s “determination” that Mr Hawthorne was guilty of an “act of negligence” vis-à-vis the storage and disposal of the suspected murder vehicle and the loss of an interior exhibit are unlawful, being in breach of the legal requirements of procedural fairness.
(g) Mr Hawthorne’s status at all stages of the Ombudsman’s Loughinisland investigation was that of mere “witness”: [110].
(h) The Police Ombudsman failed to take proper investigatory steps regarding the matter of which Mr Hawthorne was accused: [109] and [110].
(i) Turning to the broader, representative challenge of the second Applicant, Mr White, certain fundamental requirements of procedural fairness must be observed by the Police Ombudsman in every case where it is proposed to promulgate a “public statement” which is critical of or otherwise adverse to certain persons: [113] – [114].
(j) If and to the extent that any of these requirements was not observed in the compilation of the report the vitiating factor of procedural unfairness occurred: [114] – [115].
2) Finally, the Court decided that the Police Ombudsman’s “determination” of police collusion in the Loughinisland murders is unsustainable in law as it was not in accordance with the Ombudsman’s statutory powers: see [70] – [103] and the corresponding conclusion in [118].
3) The Police Ombudsman was required by the Court’s Order of 26 January 2018 to take certain steps. The Court has now seen certain inter – partes letters, which state:
(i) Those passages in the report reflecting adversely on Mr Hawthorne will be removed: see [131](d) – (f) of the judgment of the Court.
(ii) The report will be amended to include an unambiguous statement that no personal negligence is attributable directly to Mr Hawthorne. Ditto none of the investigatory failures identified in the Report.
(iii) In furtherance of (ii), the “Collusion” section of the Report [7] will be amended.
(iv) Reflecting all of the above, the Police Ombudsman will publish an amended Loughinisland Report.
Pausing, it is clear that the Ombudsman has accepted the relevant exhortations in the court’s judgment.
4) The purpose of the Court’s Order of 26 January 2018 was to identify and refine the issues to be considered in the event of any relisting of this case. The effect of the Police Ombudsman’s letters is that none of the issues identified in [1] above is any longer in dispute. The only disputed issue is that specified in [2] above. The net result is unqualified success for Mr Hawthorne in his legal challenge. For the avoidance of all doubt, this court’s extant judgment takes full effect, with the exception of [2] above. The judgment will be re-promulgated to make this clear.
5) There are two discrete ancillary issues on which the parties’ representatives have joined issue, requiring adjudication by the Court in consequence. The first is whether the Court should make a declaration enshrining and reflecting its assessments, findings and conclusions which have given rise to the Police Ombudsman’s concessions reflecting [1] and [3] above. The main governing principles are outlined in [124] – [125] of the Court’s judgment. A declaration would both vindicate Mr Hawthorne’s unqualified success in his legal challenge and provide him with a coherent and unambiguous judicial statement of the elements of his success. It would also further the aforementioned principles. I have no hesitation in confirming that the Court should make a declaration: see [12] below.
6) The second contentious issue is that of costs. The Police Ombudsman’s proposal that Mr Hawthorne recover 50% only of his costs airbrushes all of the foregoing, in particular the unassailable assessment that Mr Hawthorne’s legal challenge has succeeded in full and blithely ignores the statements in [68] – [69] of the Court’s judgment:
“The above conclusions ……… vindicate Mr Hawthorne unreservedly. However, it should not have been necessary for Mr Hawthorne to initiate legal proceedings of this kind in order to secure the judicial analysis, conclusions and vindication of which he is now the beneficiary …
The authors of the report were careless, thoughtless and inattentive in the language and structuring of the document …. A report of acceptable standards and quality would have had no potential for the lengthy reflection and debate which have arisen ….”
The Police Ombudsman spurned repeated opportunities to make the concessions ultimately afforded, from the pre-action stage onwards. The conclusion that Mr Hawthorne is entitled to recover his costs in full follows inexorably. The Police Ombudsman’s offer of 50% manifestly fails to engage with the realities.
7) As the summary in [1] above demonstrates, the wider challenge brought by Mr White on behalf of retired police officers generally has similarly succeeded, leaving only for re-litigation the issue specified in [2]. The fact that there will be re-litigation of one further issue which the Court determined in favour of Mr White and his Association cannot operate to displace the general rule that costs follow the event. They are not to be faulted for the postponement of one aspect of the ultimate “event”. Furthermore Mr White and his Association incurred substantial additional costs in successfully resisting the post-judgment recusal application unsuccessfully pursued by the Police Ombudsman. To this must be added the Court’s unreserved criticism of the Ombudsman’s conduct of such application and the proceedings generally. In the alternative this may be viewed through the ‘wasted costs’ prism. The conclusion that Mr White is entitled to recover his costs incurred to date, in full, follows with equal clarity.
8) The Police Ombudsman’s retreat from his initial position (offering 50% of Mr Hawthorne’s costs) to a later position (suggesting deferral of all cost issues) may be considered symptomatic of many of the shortcomings which have characterised the Ombudsman’s conduct of these proceedings, dating from the filing of wholly inappropriate affidavits at a much earlier stage. Furthermore, the Court is bound to deprecate the attempted imposition of a condition that Mr Hawthorne receive 50% (only) of his costs in return for withdrawing from these proceedings. The Court considers this attempt to thwart Mr Hawthorne’s constitutional right of access to the court quite improper.
9) This Court is better equipped and positioned to make a fully informed judgment of all of the complex and multi-layered issues bearing on the resolution of the parties’ costs dispute than any other Court could conceivably be at some unspecified future date. The Ombudsman’s belated deferral suggestion is therefore rejected. Finally, the resolution of all costs incurred to date at this stage is manifestly in furtherance of the overriding objective.
10) To summarise, the Police Ombudsman will pay all of both Applicants’ reasonable legal costs and outlays incurred to date, to be taxed in default of agreement.
11) There will be a relisting before an appropriately constituted Court on 23/24 April 2018 for the purpose of re-examining this Court’s conclusions relating to the content and scope of the Police Ombudsman’s statutory powers in [70] – [103] of its judgment and the related conclusion in [118].
Declaration
12) It is hereby declared that the Police Ombudsman’s Loughinisland Murders “Public Statement” (the ‘Report’) is unlawful in all of the following respects, as cross-referenced to the corresponding passages in the judgment of the Court delivered on 22 December 2017:
(a) The first Applicant, Mr Hawthorne, is readily identifiable in the Report as the person to whom various criticisms and negative findings relating to the storage and disposal of the suspected murder vehicle and the simultaneous loss of an interior exhibit apply: see [67].
(b) Mr Hawthorne is vindicated unreservedly of any accusation, finding or determination of catastrophic failures in the original police investigation or collusion: [67] – [68].
(c) The Report fell short of acceptable standards and quality and was thus antithetical to the statutory purposes: [68] – [69].
(d) In consequence of these failings on the part of the Police Ombudsman Mr Hawthorne has suffered unjustified severe public criticism: [118].
(e) The Police Ombudsman’s portrayal of Mr Hawthorne’s response to the inadequate disclosure made to him before publication of the report was inadequate and inaccurate: [110].
(f) The Report’s “determination” that Mr Hawthorne was guilty of an “act of negligence” vis-à-vis the storage and disposal of the suspected murder vehicle and the loss of an interior exhibit are unlawful, being in breach of the legal requirements of procedural fairness.
(g) Mr Hawthorne’s status at all stages of the Ombudsman’s Loughinisland investigation was that of mere “witness”: [110].
(h) The Police Ombudsman failed to take proper investigatory steps regarding the matter of which Mr Hawthorne was accused: [109] and [110].
(i) Turning to the broader, representative challenge of the second Applicant, Mr White, certain fundamental requirements of procedural fairness must be observed by the Police Ombudsman in every case where it is proposed to promulgate a “public statement” which is critical of or otherwise adverse to certain persons: [113] – [114].
(j) If and to the extent that any of these requirements was not observed in the compilation of the Report the vitiating factor of procedural unfairness occurred: [114] – [115].
The Court records that the Ombudsman has now [09/03/18] re-promulgated his Loughinisland Report, apparently in accordance with the court’s judgment, as regards [1] above.
Formal Ancillary Provisions
13) These are:
(i) The substantive judgment of the Court delivered on 21 December 2017 takes effect in the manner elaborated in [1] – [4] above.
(ii) There shall be no Order regarding the costs of the interested party, save that same be taxed in accordance with Schedule 2 to the Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981.
(iii) The Applicants’ skeleton argument for the relisted hearing shall be provided by 23 March 2018.
(iv) The Respondent’s replying skeleton argument shall be provided by 30 March 2018 and that of the interested party by 09 April 2018.
(v) The revised version of the Respondent’s Loughinisland Report, intimated in its aforementioned letters, shall be both [1] published and [2] provided to the Applicants’ solicitors and the Court, in the form of a supplementary bundle, by 16 March 2018.
(vi) One fresh set of the extant trial bundles will be provided by the Respondent to the Court by 23 March 2018.
(vii) Confirmation that the authorities’ bundles remain unchanged will be provided to the Court by the same date.
(viii) There will be one final procedural listing at 09.45, 12 April 2018.
Dated this 12 day of March 2018
[200] Paragraph [188] (iii) above must now, self-evidently, be modified, to reflect the terms of the final Order of the Court above. The judgment of the court takes effect to the extent set forth in [199] above.
APPENDIX 1: STATUTORY PROVISIONS
___________________________________
The Police (NI) Act 1998.
Section 51
“(1) 51. - (1) For the purposes of this Part there shall be a Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.
(2) The person for the time being holding the office of Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland shall by that name be a corporation sole.
(3) Schedule 3 shall have effect in relation to the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (in this Part referred to as "the Ombudsman").
(4) The Ombudsman shall exercise his powers under this Part in such manner and to such extent as appears to him to be best calculated to secure-
(a) the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the police complaints system; and
(b) the confidence of the public and of members of the police force in that system.
(5) The Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland is hereby abolished.”
Section 52
“(1) For the purposes of this Part, all complaints about the police force shall either-
(a) be made to the Ombudsman; or
(b) if made to a member of the police force, the Board, the Director or the Department of Justice, be referred immediately to the Ombudsman.
(2) Where a complaint-
(a) is made to the Chief Constable; and
(b) appears to the Chief Constable to be a complaint to which subsection (4) applies,
the Chief Constable shall take such steps as appear to him to be desirable for the purpose of preserving evidence relating to the conduct complained of.
(3) The Ombudsman shall-
(a) record and consider each complaint made or referred to him under subsection (1); and
(b) determine whether it is a complaint to which subsection (4) applies.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), this subsection applies to a complaint about the conduct of a member of the police force which is made by, or on behalf of, a member of the public.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to a complaint in so far as it relates to the direction and control of the police force by the Chief Constable.
(6) Where the Ombudsman determines that a complaint made or referred to him under paragraph (1) is not a complaint to which subsection (4) applies, he shall refer the complaint to the Chief Constable, the Board, the Director or the Department of Justice as he thinks fit and shall notify the complainant accordingly.
(7) A complaint referred under subsection (6) shall be dealt with according to the discretion of the Chief Constable, the Board, the Director or the Department of Justice (as the case may be).
(8) Subject to subsection (9), where the Ombudsman determines that a complaint made or referred to him under subsection (1) is a complaint to which subsection (4) applies, the complaint shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions of this Part; and accordingly references in those provisions to a complaint shall be construed as references to a complaint in relation to which the Ombudsman has made such a determination.
(9) If any conduct to which a complaint wholly or partly relates is or has been the subject of disciplinary or criminal proceedings, none of the following provisions of this Part shall have effect in relation to the complaint in so far as it relates to that conduct.
(10) In the case of a complaint made otherwise than as mentioned in subsection (2)(a), the Chief Constable shall, if so requested by the Ombudsman, take such steps as appear to the Chief Constable to be desirable for the purpose of preserving evidence relating to the conduct complained of.”
Section 53 (in part)
“(1) The Ombudsman shall consider whether the complaint is suitable for informal resolution and may for that purpose make such investigations as he thinks fit.
(2) A complaint is not suitable for informal resolution unless-
(a) the complainant gives his consent; and
(b) it is not a serious complaint.”
Section 54
“(1) If-
(a) it appears to the Ombudsman that a complaint is not suitable for informal resolution; or
(b) a complaint is referred to the Ombudsman under section 53(6),the complaint shall be formally investigated as provided in subsection (2) or (3).
(2) Where the complaint is a serious complaint, the Ombudsman shall formally investigate it in accordance with section 56.
(3) In the case of any other complaint, the Ombudsman may as he thinks fit-
(a) formally investigate the complaint in accordance with section 56; or
(b) refer the complaint to the Chief Constable for formal investigation by a police officer in accordance with section 57.”
Section 56
“(1) Where a complaint or matter is to be formally investigated by the Ombudsman under section 54(2) or (3)(a) or 55(3), (5) or (6), he shall appoint an officer of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation.
(1A) Where an investigation is authorised by virtue of section 85 (read with section 86A) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (investigation of the commission of certain offences by persons acquitted), the Ombudsman shall appoint an officer of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation. [added 21 April 2007]
(2) The Department of Justice may by order provide that any provision of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 which relates to investigation of offences conducted by police officers (within the meaning of that Order) shall apply, subject to such modifications as the order may specify, to investigations under this section conducted by persons who are not police officers (within the meaning of that Order).
(3) A person employed by the Ombudsman under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3 shall for the purpose of conducting, or assisting in the conduct of, an investigation under this section have all the powers and privileges of a constable throughout Northern Ireland and the adjacent United Kingdom territorial waters; and subsection (3) of section 32 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 applies for the purposes of this subsection as it applies for the purposes of subsection (2) of that section.
(4) Section 66 applies to a person to whom subsection (3) applies as it applies to a constable.
(5) A person to whom subsection (3) applies shall not be regarded as in police service for the purposes of-
(a) Article 145 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1995; or
(b) Article 243 of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996.
(6) At the end of an investigation under this section the person appointed to conduct the investigation shall submit a report on the investigation to the Ombudsman.”
Section 58
“(1) The Ombudsman shall consider any report made under section 56(6) or 57(8) and determine whether the report indicates that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force.
(2) If the Ombudsman determines that the report indicates that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force, he shall send a copy of the report to the Director together with such recommendations as appear to the Ombudsman to be appropriate.
(3) Where a report is sent to the Director under subsection (2), the Ombudsman shall, at the request of the Director, ascertain and furnish to the Director all such further information in relation to the complaint or matter dealt with in the report as appears to the Director to be necessary for the discharge of his functions.”
Section 58A
“(1) If the Ombudsman-
(a) determines that a report made under section 56(6) or 57(8) does not indicate that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force, and
(b) considers that the complaint is not a serious one,
he may determine that the complaint is suitable for resolution through mediation.
(2) If he does so, he must inform the complainant and the member of the police force concerned.
(3) If the complainant and the member of the police force concerned agree to attempt to resolve the complaint through mediation, the Ombudsman shall act as mediator.
(4) Anything communicated to the Ombudsman while acting as mediator is not admissible in evidence in any subsequent criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings.
(5) But that does not make inadmissible anything communicated to the Ombudsman if it consists of or includes an admission relating to a matter which does not fall to be resolved through mediation.
(6) If a complaint is resolved through mediation under this section, no further proceedings under this Act shall be taken against the member of the police force concerned in respect of the subject matter of the complaint.”
Section 59
“(1) Subsection (1B) applies if-
(a) the Director decides not to initiate criminal proceedings in relation to the subject matter of a report under section 56(6) or 57(8) sent to him under section 58(2); or
(b) criminal proceedings initiated by the Director in relation to the subject matter of such a report have been concluded.
(1A) Subsection (1B) also applies if the Ombudsman determines that a report under section 56(6) or 57(8) does not indicate that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force and-
(a) he determines that the complaint is not suitable for resolution through mediation under section 58A; or
(b) he determines that the complaint is suitable for resolution through mediation under that section but-
(i) the complainant or the member of the police force concerned does not agree to attempt to resolve it in that way; or
(ii) attempts to resolve the complaint in that way have been unsuccessful.
(1B) The Ombudsman shall consider the question of disciplinary proceedings.
(2) The Ombudsman shall send the appropriate disciplinary authority a memorandum containing-
(a) his recommendation as to whether or not disciplinary proceedings should be brought in respect of the conduct which is the subject of the investigation;
(b) a written statement of his reasons for making that recommendation; and
(c) where he recommends that disciplinary proceedings should be brought, such particulars in relation to the disciplinary proceedings which he recommends as he thinks appropriate.
(2A) In a case mentioned in subsection (1A)(b), the Ombudsman shall, in considering the recommendation to be made in his memorandum, take into account the conduct of the member of the police force concerned in relation to the proposed resolution of the complaint through mediation.
(3) No disciplinary proceedings shall be brought by the appropriate disciplinary authority before it receives the memorandum of the Ombudsman under subsection (2).
(4) The Board shall advise the Ombudsman of what action it has taken in response to a recommendation contained in a memorandum sent to it under subsection (2); and nothing in the following provisions of this section has effect in relation to senior officers.
(5) If-
(a) a memorandum sent to the Chief Constable under subsection (2) contains a recommendation that disciplinary proceedings should be brought; but
(b) the Chief Constable is unwilling to bring such disciplinary proceedings,
the Ombudsman may, after consultation with the Chief Constable, direct him to bring disciplinary proceedings.
(6) Subject to subsection (7)-
(a) it shall be the duty of the Chief Constable to comply with a direction under subsection (5);
(b) the Chief Constable may not discontinue disciplinary proceedings which he has brought in accordance with-
(i) a recommendation contained in a memorandum under subsection (2); or
(ii) a direction under subsection (5).
(7) The Ombudsman may give the Chief Constable leave-
(a) not to bring disciplinary proceedings which subsection (6)(a) would otherwise oblige him to bring; or
(b) to discontinue disciplinary proceedings with which subsection (6)(b) would otherwise require him to proceed.
(8) Regulations made in accordance with section 25(3) or 26(3) may establish, or make provision for the establishment of, a special procedure for any case in which disciplinary proceedings are brought-
(a) where a memorandum under subsection (2) recommending the bringing of those proceedings contains a statement to the effect that, by reason of exceptional circumstances affecting the case, the Ombudsman considers that such special procedures are appropriate; or
(b) in compliance with a direction under subsection (5).
(9) The Chief Constable shall advise the Ombudsman of what action he has taken in response to-
(a) a recommendation contained in a memorandum under subsection (2);
(b) a direction under subsection (5).”
Section 61
“(1) The Ombudsman shall, at the request of the appropriate authority, report to the appropriate authority on such matters relating generally to the functions of the Ombudsman as the appropriate authority may specify, and the Ombudsman may for that purpose carry out research into any such matters.
(2) The Ombudsman may make a report to the appropriate authority on any matters coming to the Ombudsman's attention under this Part to which the Ombudsman considers that the appropriate authority's attention should be drawn in the public interest.
(2A) In subsections (1) and (2) “the appropriate authority” means, in relation to any matter—
(a) the Secretary of State, if the matter relates (in whole or in part other than incidentally) to an excepted matter or reserved matter or to a function conferred or imposed on the Secretary of State by or under a statutory provision;
(b) otherwise, the Department of Justice;
and in paragraph (a) “excepted matter” and “reserved matter” have the meanings given by section 4 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
(3) The Ombudsman shall, not later than 3 months after the end of each financial year, make to the Department of Justice a report on the discharge of the Ombudsman's functions during that year.
(4) The Ombudsman shall-
(a) keep under review the working of this Part; and
(b) at least once every five years, make a report on it to the Department of Justice.
(5) The Ombudsman shall send a copy of any report under this section to-
(a) the Board and the Chief Constable; and
(b) if the report concerns any such body of constables as is mentioned in section 60, to the authority maintaining it and the officer having the direction and control of it; and
(c) if the report concerns the National Crime Agency, to the Agency.
(5A) The Department of Justice shall—
(a) lay before the Northern Ireland Assembly a copy of every report received by the Department under this section; and
(b) cause every such report to be published.
(5B) Section 41(3) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954(c) applies for the purposes of subsection (5A)(a) in relation to the laying of a copy of a report as it applies in relation to the laying of a statutory document under an enactment.
(6) The Secretary of State shall-
(a) lay before both Houses of Parliament a copy of every report received by him under this section; and
(b) cause every such report to be published.”
61A. Reports to Chief Constable and Board. [added from 4 Nov 2001, rep. 2003 c.6 from 8 April 2003]
Supply of information by Ombudsman to Board. [added from 4 Nov 2001]
“61AA. - (1) The Ombudsman shall compile, and supply the Board with, such statistical information as is required to enable the Board to carry out its functions under section 3(3)(c)(i) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000.
(2) The Ombudsman shall consult the Board as to-
(a) the information to be supplied under subsection (1); and
(b) the form in which such information is to be supplied.
(3) The Ombudsman shall supply the Board with any other general information which the Ombudsman considers should be brought to the attention of the Board in connection with its functions under section 3(3)(c)(i) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000.”
Section 62
“The Ombudsman may, in relation to any exercise of his functions under this Part, publish a statement as to his actions, his decisions and determinations and the reasons for his decisions and determinations.”
Section 63
“(1) No information received by a person to whom this subsection applies in connection with any of the functions of the Ombudsman under this Part shall be disclosed by any person who is or has been a person to whom this subsection applies except-
(a) to a person to whom this subsection applies;
(b) to the Department of Justice or the Secretary of State;
(c) to other persons in or in connection with the exercise of any function of the Ombudsman;
(ca) for the purposes of an inspection of the Ombudsman carried out by the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland under Part 3 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002; [added SR (NI) 2002/414 from 20 Dec 2002]
(d) for the purposes of any criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings; or
(e) in the form of a summary or other general statement made by the Ombudsman which-
(i) does not identify the person from whom the information was received; and
(ii) does not, except to such extent as the Ombudsman thinks necessary in the public interest, identify any person to whom the information relates.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to-
(a) the Ombudsman; and
(b) an officer of the Ombudsman.
(2A) [added from 4 Nov 2001, am. 2003 c.6 from 8 April 2003] Subsection (1) does not prevent the Ombudsman, to such extent as he thinks it necessary to do so in the public interest, from disclosing in a report of an investigation under section 60A-
(a) the identity of an individual, or
(b) information from which the identity of an individual may be established.
(3) Any person who discloses information in contravention of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(4) Nothing in subsection (1)(b) permits the disclosure to the Department of Justice of information—
(a) which has been supplied to the Ombudsman under section 66(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000(a) for the purposes of or in connection with an investigation under section 60A of this Act, and
(b) in relation to which the Ombudsman has been informed under section 66(3)(b) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 that the information is, in the opinion of the Chief Constable or the Board, information which ought not to be disclosed on the ground mentioned in section 76A(1)(a) of that Act.”
RUC (Complaints) Regulations 2001
Regulation 5: “Conditions to be met for complaints”.
“Subject to regulations 6 and 10, the requirements for a complaint received under section 52(1) of the 1998 Act to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Part VII of the 1998 Act shall be:
(1) It is made by, or on behalf of, a member of the public;
(2) It is about the conduct of a member which took place not more than 12 months before the date on which the complaint is made or referred to the Ombudsman under section 52(1); and
(3)(a) A statement has not been issued in respect of the disciplinary aspects of an investigation under Article 9(11) of the Order or section 59(2) of the 1998 Act;
(b) the complaint has not been informally resolved in accordance with Article 5 of the Order or section 53 of the 1998 Act;
(c) the complaint has not been withdrawn within the meaning of Regulation 16 of the 1988 Regulations or Regulation 23 of the 2000 Regulations;
(d) the complaint has not been dispensed with under Regulation 17 of the 1988 Regulations or Regulation 25 of the 2000 Regulations;
(e) the complaint has not been otherwise dealt with under regulations made under 64(2)(d) or (e) of the 1998 Act, or
(f) the complaint has not otherwise been investigated by the police.”
Regulation 6: “Exceptions for Certain complaints”.
“(1) Regulation 5(2) shall not apply where the complaint is not the same or substantially the same as a previous complaint or matter and the Ombudsman believes that a member may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner which would justify disciplinary proceedings; and the Ombudsman believes that the complaint should be investigated because of the gravity of the matter or the exceptional circumstances.
(2) Regulation 5(2) and (3) shall not apply where new evidence has come to light which is not evidence which was reasonably available at the time of the original complaint, the Ombudsman believes that a member may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner which would justify disciplinary proceedings, and the Ombudsman believes that the complaint should be investigated because of the gravity of the matter or the exceptional circumstances.
(3) Where the Ombudsman decides that a case falls under Regulation 6(1) or (2), he shall investigate it under section 56 of the 1998 Act.
(4) Where the Ombudsman decides that a complaint meets the criteria in paragraph (1) or (2) except that the case is not grave or exceptional and the Ombudsman believes that the member may have committed a criminal offence then he may investigate it by applying section 54(3) of the 1998 Act.
(5) If any conduct to which a complaint wholly or partly relates is or has been the subject of disciplinary or criminal proceedings, the Ombudsman shall have no powers in relation to the complaint in so far as it relates to that conduct.”
“11.—(1) Where a complaint or other matter relates to conduct by a member which occurred or commenced before 6th November 2000 a charge shall not be regarded as proved unless it is:
(a) admitted by the accused; or
(b) proved by the person presenting the case beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Where a complaint or other matter relates to conduct by a member which occurred or commenced on or after 6th November 2000 the person considering the case shall not find that the conduct of the member concerned failed to meet the appropriate standard unless the conduct is—
(a) admitted by the member concerned; or
(b) proved by the person presenting the case, on the balance of probabilities, to have failed to meet the standard. “
POLICE OMBUDSMAN’S REPORT – APPENDIX 1
___________________________________
Summary of findings in relation to core complaints made by the bereaved families of those murdered at Loughinisland on 18 June 1994
Allegation 1: Police failed to conduct an effective investigation of the Loughinisland murders.
I have articulated within the body of this public statement that police failed to pursue efficiently relevant lines of enquiry; failed to make timely arrests of suspects; failed to consider linked incidents; and failed to develop and implement a coherent forensic strategy.
Allegation 2: Police failed to keep the bereaved families updated as to progress in the investigation of the Loughinisland murders.
Whilst I accept that in 1994 there was no national police policy in place in respect of family liaison, it was widespread policing practice at the time of the Loughinisland murders to keep bereaved families informed as to developments in such an inquiry. This did not happen with the Loughinisland families until some years following the murders.
Allegation 3: Police failed to make an earnest effort to identify the persons responsible for the Loughinisland murders.
This complaint was primarily directed at the initial police investigative response to the attack at Loughinisland. Within this public statement I have described a catastrophic failure in the early stages of the police suspect strategy.
Allegation 4: Police failed to discharge the State’s duties as required by Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), as incorporated by Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act (1998).
I have expressed my opinion on a potential breach of Article 2 ECHR in a previous public statement concerning ‘The events surrounding the bombing and murders at 38 Kildrum Gardens on 21 August 1988’ where the evidence available persuaded me to do so. In that case I concluded that....’police were very aware of the threat of the bomb, its location and their own duty to protect the public and maximise the safety of the police and security staff involved in any response. It is apparent that there was no contingency put in place to protect the public from the bomb, and whilst the responsibility for the murders remains with the bombers, there was a failure by the police to protect the lives of the local community who were in such a real and immediate danger....it is my opinion that police failed in their responsibilities to uphold Mr Dalton’s right to life’. That was an exceptional course to take and one which I may take again in the future. In relation to this matter, I am not convinced that the evidence available allows me to form such an opinion.
Allegation 5: Police colluded with those responsible for the Loughinisland murders.
The bereaved families of those murdered at Loughinisland have articulated a range of issues, which they consider support their complaint of collusion. As articulated in my public statement, ‘many of the individual issues, which I have identified in this report, including the protection of informants through both wilful acts and the passive ‘turning of a blind eye’, catastrophic failures in police investigations and the destruction of records are in themselves evidence of collusion, as defined by Judge Smithwick. When viewed collectively, I have no hesitation in unambiguously determining that ‘collusion’ is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders’.
Allegation 6: Forensic exhibits seized during the initial police investigation were not re-examined until mid-2005 following complaints by the families to the Police Ombudsman.
Although it is evident that the campaign for justice driven by the bereaved families of those murdered at Loughinisland has often been the catalyst for progress in the related police investigation, my investigation revealed that a number of exhibits were re-submitted for specialist forensic examination during 1999. Between 2001 and 2004 a period of forensic consultation took place where specialist advisors provided guidance on the best potential to secure forensic evidence in light of new and emerging techniques. A number of exhibits were submitted for re-examination utilising specialist techniques. I am satisfied that this was not as a result of complaints made by the families to my Office.
Allegation 7: A major exhibit in the Loughinisland murder inquiry, the Triumph Acclaim car used by the offenders was ‘wilfully destroyed’ some ten months after the attack and the destruction was authorised by a senior police officer, who may be related to individuals implicated in the attack.
My public statement outlines the investigation undertaken by my Office to establish the circumstances in which the car was disposed of by police some ten months after the murders at Loughinisland occurred. I have established that the officer responsible for the station yard at Saintfield Police Station sought authority to have the vehicle removed and scrapped. This authority was granted by a senior police officer in charge of the police station and who I am satisfied is not related to individuals suspected of having been responsible for the attack. Both of these officers stated that they believed that the SIO had authorised the destruction. There is no evidence, however, to corroborate these decisions, which I have determined to have been an act of negligence.
Whether or not subsequent examination of the car might have yielded further forensic opportunities which, given the conditions in which it had been retained, appears unlikely, the car should not have been destroyed without proper consideration by the SIO in consultation with his forensic advisers. Whilst I have not found evidence of a sinister motive behind the destruction of the vehicle, I have identified negligence associated with its disposal.
Allegation 8: On 26 July 2005 the bereaved families met with a senior police officer of the PSNI who in addressing resourcing pressures for the police investigation of the Loughinisland murders referred to the loss of numerous experienced detectives due to early retirements under the Patten policing reforms. The families considered these comments to be insensitive.
My investigation spoke with the senior officer concerned who stated that in attempting to explain his difficulties in resourcing major crime inquiries in an open and transparent manner, he had made reference to the loss of experienced detectives but not intended his remarks to be insensitive. There is, however, no doubt that many of the bereaved families were affronted by the suggestion that the PSNI’s investigation of the Loughinisland murders was being adversely impacted by early retirements.
Allegation 9: In July 2005 the PSNI’s SIO of the Loughinisland murders investigation indicated to bereaved families that forensic evidence had been obtained and that an arrest was imminent. However, the arrest of the individual concerned was not made for some three years.
My investigation has established that police encountered difficulties in locating the suspect involved due to his itinerant lifestyle and that ultimately he was arrested outside Northern Ireland. He was interviewed at length and a file of evidence considered by the Director of Public Prosecutions but no prosecution was directed. I am satisfied that the police have accounted for the three year delay in this arrest.
Allegation 10: Vehicle Checkpoints (VCPs) established by police shortly after the attack at Loughinisland were strategically placed to allow those responsible for the murders access to and from the Heights Bar.
Security Forces responded promptly to the initial report of the Heights Bar attack, establishing VCPs in accordance with an established operational contingency plan. Both RUC and military units were involved, the latter self-deploying to VCPs and patrols. Having considered the timings, potential routes and distances involved, I believe it entirely plausible that those responsible for the murders could have travelled beyond the position of VCPs by the time they were established.
Allegation 11: Police delayed tasking deployment of a military helicopter to search for those responsible for the Loughinisland attack and the vehicle they used to flee the murder scene and once deployed the helicopter only remained in the area for one hour and eighteen minutes.
My investigation has not examined the conduct of any parties other than members of the RUC and PSNI. I have, however, established that a helicopter was requested, tasked and deployed by the military, who on the night of the Loughinisland murders had access to police communications which was not unusual. Whilst there is no existing record of the flight plan undertaken by the military helicopter my enquiries have not identified any anomalies or irregularities in the timings of either the deployment or flying time of the helicopter involved.
Allegation 12: Police failed to properly investigate an anonymous letter that was forwarded to a local councillor concerning the Loughinisland murders and failed to make a timely arrest of the alleged author of the letter following their identification.
I am satisfied that police involved in the Loughinisland investigation failed to exploit the evidential opportunities presented by the anonymous information they received and as a result may well have lost another significant opportunity to bring those responsible for the attack before the courts.
APPLICANTS’ SCHEDULE & RESPONDENT’S RESPONSE
[SEE PARAGRAPHS [ 50 ] – [ 69 ] OF THE JUDGMENT]
___________________________________
|
Note on Matters Affecting Mr White |
OPONI COMMENT |
Paragraph |
Text |
|
Exec Summary, p2 |
The failure by the police to recognise the risks posed by the UVF unit in South Down gives cause for concern. Had this unit been subject to sustained and robust investigation for the previous murders they may have been arrested and brought to justice and may not have been involved in the Loughinisland attack, for which they were suspected. Whether the attack would then have been carried out by another group of individuals will never be known. |
CID/SB responsibility (see Mr Hawthorne letter of 04.05.16 ‘…CID, even at a local level, had their own command and control structure, totally removed from me as the operational commander.’) |
Exec Summary, p4 |
My conclusion is that the initial investigation into the murders at Loughinisland was characterised in too many instances by incompetence, indifference and neglect. This despite the assertions by the police that no stone would be left unturned to find the killers. My review of the police investigation has revealed significant failures in relation to the handling of suspects, exhibits, forensic strategy, crime scene management, house to house enquiries and investigative maintenance. |
CID responsibility (see Mr Hawthorne letter of 02.09.09 ‘… I had no involvement in the nature or direction of the CID inquiry.’) |
Exec Summary, p 5 |
Throughout my investigation I have identified evidence of the destruction of important police documents such as records relating to the arms importation in late 1987/early 1988 and case-specific material such as forensic exhibits seized as part of the pre-cursor incidents and the Loughinisland murders. In addition, an important evidential opportunity was lost by the handling of the car used in the killings. |
No allegation that Mr Hawthorne was involved in any way in this. Events regarding arms importation outside his division. |
Exec Summary, p 7 |
Many of the issues I have identified in this report, including the protection of informants through both wilful acts and the passive ‘turning a blind eye’; catastrophic failures in the police investigation; and destruction of exhibits and documents are in themselves evidence of collusion as defined by Judge Smithwick. When viewed collectively I have no hesitation in unambiguously determining that collusion is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders. |
This is a “corporate” finding. |
5.4 |
During the years preceding the murders at Loughinisland, a series of incidents occurred which police should have recognised as the escalating activities of a small but ruthless unit of the UVF operating from within the RUC’s Newcastle Sub-Division. |
Not the Downpatrick sub-division. |
5.5 |
Police investigations and intelligence relating to these incidents should have not only alerted police to the existence of this small group of loyalist terrorists but also informed concerted policing efforts aimed at disrupting activities, which presented a significant risk to the local community. |
Not directed to Mr Hawthorne. Also, different sub-division. |
5.6 |
Whilst my investigation has identified evidence that by mid-1993 a small team of Special Branch officers based at Newcastle Police Station did come to recognise the threat presented by these individuals, it is equally clear that there was little by way of a sustained policing response to their activities. Instead, the focus of police investigations and intelligence gathering within the Newcastle and Downpatrick Sub-Divisions was almost entirely directed towards the IRA. |
There is a reference to intelligence gathering in the Downpatrick sub-division but this was the responsibility of SB officers. |
5.7 |
Whilst recognising the challenges presented to the RUC by republican paramilitaries in South Down during the ‘Troubles’, the failure to properly acknowledge and address the UVF gang within this area, specifically the Newcastle and Downpatrick Sub-Divisions, demonstrated a lack of focus on the loyalist paramilitaries who were operating in the area resulting in heightened risk to members of the local community. |
See above re 5.6 |
5.14 |
The police investigation into the murder of Mr Jack Kielty in 1988 was successful in identifying personalities and associations, including those within and associated with the security forces, within a small, embryonic loyalist paramilitary unit operating mainly in the Newcastle Sub-Division of the RUC’s ‘G’ Division. It also identified their developing relationship with elements of the UVF in Belfast. Police did not, however, fully exploit this information by maintaining an interest in the gang as a result of which it re-emerged a number of years later as a fully functional UVF unit, embarking on a campaign of murder that would ultimately escalate to the Loughinisland atrocity. |
This was in the Newcastle sub-division. Suspects resided and active in Newcastle sub-division. |
5.33 |
The success of Police Officer 3 in confronting this loyalist paramilitary activity in the RUC’s ‘G’ Division (composed of elements from both the UDA and UVF) can be measured in both the convictions he secured and the disruption caused to them in the area. They were largely inactive, certainly in this Division for a number of years. By 1992, however, individuals connected to the UVF, who had come to the attention of Police during the investigation of Mr Kielty’s murder had organised themselves into an operational unit of the UVF at the disposal of a Belfast Commander. Having lost sight of the personalities involved due to their focus on the activities of republican paramilitaries in South Down, police in ‘G’ Division were unaware of this development |
There is some scope for debate about the extent of south Down but the reference here is to the Kielty murder which took place in the Newcastle sub-division. Other incidents occurred in either Belfast or Newcastle sub-Division. |
5.82 |
Accounts of the police officers, who assisted my investigation support the conclusion that the strategic positioning of the RUC in prioritising the policing response to the threat posed by the IRA in South Down was at the expense of disruption and intrusive tactics against the UVF, which its actions in the area warranted. |
See above |
7.20 |
My investigation has concluded that at the outset the police investigation was properly resourced but that the inquiry was quickly scaled down due to other investigative commitments. A senior police officer (Police Officer 18), who assumed responsibility for the Loughinisland Murder Investigation in 2005 expressed the view to my investigators that underresourcing of the inquiry by South Region Command during 1994 had an adverse impact on the investigation. |
The resourcing of the investigation was not Mr Hawthorne’s responsibility (see his letters of 2009 and 2016). |
7.101 |
The vehicle was taken after examination to Saintfield RUC Station, where it was stored in a yard exposed to the elements. |
Mr Hawthorne did make a comment about this in his 2009 and 2016 letters. |
7.113 |
The Triumph Acclaim should not have been stored in a manner which exposed it to the elements and certainly should not have been destroyed without the express permission of Police Officer 8. |
Mr Hawthorne was permitted to comment on this paragraph. |
7.114 |
The forensic examination of this important exhibit was thorough and carried out appropriately. However, the integrity of the exhibit was compromised as I have described. An important exhibit (the yellow twine) was lost. |
This was the negligence issue which as Mr Holmes has averred was not attributable to Mr Hawthorne. |
7.133 |
A review of the HOLMES account by my investigators established that on occasions street indices were marked as complete when a number of addresses had still not been visited and residents interviewed. There is nothing to suggest that follow-up enquiries were conducted at these addresses. This was most noticeable on the Carsonstown Road. House to house enquiries do not appear to have been considered in and around the addresses of those suspects identified during the early stages of the investigation. |
Relates to detectives responsible for the investigation (for which Mr Hawthorne has advised in correspondence he had no responsibility). |
7.137 |
The consequence of this was that potential witnesses may have been missed. There was no record of follow-up visits or letter drops to addresses, where no-one had been at home during initial police visits, indicating a lack of thoroughness on the part of police completing and recording these enquiries. |
See above. |
8.15 |
As covered earlier in this report the liaison between the murder investigation and the survivors and families of the deceased was less than adequate. However, following the Stephen Lawrence murder review the concept of Family Liaison Officers (FLO) was adopted by the police in Northern Ireland in 2001. |
Responsibility rested with SIO/murder investigation. |
9.5 |
I have also concluded that there was a strategic failure by police to identify and implement robust measures to counter the escalating activities of a small unit of the UVF within South Down. I attribute this to: 1. Failures in the policing response to Loyalist Paramilitary activities due to a focus on the IRA as a result of which the activities of the UVF unit in South Down escalated; |
CID/SB responsibility. |
9.6 |
There was an inadequate proactive policing response to the threat, which emerged to the local community in ‘South Region’, as identified by police following the murders of alleged UVF leaders on the Shankill Road on 16 June 1994. |
This would have been reliant on assessments provided by SB. |
9.40 |
Many of the individual issues, which I have identified in this report, including the protection of informants through both wilful acts and passive ‘turning of a blind eye’, catastrophic failures in police investigations and the destruction of records are in themselves evidence of collusion, as defined by Judge Smithwick. When viewed collectively, I have no hesitation in unambiguously determining that ‘collusion’ is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders. |
Directed at murder investigation, use of informants by SB and RUC corporate position (and not Mr Hawthorne). |
Allegation 2, p 147 |
Whilst I accept that in 1994 there was no national police policy in place in respect of family liaison, it was widespread policing practice at the time of the Loughinisland murders to keep bereaved families informed as to developments in such an inquiry. This did not happen with the Loughinisland families until some years following the murders. |
Responsibility rested with SIO/murder investigation |
Allegation 5, p 148 |
The bereaved families of those murdered at Loughinisland have articulated a range of issues, which they consider support their complaint of collusion. As articulated in my public statement, ‘many of the individual issues, which I have identified in this report, including the protection of informants through both wilful acts and the passive ‘turning of a blind eye’, catastrophic failures in police investigations and the destruction of records are in themselves evidence of collusion, as defined by Judge Smithwick. When viewed collectively, I have no hesitation in unambiguously determining that ‘collusion’ is a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders’ |
Directed at murder investigation, use of informants by SB and RUC corporate position (and not Mr Hawthorne). |
Allegation 7, p 149 |
My public statement outlines the investigation undertaken by my Office to establish the circumstances in which the car was disposed of by police some ten months after the murders at Loughinisland occurred. I have established that the officer responsible for the station yard at Saintfield Police Station sought authority to have the vehicle removed and scrapped. This authority was granted by a senior police officer in charge of the police station and who I am satisfied is not related to individuals suspected of having been responsible for the attack. Both of these officers stated that they believed that the SIO had authorised the destruction. There is no evidence, however, to corroborate these decisions, which I have determined to have been an act of negligence. Whether or not subsequent examination of the car might have yielded further forensic opportunities which, given the conditions in which it had been retained, appears unlikely, the car should not have been destroyed without proper consideration by the SIO in consultation with his forensic advisers. Whilst I have not found evidence of a sinister motive behind the destruction of the vehicle, I have identified negligence associated with its disposal. |
Mr Hawthorne was permitted to comment on the related paragraphs which resulted in changes being made upon consideration. |
Allegation 12 |
I am satisfied that police involved in the Loughinisland investigation failed to exploit the evidential opportunities presented by the anonymous information they received and as a result may well have lost another significant opportunity to bring those responsible for the attack before the courts. |
CID responsibility (see Mr Hawthorne letter of 02.09.09) |