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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Arrowsmith v. Nottingham Trent University [2010] UKEAT 1708_09_1207 (12 July 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2010/1708_09_1207.html Cite as: [2010] UKEAT 1708_9_1207, [2010] UKEAT 1708_09_1207 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC
(SITTING ALONE)
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
RULE 3(10) APPLICATION - APPELLANT ONLY
For the Appellant | MS D M ARROWSMITH (The Appellant in Person) |
SUMMARY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Review
Appellate jurisdiction/reasons/Burns-Barke
The Employment Tribunal did not err in refusing at a review hearing to vary its decision. The new evidence would not have an effect on the decision. Observation in Meteor Parking applied: the Employment Tribunal is the better place for such issues to be determined.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC
Introduction
"The Appellant, an agency worker, complained to the Employment Tribunal that she had not been appointed to the BDO post for which she had applied because she was pregnant. The interview took place on 7 August 2008. The critical factual question for the Employment Tribunal was whether 2 members of the interviewing panel (or either of them) knew that the Appellant was pregnant at that time.
Having heard the evidence on both sides the Employment Tribunal accepted the denial of knowledge by both panel members, Ms Holstein and Dr Albery (both female).
In arriving at that factual conclusion the Employment Tribunal carefully analysed the conflicting evidence at para 4 of their Reasons.
The grounds of appeal barely assert that such a conclusion was perverse – a judgment no reasonable tribunal could reach. Apart from its lack of specificity that contention is wholly unsustainable as a matter of law. There was evidence to support a conclusion either way as to the relevant knowledge. Neither conclusion could be termed perverse.
In short, the Appellant lost on the facts. No point of law arises in this appeal."
"Now the Appellant appeals the review decision and, I infer, the costs order. The sole ground of appeal is that the review judgment was legally perverse. No particulars are given. An appeal so framed cannot possibly succeed."
"The Appellant's fresh grounds of appeal (letter lodged on 6 April with attached bundle) disclose no arguable point of law. I reach that conclusion, not on the basis of lack of 'legal' drafting, but because at the heart of the proposed appeal (which is against the review, not substantive decision of the Employment Tribunal) Appellant merely asserts that on the crucial factual question of knowledge her case might have been preferred to the evidence of the Respondent's witnesses. That question of fact was for the ET; not the EAT."
The legislation
The Claimant's case
Conclusions
Appeal
"All courts are familiar with the litigant, often an unrepresentated litigant, who will never take no for an answer, however unpromising his/her cause. Under the new appeals regime, however, such litigants must appreciate that the general rule will be that the decision of the appeal court on the first appeal will be the final decision. If they wish to pursue the matter further and to incur the often quite heavy costs involved in paying the court fee and preparing the appeal papers, the Court of Appeal may dismiss their application quite shortly, saying that the appeal raised is no important point of principle or practice and there is no other compelling reason for the court to hear the appeal."
"I feel that like many highly intelligent non-lawyers, the applicant puts a great deal of faith in detail and in complexity. This is actually a quite simple case."